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Abstract 
 
In this thesis I argue that what we tend to see in contemporary accounts of human service 
practice in the relevant literature is a ‘common-sense’ informed by a complex mix of 
neoliberal political and policy imperatives and various kinds of technical-rational styles of 
administration and management. These accounts of practice can inadvertently contribute to 
the problems they are meant to address and can do more harm than good. Common-sense 
accounts of practice also align with how human services are typically regulated and they 
align with prevailing ways the education of human services takes place, including in 
universities. Consequently, the same types of problems that take place with human service 
practice also take place with the institutionalisation and reproduction of human services. If 
we are serious about achieving good practice in human services, then we need to think more 
clearly about what practice in human services is.  
 
There is a good case for articulating a theory of human service practice to inspire new and 
better ways of achieving good practice. The theory of good practice outlined here draws on 
the philosophy of Aristotle and neo-Aristotelian accounts of practice. It draws especially on 
Dunne who argues that a theory of practice should offer a defensible account of how we 
should conceptualise the stuff that human services deal with, and the sorts of knowing, action 
and ends that best accord with such conceptualisations.  
 
I argue that the beings at the centre of human services should be understood as complex, 
emergent, unpredictable, and ‘wicked’ in the sense that Rittel and Webber talk about. This 
highlights the possibility that the people, problems and practices of human services can be 
revealed in multiple and contrary ways. Accordingly, human services hold both promises and 
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dangers for people and good practice is far from self-evident and is highly contestable in each 
individual case.  
 
I argue that phronesis (practical wisdom) is the way of knowing that best corresponds to and 
is most suited to deal with the uncertain, messy, contingent and context-dependent beings of 
human services, which require and deserve ongoing deliberations and good determinations on 
each occasion that are at the same time always tentative and remain open to other suggestions 
and modification especially because our knowledge may be erroneous and incomplete. I 
argue that good practice also requires reflexivity and value rationality to help identify and 
alleviate the problems associated with neoliberal approaches to practice and as an alternative 
to technical rationality and value neutrality.  
 
I make the case for praxis (good action) along with a range of other human activities 
including value-rational deliberation as the forms of action that best align with and are most 
appropriate for dealing with the ever-changing, often inexplicable and always difficult beings 
of human services. Praxis is in accordance with phronesis and can be understood in part as 
durable practice and in part as responding to each case in new ways. In particular, it involves 
figuring out and enacting the most desirable course of action in each instance of practice 
while at the same time remaining receptive to other possibilities and to doing things 
differently particularly because we might not always be immediately aware of what we are 
doing, and our actions could be doing more harm than good.  
 
I show that clarity about our telos will help to re-orient human services to pursuing preferred 
ends and securing goods that are better suited to the entities of human services compared to 
instrumentally designed relations between widely applicable and transferable techniques and 
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pre-determined outcomes. I argue for the telos of youth work to be enabling young people to 
live the good life. Following my accounts of phronesis and praxis this orientation of human 
services towards more desirable and ethical purposes takes the form of a commitment that is 
always carefully reconsidered at the same time as determinedly pursued. However, unlike 
outputs that can be wholly predetermined, efficiently sought after and completely achieved, 
this is an end that is never fully attained. This is especially the case because there is always 
more that can be known and done and because there are always disagreements on the goods 
to be secured.  
 
This theory of practice should correspond to and supports the education of people for 
professional practice. In particular, the education of human services needs to reproduce how 
the beings of human services are to be conceptualised and the ways of knowing, forms of 
action and ends that cohere. At the same time, university-based human service education 
should support the development, exercise and experience of good practice-as-praxis guided 
by phronesis.  
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Introduction 
 
Currently I work as a lecturer in a human service program at a large Australian university. 
Part of my role is teaching. Before taking up this position I had a number of youth, disability, 
and family work jobs over many years. Whilst doing direct service delivery I was constantly 
trying to do the right thing, which was often a struggle in light of the complex and perplexing 
nature of the work. I find I am in the similar situation now when it comes to teaching. 
 
To help work out the best thing to do I searched for answers. What I typically found were 
theories to be applied, instruments to be used, and instructions to be followed. In other words, 
doing caring work and teaching well generally meant learning about and correctly 
implementing other people’s explanations and courses of action. However, I came to 
appreciate that while empirically tested methods, expert prescriptions, and technically derived 
solutions provided some useful ideas they were never enough to achieve good practice. 
 
I realised something else was required to practice well. Yet this ‘thing’ I intuitively knew I 
needed to do good practice always seemed to escape words. The fact that it was not 
something talked about in the education and practice realms I was involved with did not help. 
 
There are good reasons to examine how we should conceive good practice in ‘people 
professions’ such as child, youth, family, disability and aged-care work (Bondi, Carr, Clark 
and Clegg, 2011). First and most obvious it is difficult to achieve good practice if we do not 
know what good practice is. Green (2009, p. 1) was right to argue professional practice, ‘…is 
still in need of clarification and elaboration, as is indeed the concept of practice itself’.  
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At the moment there is not a clear defensible conception of good practice in human services. 
As we approach the third decade of the twenty-first century, human service occupations 
including social work, youth work, counselling, drug and alcohol work, child protection and 
youth justice, family services, housing and aged care, and disability care continue to play a 
significant, even expanding role in the lives of many Australians. According to official 
reports, human services categorised as part of Australia’s health care and social assistance 
industry, is now Australia’s largest employing industry (Australian Government Department 
of Jobs and Small Business, 2018). This ‘industry’ experienced the largest growth in new 
jobs over the five years to February 2018 and is expected to continue contributing the largest 
number of new jobs over the five years to May 2022 (Australian Government Department of 
Jobs and Small Business, 2018). The expanding supply of jobs in the industry is matched by 
reports of growing demands for community services (Community Services and Health 
Industry Skills Council, 2015). The importance of this sector is also signified by persistent 
attempts by Australian governments to urge the expansion of market-based mechanisms in 
human services if they have not already been transformed by inclusion in a ‘free market’, or 
by exposure to the New Public Management (NPM) rationalization project that has its origins 
in the 1970s (Pusey, 1991; Bessant, 1997; Bessant and Emslie, 1997, 1996; Jamrozik, 2009; 
Productivity Commission, 2017).  
 
Persistent advocacy by Australia’s Productivity Commission (2017) for the ‘marketisation’ of 
human services helps to illuminate some of the ways human service practice is typically 
spoken about in Australia in our time. According to the Productivity Commission (2017, p. 3-
6) ‘user choice’ should be ‘at the heart of human service delivery’, and ‘the principles of 
‘informed user choice, competition and contestability’ should be applied to the provision of 
human services to ‘improve outcomes for service users and the community’. A recent report 
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by the Victorian Council of Social Services (VCOSS) (2018) the peak community sector 
organisation echoed the ways the Productivity Commission spoke of human service practice 
with talk of ‘person-centred services’, ‘flexible, person-centred funding models’, and 
‘strengthening outcomes’. VCOSS (2018) added to the ways practice is often understood in 
their list of ‘ten key priority focus areas’ for community services industry planning that 
included being ‘place-based’, technologically innovative, and ‘evidence-informed’. The ways 
VCOSS (2018) spoke about human service practice was legitimized by reference to an 
‘evidence-based’ report generated by a university-affiliated Future Social Service Institute 
(FSSI) (2018), and VCOSS (2018) and FSSI (2018) were preceded by a report co-authored 
by the Victorian Government (Human Services & Health Partnership Implementation 
Committee (HSHPIC), 2017). One striking feature of these three reports is that the same ten 
priority areas and terms were used to talk about human service practice in all of them, 
including: ‘emphasising person-centred services’, ‘emphasising place-based systems and 
services’, ‘a focus on strengthening outcomes’, ‘a focus on embedding evidence-based 
approaches’, ‘funding to support flexible, person-centred service delivery’ and making the 
most of ‘new information sharing provision and digital technologies’ (HSHPIC, 2017).  
 
These ways of talking about human service practice have a lot in common with the ways 
practice had been talked about in a previous account by VCOSS (2014) that also listed ten 
‘principles’ for community services reform and included references to ‘provider choice’, 
‘citizen control’, and ‘achieving best outcomes for clients’. And like the HSHPIC (2017), 
FSSI (2018) and VCOSS (2018), VCOSS (2014) claimed it is was interested in community 
sector planning and reform. However, a report that preceded and subsequently shaped what 
was written in VCOSS (2014) was most revealing of the sort of rationality that informed how 
practice in human services was spoken about in VCOSS (2014). Peter Shergold (2013) led 
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the 2012-2014 Victorian Service Sector Reform Project, which kick started the process with 
an ‘Ideas Paper’. According to Shergold (2013, p. 9):    
‘[The] conversation-starter Ideas Paper issued in December 2012 suggested that the 
greater productivity savings would be gained from:…early intervention…integrated 
services…place-based solutions…flexibility of services…’.  
 
What this ‘suggestion’ in the ‘Ideas Paper’ revealed was that the idea of ‘greater productivity 
savings’ was critical to how human service practice was spoken about. Whether the ways the 
Productivity Commission (2017) talked about human service practice was influenced by the 
promise of productivity savings should be self-evident - improving ‘efficiencies’ has long 
been central to the Productivity Commission’s work. The HSHPIC (2017) acknowledged the 
social and economic benefits of community services in their account of human service 
practice, while making sure to emphasise potential economic returns.  
‘Welfare or community services are often perceived as a cost to society, rather than a 
major and growing employer that has diversified revenue contributing billions to the 
Victorian and Australian economies’ (HSHPIC, 2017, p. 18).  
 
With all of this talk about ‘productivity savings’, ‘social and economic contributions’, 
‘increasing person-centeredness’, ‘user-choice’ and ‘measuring and demonstrating outcomes’ 
there does not appear to have been much thought given to whether this is how we should be 
talking about practice in human services. Thinking about this might help to examine what if 
anything these rationalities, initiatives and schemes have to do with good practice. That there 
was little if any difference between the ways human service practice was spoken about by 
groups including a State government, an ‘independent’ research and advisory body, a 
university-affiliated institute, and a social service sector peak organisation is also puzzling. 
8 
 
Are these the only ways we can and should think about practice in human services? Could it 
be that these ways of talking about practice are both limited and limiting especially if we are 
interested in understanding what good practice is and then doing it?  
 
This sets the scene for the investigation I undertake in this thesis into good practice in human 
services with a special focus on youth work.  
 
 
Research questions 
 
In this thesis I engage with and investigate one large question: how can good practice in 
human service work be understood and achieved? Analytically and conceptually this involves 
asking a series of subordinate questions in a certain order. These questions include: 
• What are some of the ways good practice in youth and community work is currently 
understood and are there problems with these accounts?  
• How are human beings typically conceptualised in the human services are there problems 
with this?  
• What, if any effect, has there been on human service practice working in a society and a 
polity reshaped by neoliberal forms of government and neoliberal policies?  
• How might human service practice be rethought when thinking about ways of knowing 
and doing?  
• Are there problems in the education of human services, and what sort of education is 
needed if we are to elucidate the qualities of good practice and orient professional 
practice to a warrantable conception of good practice?  
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Rationale  
 
There are a number of good reasons to address these questions. While I will elaborate on 
these reasons in the chapters that follow, a relatively brief summary of these problems points 
to at least five key considerations warranting this thesis.  
 
Firstly, and a key practical justification for asking these questions, is the widespread evidence 
of bad practice in human services and reports that point to a loss of confidence in the human 
service professions. For example, Bessant, Hil and Watts (2016) reported on the decades of 
systemic and repeated abuse and neglect of children and young people at the hands of carers 
in many western nations, and official government inquiries in many countries have exposed 
systematic and widespread institutional mistreatment of children and young people. Gambrill 
(2013, p. 191) similarly reported, ‘The history of the helping professions shows that common 
practices thought to help people were found to harm them’. Schön (1983, pp. 4, 9-11) and 
Schwartz and Sharpe (2010) are among others who have articulated ‘a crisis of confidence 
and legitimacy’ in the professions characterised by ‘failures of professional action’, ‘well-
publicized scandals’, and ‘a loss of faith in professional judgment’. This research points to 
the possibility that human service practice can be detrimental to human well-being.  
 
Secondly and this is a related observation there are significant problems with the way 
governments, policy-makers, peak bodies and some academic research now thinks about and 
talks about practice and good practice in the human services.1 One form this can take is a 
                                               
1 There are significant challenges in defining and demarcating human services. Understanding what and how 
many services are within the broad field referred to as human services is far from straightforward. For example, 
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failure to think about whether common ways practice is spoken about actually is good 
practice. This problem is evident when we look across the breadth and depth of contemporary 
human service literature. In particular, what we tend to see in this literature are ‘common-
sense’ accounts of practice that conceive good practice as fairly simple, straightforward and 
uncomplicated and that do not ask whether there are problems, errors, puzzles (aporia) or 
gaps in such accounts. Such accounts include ideas that suggest human service practice 
should be referred to as ‘person-centred’, ‘place-based’, and should be ‘focused on 
outcomes’, and be ‘evidence-based’. It also includes claims that all good practice requires is 
‘quality relationships’, ‘empowering service users’, acting on ‘service-user’ feedback, ‘client’ 
participation and involvement, putting service user’s interest first, early intervention, 
following rules, engaging young people in education and training, and enhancing service 
                                               
it is unclear whether the terms used in the literature to describe this broad field refer to the same things, and 
these terms include caring work, social services, youth and community work, social care, charities, welfare and 
social work, helping and people professions, and social intervention work. Similar problems are faced within the 
many subfields of human services that include drug and alcohol work, mental health services, housing and aged 
care, children and family services, family violence services, disability care, children protection, youth justice 
and residential care, and so on and so forth. Simply trying to identify which ‘professions’ or ‘occupations’ 
belong in these categories, not to mention whether human services should be conceptualised as a series of 
professions, sectors, industries, vocations or something else, presents a range of questions and complications. 
These problems are evident in literature that tries to define and map the human services sector where we can 
witness a wide disparity among accounts (e.g., Australian Community Workers Association, 2012; Australian 
Council of Social Services, 2014; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2017; Australian Youth Affairs 
Coalition, 2013a, 2013b; Ghoorah, 2018; Healy and Lonne, 2010; International Federation of Social Workers, 
2014; Lyons, 1993; 2001; Martin and Healy, 2010; Powell, Cortis, Ramia and Marjolin, 2017; Productivity 
Commission, 2010; Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2014). In this thesis I 
use the term human services to broadly encompass the aforementioned terms and subfields. This thesis is an 
attempt to define and demarcate human services with a focus on youth work.  
11 
 
integration and partnerships between ‘stakeholders’. There is a tendency to too readily accept 
and promote these accounts of human service practice as good practice without adequate 
thought and criticism (European Commission, 2015; Malley and Fernández, 2010; Morton 
and Montgomery, 2011; Muir and Bennett, 2014; OECD, 2012; Seivwright, Flatau, Adams 
and Stokes, 2016). If this is the only way we can think about practice in such limited and 
limiting ways, then, as I will argue in this thesis, we confront a serious problem. This warrant 
thinking about whether these ‘common-sense’ accounts of practice can be treated as 
exemplars of good practice and whether we need to think about other and possibly better 
ways of understanding good practice (Seal and Frost, 2014).  
 
This thought is especially important given the limited and limiting ways that people and 
human practices are understood and represented in ‘common-sense’ accounts of human 
service practice and the related failure of reflexivity to notice this let alone do anything about 
this. The apparently ‘simple’ and ‘straightforward’ ways practice is spoken about can have 
the effect of distorting and dehumanising people by imaging and revealing them in one-
dimensional, unambiguous, calculable and orderable ways that often align with neoliberal 
inspired and technical approaches to practice, or what Smeeton (2017) recently characterised 
as neoliberal technical approaches to practice.2 For example, young people can be constituted 
in particular ways to justify interventions into their lives that may not serve their best 
interests and that might inadvertently and paradoxically contribute to the problems they claim 
to address. At the same time these ways of knowing people can erase other and more 
complex ways of ‘knowing’ or understanding human beings. There are criticisms and 
recognition of the dangers of human service practice that is informed by and supports a 
                                               
2 Rabinow and Sullivan (1987, p. 29) note that Habermas and Jameson have pointed to the increasing economic 
and administrative integration of late capitalist society, which is suggested by the phrase ‘neoliberal technical’.  
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complex mix of neoliberal political and policy imperatives and various kinds of technical 
rational styles of administration and management. This includes deleterious subjectification 
effects, and detrimental, determinative and restrictive regulative effects on workers and 
practice (Banks, 2011; Bessant, 2004a, 2003a; Bradford, 2000; Bradford and Cullen, 2014; 
Connell, Fawcett and Meagher, 2009; Cooper, Gormally and Hughes, 2015; de St Croix, 
2018, 2016; Duffy, 2017; Gray et al., 2015; Green, 2011; Healy, 2009; Jones, 2014; 
Lohmeyer, 2017; Magnuson, 2014; McDonald, 2006; Nicholls, 2012; Pease and Nipperess, 
2016; Penna and O’Brien, 2012; Rōgowski, 2011; Sawyer, Green, Moran and Brett, 2009; 
Sercombe, 2015; Skott-Myhre and Skott-Myhre, 2018; Taylor et al., 2018; Wallace and 
Pease, 2011). However, what is missing is a well-thought out and defensible account of how 
we should think about the stuff, i.e., the people and problems, of human service work, and 
how these conceptualisations are interdependent with how practice is understood.  
 
To put this another way, a third reason for engaging with the questions addressed here is the 
difficulty that the human services as a field of theory and practice has had in thinking about 
what is to be a human being and how best to understand those characteristic ways of acting 
that we treat as human. This problem is entangled with the common-sense accounts of 
practice just mentioned. The basic difficulty is that while many philosophers have thought 
long and hard about how ‘human being’ and ‘human activity’ should be understood 
throughout Western history this exercise seems to have gone missing in common sense 
accounts of human service practice. The failure to explore fundamental philosophical 
questions to do with how we understand good human service practice go to questions about 
the defining features of the human and involves us thinking about who or what we are. This is 
a significant oversight in light of the centrality of examining what it means to be a human 
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being for what is typically referred to as the Western philosophical tradition (Arendt, 1958; 
Berti, 2014; Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Mansfield, 2000; Taylor, 1989).  
 
There are two traditions of thought which might provide the resources to overcome this 
absence. On the one hand there is a vast literature associated with the dominant Anglo-
American ‘analytic’ philosophy of action, grounded in causal theories of instrumental 
rationality, methodological individualism, and utility-maximisation and eschewing what its 
proponents dismiss as ‘metaphysics’ (e.g. Anscombe 2000; Davidson 1980; Searle, 1983; 
Setiya 2003; Schroder 2009; von Wright, 1971).3 On the other there is a body of work almost 
as large that is typically associated with what is referred to as the continental mode, school or 
tradition of philosophizing that has criticised the fundamental assumptions and arguments 
central to this analytic tradition (Ansell-Pearson and Schrift, 2014). And key figures of this 
tradition like Heidegger (1962), Arendt (1958), Bakhtin (1993) and Levinas (Critchley, 
Peperzak and Bernasconi, 1996) have drawn on resources found deep in the history of 
western philosophy to develop important insights into what it is to be human. As will become 
clear it is this later tradition that I have drawn on here. As Richard Bernstein (1971, p. 320) 
has insisted: 
‘The ancient and modern questions of what is the nature of man [sic] and his [sic] 
activity and what ought to be the directions pursued in this activity are once again 
being reaffirmed as the primary issues for reflective men [sic].’ 
 
                                               
3 As Beaney (2013, p. 1) notes; ‘Over the course of the twentieth century analytic philosophy developed into the 
dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world, and it is now steadily growing in the non-
English-speaking world. Originating in the work of Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein, it has now 
ramified into all areas of philosophy, diversifying in its methodology, ideas, and positions’.  
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If we attend to the Anglo-American philosophy of action first, we see that it is grounded in a 
tradition of inquiry involving knowledge practices and typologies of human activity that were 
promoted originally in the course of the ‘scientific revolution’ of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries that made both the Enlightenment and the advance of modern science 
and technology possible. Modern science emerged in the seventeenth century as an 
alternative to older ways of thinking about, revealing and knowing the world that preceded it. 
Broadly speaking, scientific enlightenment and humanism replaced religious authority, 
scholasticism, and centuries of superstition that was indebted to Plato and Aristotle and that 
restricted doubt, critical thinking and free thought. Spurred on by key Enlightenment thinkers 
including Bacon to Descartes to Hobbes to Locke to Kant to Condorcet and beyond the 
human subject was liberated and no longer did people have to conform to tradition, dogma, 
gods or a god for understanding and explanation. Human or subject-centred reason replaced 
doctrine as the foundation of truth.  
 
In this way we entered the period often broadly called ‘modernity’. Less than 100 years after 
Copernicus (1995/1543) displaced the Earth as the centre of the universe Descartes 
(2009/1637) established human beings as the source of certain knowledge, albeit at the cost 
of setting loose the modern mind-body problem. Subsequently, Kant (2007/1787) entrenched 
the knowing subject’s mind in that central and fundamental place. We were absorbed in what 
Richard Rorty (1979, pp. 5-6) called the ‘Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian tradition’. It is a 
tradition that has produced a model of knowledge as a science reliant on processes like 
reductionism, and premises like subject/object dualism, and determinism (see Lee 2010a; 
2010b; 2010c). The problem is that this long-dominant scientific and technological way of 
knowing and doing is now entangled with how practice and good practice in human services 
are conceived and understood. Practice and good practice in human services continues to be 
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conceived and understood in ways that indicate good practice involves a broad-church 
positivist model of knowledge that informs a technicist account of action. Weber suggested 
this was not a contemporary phenomenon and at least the last two centuries have been 
dominated by what he called ‘formal’ or ‘instrumental rationality’ (Kalberg, 1980). This 
tradition has now been subjected to devastating critique (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Bondi, Carr, 
Clark and Clegg, 2011; Carr, 2004; Collingwood, 1938; Ellul, 1964; Feyerabend, 2010; 
Flyvbjerg, 2001; Geertz, 1973; Green, 2011; Green, 2009; Grundy, 1987; Habermas, 1990, 
1987a; Higgins, 2011; Kemmis and Smith, 2008; Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; Kupers and 
Pauleen, 2013; MacIntyre, 1984; Putnam, 1978; Rabinow & Sullivan, 1987; Roochnik, 2013; 
Rorty, 1979; Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010; Taylor, 1972; Vogel, 1996).  
 
These ways of knowing and acting have been variously described as calculative (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, 1987), instrumental (Schecter, 2012), making (Arendt, 1958), positivist (Winch, 
1958), instrumentality (Dunne, 2005), rational (Toulmin, 2001), rationalism (Newman, 
1870), strategic and purposive-rational (Habermas, 1984, 1971), technical (Polkinghorne, 
2004), technique (Dunne, 1997), technological (Tabachnik, 2013), and theoretical (Gadamer, 
2004). One problem associated with these ways of knowing and doing practice is a 
privileging of compliance and obedience to technical authority. Another is to do with the 
ways people are revealed with such sorts of knowing and action. Criticisms of evidence-
based practice in human services, that are indebted to this tradition, similarly signify a 
problem. However, even in light of the increasing critiques with these forms of knowledge 
and action we seem to have a problem with noticing or explaining this problem in a 
substantial way, or at least in a way that is creating a cause for concern, in accounts of human 
service practice. There is a small but significant number of academics writing in the human 
services literature who are voicing concerns with knowing and doing practice according to 
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these rationalities and actions (e.g., Bessant, 2009a; Cheung, 2017; Chu and Tsui, 2008; 
Clark, 2006; Dybicz, 2004; England, 1986; Hothersall, 2015; Klein and Bloom, 1995; 
Madhu, 2011; Ord, 2016a, 2016b, 2014, 2012a, 2012b; Petersén and Olsson, 2015; Scott, 
1990; Sheppard, 1995; Smeeton, 2017; Tsang, 2008; Walker and Walker, 2012; Whan, 1986; 
Whitaker, 2014; White, 2007). At the same time, the unceasing expansion of technical ways 
of knowing and acting confirm that criticisms of this way of revealing the real appear to be a 
marginal view. 
  
Exploring how to understand the being that is the human being and the best or good life of 
that being were central preoccupations for the philosophy of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. 
Their thinking had a profound effect on subsequent prominent theologians, philosophers and 
writers who have also closely examined these questions. This includes St. Augustine, John 
Scotus Eriugena (or John the Scot), and St. Thomas Aquinas from the broad medieval 
tradition, through to modern philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, 
Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Arendt, to name a few. According to 
Thomas Sheehan (2018a, 2018b, 2018c) the question concerning human being was critically 
important to Martin Heidegger, who is a key influence on my thinking for this thesis. 
Sheehan (2018a, p. 2) recently argued following decades of scholarship on Heidegger: 
‘Heidegger’s entire philosophy, including his effort to overcome or get free of 
metaphysics, begins and ends with his radically new vision of human being’.  
Heidegger (1998, p. 56) demonstrated the point when he argued: 
‘the debate between the two position, being the technical-scientistic view of language 
and the speculative-hermeneutical experience of language, has nothing less at stake 
than the question of human existence and its determination’.  
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Heidegger claimed that there are different possibilities for thinking about human being. As 
Sheehan (2014a, 2014b) observed, Heidegger put this question at the centre of his work. 
Basically, it would be difficult to think of a key philosopher for whom questions regarding 
how we should reveal human being have not been fundamental to their thinking. However, 
this question does not appear to be as crucial to thinking about practice in the human services 
literature. This question is not given the same attention or importance in the human services 
field compared to what it has had and continues to receive within philosophy. But the 
question is no less important for understanding human services, and for understanding good 
practice. However, when we look at the ways practice in human services is spoken about 
Bernstein (1971) appears to have been overly optimistic when he argued, as I previously 
noted, that the primary issues for contemporary philosophers are the ancient and modern 
questions of what the nature of human beings and human activity is, and what ought to be the 
directions pursued in this activity.  
 
This failure to think what we do was recently illuminated by Babette Babich (2018). Babich 
was contesting the current demand for philosophy, and in particular university-based 
philosophy departments in the UK, to demonstrate impact, relevance, and practical 
applicability and one reason why Babich was critical of this state of affairs is because it 
obscures and silences philosophy’s other possibilities. In particular, Babich argued that what 
is concealed and ignored is philosophy’s role and interest in encouraging thinking and 
explaining the world rather than just attempting to change it and to do this in the 
circumscribed ways demanded by official impact and applied agendas. I suggest the problems 
Babich articulates are not only relevant for philosophy. For example, in Australia, as in many 
other parts of the world, the present obsession with all human ways of knowing and forms of 
action, including most recently university research (Australian Government Department of 
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Education and Training, 2016; Innovation and Science Australia, 2017), to seek and 
demonstrate ‘real world’ impact and engagement with industry and commerce, and to do this 
in particularly narrow and specific ways that include being quantitative aka measurable and 
aligned with neoliberal government policy agendas, is widespread. Babich’s suggestion that 
we are failing to think what we do has been affirmed, and there is not enough philosophy or 
thinking as characterised by Babich and Bernstein taking place. 
  
A fourth reason for asking these questions is the worrying lack of clarity on the part of human 
service practitioners and theorists about ends that ought to guide or inform practice. The field 
of youth work provides a good example of this. When we look at the youth work literature 
what we tend to see is inadequate or impoverished accounts about the proper ends, 
fundamental aims, and ethically worthwhile goods, that youth work practice is or should be 
oriented to. There is a failure and reluctance to examine different aims, compare and assess 
their merits and argue the case for a proper purpose. Framing these ends in terms of achieving 
‘outcomes’ and ‘outputs’ in the most cost-effective (cheapest) way possible is almost risible. 
What we have here is a form of ‘economism’, reliant on the primacy of economic factors, that 
sits at the heart of neo-classical economics and has been picked up by NPM discourse and 
neoliberal government policy-makers that shapes how the ends of practice and good practice 
in youth work are understood (Sandel, 2012). There is an absence of a warrantable end (or 
ends) couched in terms of a defensible account of practice. Moreover, too often accounts of 
youth work practice fails to clearly say why it does anything or it fails to articulate what it 
aims to do in a way that is ethical.  
 
We need to distinguish between instrumental and substantive values and goods. Efficiency 
e.g. is an instrumental value. It may well have been a virtue that the trains that took millions 
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to their deaths in Auschwitz were run efficiently, but few would defend the proposition that 
that virtue was all that important or defensible. We need clarity not about instrumental values 
or goods like ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ or whether ‘outcomes’ were achieved but about 
the ends to which those instrumental values are applied. In the messiness, uncertainty and 
unpredictability of day-to-day human service work at some point and often workers have to 
make decisions on what to do. But how are workers to decide what to do? (Finnis, 1980; 
Williams, 1985). Dworkin (2011, p. 223), argued; 
‘…you cannot choose, except in particularly banal matters, without supposing that 
there is a better or worse choice for you to make…You cannot wrestle apart the 
thought “What shall I do?” from the thought “Which decision would it be better for 
me to make”. 
Heidegger (1977, p. 40) made a similar point when he insisted that;  
‘…before considering the question that is seemingly always the most immediate one 
and the only urgent one, What shall we do? We ponder this: How must we think?’. 
 
Human services workers need to make decisions; they cannot not act, and their actions should 
be aimed towards some idea of the good, and they need to give thought to this good, they 
need to think about the good or goods their actions are oriented towards pursuing and 
realising. This idea that we should and cannot avoid orienting action to an idea of the good 
was recognised by Aristotle (2009) approximately 2,400 years ago and more recently by 
Wilfred Carr (2004), Jacques Derrida (Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000), Alistair 
MacIntyre (1984), Mary Midgley (1992); Onora O’Neill (2002), Michael Sandel (2009), and 
Bernard Williams (1993). All of these authors also recognise that the idea of the good that 
action should be oriented towards is hotly contested and cause for serious disagreement. 
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However, these problems are no excuse for the lack of attention given to the ends of human 
service practices such as youth work.  
 
One way we can understand this oversight is that it could be a legacy of the modern scientific 
tradition. Since the scientific revolution and the rise of modern science, Aristotle’s account of 
the four causes fell into disrepute and was replaced by different accounts of causation 
(Aristotle, 1996, 2004, 2009; Heidegger, 1977; Henry, 2008; Lee, 2009). One consequence of 
this radical shift in thinking was the disparagement and rejection of Aristotle’s final cause, or 
telos or end, to help explain phenomenon, in particular because ends could not be rigorously 
and reliably known by using the new scientific methods. These ideas were initially applied to 
natural entities but eventually became influential in understanding the social, human and 
moral realm. However, criticisms of modern scientific ways of knowing for understanding 
and explaining human action, often referred to as scientism, and a general critique of claimed 
disinterestedness in ends in any human action, including science, have contributed to a 
reengagement with Aristotle’s ideas and this includes revisiting his idea of telos (e.g., Carr, 
2004; Gadamer, 2004; Kirkland, 2007; Moss, 2011; Nussbaum, 2001; Vaccarezza, 2018). In 
my view it is time to address this absence and oversight in how human service practice is 
understood.  
 
The final problem that justifies the need to address my key research questions has to do with 
the education and regulation of human services like youth work. As we come to the end of 
the second decade of the twenty first century, Australian higher education continues to play a 
critical role in preparing professional practitioners for the human services. Some human 
services such as nursing, education and psychology are also subject to government regulation 
that legally requires nurses, teachers and psychologists to complete an accredited university 
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qualification and to then register with a professional body that recognises the credential 
before they can practice. Other human service fields that are not regulated in this way 
(including social work and youth work) have long entertained and discussed proposals for 
strengthening the link between higher education and professional credentials. Underpinning 
the relationships between human service work, professionalization and higher education is 
the idea that good teaching and learning in universities can transform people into competent 
human service practitioners and professional education is a precondition for quality human 
services. In other words, good practice in higher education is implicated in producing good 
practice in human services. 
 
However, the ability of Australian universities to deliver quality education has increasingly 
come under scrutiny (Andrews, 2007; Bartlett and Clemens, 2017; Hil, 2012; Murphy, 2017; 
Watts, 2017). Some of the key problems that have been identified with universities include 
the dominance of managerialism and neoliberal forms of governance and their deleterious 
and ‘toxic’ effects on universities’ purposes, cultures, practices, leadership and management, 
workforce, and students (Arum and Roksa, 2010; Barnett, 1997; Barnett and Coate, 2005; 
Bottrell and Manathunga, 2019a, 2019b; Chua, Murray and Vilkinas, 2018a, 2018b; 
Docherty, 2018, 2011; Ginsberg, 2011; Newfield, 2011; Nussbaum, 2016; Smyth, 2017). The 
reproduction of advantage and disadvantage by universities that was so perceptively 
identified by Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) persists (Parker, 2016). This literature raises 
questions about the capacity of higher education to educate people in ways that prepares 
human service professionals who are capable of good practice. Ironically, proponents of 
managerialism argue that they exemplify and realise good practice in institutions like 
universities and human service organisations.  
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This sets the scene for the investigation I undertake into the education of practitioners for 
good practice in human services. Investigating the role of education in achieving good 
practice is particularly important because of the critical role universities play in modelling 
types of thinking that are possible and desirable, and in legitimizing knowledge practices. In 
particular, if universities are meant to model the sorts of knowing and action that are possible 
and because universities legitimate ways of knowing and forms of human activity then it is 
important to examine the thinking and action that takes place in universities and that have a 
key role in shaping how we can talk about practice and good practice in human services. And 
in particular this means exploring whether the ways of knowing and forms of action that are 
legitimised by universities accord with the sorts of neoliberal inspired and technical rational 
approaches to practice that I am suggesting are a problem. This problem is evident according 
to Babich (2018) and when we look at recent accounts on university education in human 
service such as youth work. Brooker (2016) provides a good example where what we see is a 
grab-bag of inconsistent and simple ideas on what a good education consists of such as 
proposals for what should be in the curriculum, the amount of field practice students should 
engage in, and suggestions for course configurations.  
 
I am not suggesting that these elements are not important to a good education. However, 
these ideas have not been thought out in ways that connect to a coherent idea of good practice 
and that at least try to ensure that they do not reproduce the very problems that they claim to 
address. Similarly, much more careful thinking is needed on the types of regulation and 
institutionalisation, including professionalization, that are needed for good practice than is 
usually afforded in accounts of human service practice. In particular, too often we witness 
claims that good practice will take place if practitioners have a qualification that has been 
accredited by a professional association, or good practice will occur if there is a code of 
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ethics that has been established by a professional association or human services sector peak 
body. Such proposals pay too little attention to the sorts of questions I am addressing here.  
 
In this thesis I make the case that we need to think far more carefully about practice and good 
practice in human services. To do this I draw on a number of perspectives and traditions of 
inquiry that serve as resources to think with and help sustain a methodical approach. 
 
 
Theoretical perspectives and method 
 
The key intellectual resources I have drawn on to engage my questions are derived from a 
tradition of inquiry associated with Aristotle and the theoretical perspectives of other writers 
who have also been inspired by Aristotle and, in particular, his approach to ethics.  
 
Like the six books that comprise Aristotle’s Organon or his study of logic, and his 
metaphysics, physics and politics, the Nichomachean Ethics (NE) takes up, adjusts and builds 
on the philosophy that preceded, in particular that of Socrates and Plato, and anchored a field 
of inquiry and posits an argument that continue to be a significant aspect of contemporary 
thought. According to Brown (2009, p. viii) the Nichomachean Ethics is Aristotle’s definitive 
work on ethics. It is a comprehensive ethical theory - ‘a theory about what is good or bad for 
people’ (Dworkin, 2011, p. 51) - that provides an answer to four key ethical questions; ‘how 
one should live; what the virtues are, whether they can be taught, and most of all, why they 
are worth choosing’.  
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In a nutshell Aristotle (2009) argues that one should try to live the best life for a human 
being, and this is possible by having and exercising the virtues. According to Aristotle the 
virtues are excellent rational activities or kinds of knowledge. Aristotle makes the case that 
the virtues come in two types, moral and intellectual, and these correspond to two ways that 
reason features in two parts of the human soul, or they correspond to two capacities or 
dimensions of human being. There is the appetitive and desiring part of the soul that shares in 
reason in so far as it listens to and obeys it, and moral virtues or virtues of character are in 
kinship with the appetites and help to realise excellence of character. And there is the rational 
part of the soul or intellect that has reason in the full sense, and intellectual virtues or virtues 
of intellect help to realise excellence of intellect or reason. Aristotle elaborates ten moral and 
five intellectual virtues and discusses the link between the moral and intellectual virtues. 
Aristotle’s idea that human beings can have and can exercise virtues has been extremely 
influential e.g., on Christianity and particularly the moral doctrine of Thomas Aquinas 
(McInerny and O'Callaghan, 2018). More recently there has been interest in the possibilities 
afforded by humans having and exercising virtues to do good practice in youth work 
(Bessant, 2009a; Smith and Smith, 2008), social work (Pawar, Hugman, Alexandra and 
Anscombe, 2017), teaching and education (Cooke and Carr, 2014), and professional practice 
more broadly (Carr, 2018; Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; Oakley and Cocking, 2006; The 
Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2016). My work connects with and is inspired by 
this renewed interest in Aristotle’s ethics and virtue ethics (Anscombe, 1958; Broadie, 1991; 
Crisp and Slote, 1997; Hursthouse and Pettigrove, 2016; Ord, 2016a, 2014; Peters, 2013; 
Rorty, 1980; Sherman, 1999; Snow, 2018; van Hooft, 2014; Whitaker, 2014).  
 
Regarding whether the virtues can be taught Aristotle (2009) argues moral virtues come 
about as a result of habit and can be developed by the ordinary upbringing by parents and the 
25 
 
right laws that set good standards of behaviour (Brown, 2009). On the other hand, Aristotle 
(2009, p. 23) makes the case that ‘…intellectual virtue in the main owes its birth and growth 
to teaching (for which reason it requires experiences and time).’ Aristotle (2009, pp. 110, 
115-117) stresses that phronesis or practical wisdom - the intellectual virtue that guides 
praxis or right action (i.e., the courageous act) to achieve the end (i.e., courage) that has been 
determined by moral virtue - requires experience (Moss, 2011). I draw on these ideas to help 
develop my arguments on how to achieve good practice in human services.  
 
And finally, to the question of why the virtues are worth choosing. Aristotle (2009) is 
adamant that the highest good for human beings is eudaimonia, which is often translated as 
‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’ but can also be understood as ‘good conscience’. Aristotle argues 
that human happiness or flourishing is a life of activity in accordance with virtue (Brown, 
2009). In other words, Aristotle argues that by having and exercising virtues ‘one is living a 
life that is the best life for a human being’ or one is living well and having a good life 
(Brown, 2009, p. xiii, Dworkin, 2011). I will argue that Aristotle’s ideas about the best life 
for a human being should inform consideration of the proper purpose of youth and 
community work.  
 
This brief overview of the Nichomachean Ethics follows Ross’s (Aristotle, 2009) translation 
of the text that contains the ideas that have been deployed by an array of contemporary 
writers e.g., in political philosophy, social theory, moral philosophy, educational studies and 
organisational research (e.g., Arendt, 1958; Bernstein, 1983; Eikeland, 2008; Flyvbjerg, 
2001; Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram, 2012; Gadamer, 2004, 1987; Green, 2009; 
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Habermas, 1974; Kemmis and Smith, 2008; MacIntyre, 1984; Nussbaum, 2001; Sandel, 
2014; Sandel, 2009; Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010; Volpi, 1999).4  
 
In this thesis I draw on the common and widely used understandings of the Nichomachean 
Ethics. However, I am also moved by other less familiar and alternative accounts especially 
those in which we can see the hand of Heidegger. For example, Brogan (2005, p. 15) claims 
that the Nichomachean Ethics ‘is about the ‘movement’ or way in which one becomes 
human’, as distinct from the movement of produced beings or artefacts, and the movement of 
natural beings or growing things (see also: Heidegger, 1998a; Sheehan, 2017, p. 45, 2014a, 
pp. 45-65, 130). This resonates with Thomas Kuhn’s (1977, p. xi) suggestion that ‘Aristotle’s 
subject was change of quality in general’. Sheehan (2014a, pp. 277-281) and Heidegger’s 
(2009, 2007a, 2007b, 1997) interpretations of aspects of the Nichomachean Ethics are also 
significantly different to conventional accounts, which Heidegger is critical of (e.g., 
Heidegger, 2007a, p. 176; 2003, pp. 5-43; see also: Garrett, 2013; Moss, 2014; Nicholson, 
2014a). For example, Brown (2009, p. xii) argued Nichomachean Ethics offers an account of 
what the good for a human being is. Heidegger (2009, 2007a, 2007b, 1997) on the other hand 
interprets aspects of the Nichomachean Ethics, particularly Book VI, and other works of 
                                               
4 One-way Aristotle’s ethics and virtue ethics is typically characterised is by distinguishing it from two other 
normative ethical theories (e.g., Sandel, 2009). The first is deontology or an obligation or rule-based ethics that 
is often associated with human rights frameworks. And the second is consequentialism or an approach to ethical 
conduct that is based on the consequences actions and utilitarianism is an example. I do not repeat these 
distinctions and arguments here. At the same time, in the chapters that form this thesis I am critical of rule-based 
approaches to achieving good practice in human services, and I criticise utilitarianism and argue that good 
practice in human services requires more than utility maximisation.  
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Aristotle’s as giving an account of what the human being is (Sheehan, 2017, 2014a).5 
According to Sheehan (2018a, p. 3);  
‘What Aristotle called mind or reason (nous, logos) is interpreted by Heidegger not as 
a faculty embedded in our souls [and that according to usual accounts differs 
depending on the part of the soul – the intellect has reason in the full sense and the 
intellectual virtues help to realise excellence of intellect, and the appetites are 
responsive to reason and the moral virtues help to realise excellence of character] but 
rather as a field of meaningfulness that preceded us and illuminates everything we 
encounter…this field of meaningfulness is not a “tool” that we “use”…it is what we 
are’.6 
 
Sheehan (2017, pp. 48-49) provides a clear explication of Heidegger’s approach to Aristotle 
arguing that Heidegger is doing phenomenology:  
‘Heidegger made it clear that all his work, from 1919 until his death, was 
phenomenological…Phenomenology is correlation-research. As such it is about 
meaning, and specifically about the meaningful presence (Anwesen) of what one 
encounters…For Heidegger the phenomenological correlation lies between what we 
                                               
5 Wisnewski (2012) suggests these may not be distinct. Wisnewski (2012, pp. 58-59) argues that in articulating 
the ‘five modes in which the world is disclosed’ in Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle ‘is not 
attempting to impose a view of the modes of knowledge onto the practices of human beings. Rather, he is trying 
to make these practices – these modes of disclosure – more transparent’. In other words, ‘the way we encounter 
things in phronesis – a disclosure of things through praxis’ is both a mode of being a human being and a good 
mode of being a human being, or how a human being is and should be (Wisnewski, 2012, p. 59).  
6 The meaning of nous and logos are far from straightforward, e.g., see: Moss, 2014.  
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encounter and the meaningful possibilities we are living into’ (see also: Heidegger, 
2003, pp. 5-7; Sheehan, 2018b, pp. 8-10; 2018c; 2014a, pp. 10-13; 2014b).  
One significant implication is that, according to Sheehan (2018b), Heidegger articulates the 
ontological difference, or the difference between Being and beings, on phenomenological and 
not metaphysical grounds.  
‘Anwesen [meaningful presence] as different from that which is meaningfully present’ 
rather than ‘Sein [Being] as distinct from das Seiende [the beings]’ (Sheehan, 2018b, 
pp. 4-5).  
 
This helps to explain why many have argued that Heidegger interprets phronesis (‘practical 
wisdom’) and praxis in a particular way for his account of Dasein or the structure of human 
being or what has also been referred to as his fundamental ontology (Bernasconi, 1989, 1986; 
Gonzalez, 2006; Heidegger, 1962; Kisiel and Sheehan, 2007; McNeill, 1999; Nicholson, 
2014a; Ross, 2002; Sheehan, 2018c, 2017, 2014a; Thanassas, 2012; Weidenfeld, 2011; 
Wisnewski, 2012). Heidegger invites a radically different way of thinking about Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics and he offers some important insights that I draw on in my thesis. 
Some writers have insisted often vehemently that Heidegger misinterprets, overlooks and 
denigrates phronesis and praxis, and fails dismally to address ethics (Arendt, 1958; 
Bernstein, 1991; Gadamer, 1994, 1987; Taminiaux, 1991).7 I do not pursue these 
                                               
7 Sheehan (2014a, p. 294) has a damning dig at Heidegger when he quotes Marx Fourth Thesis on Feuerbach to 
make the point;  
‘With his final exhortation to “become what you already are,” Heidegger…felt that his work was done. 
Be that as it may, it is not enough. As with Feuerbach before him, so, too, with Heidegger the point 
holds true: “He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be 
done”.’  
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controversies here. If the case that Heidegger failed to consider what is good or bad for 
people is well-grounded, then I am reminded to not make the same mistake.  
 
Another key idea from Aristotle’s work influenced how I engaged with the research 
questions. This is the idea that there are different types of entities, beings, matters, or subject 
matters and that these accord with different ways of knowing, different types of human 
action, and different ends (Aristotle, 2009, 2004, 1996; Sheehan, 2018c, 2014b). Aristotle 
(2009, p. 103) appropriated, criticized and transformed Plato’s (2007, 1987) distinction 
between unchanging and eternal ίδέα, the Ideas or forms, and changeable and finite 
particulars or appearances, which according to Heidegger (2008) was a development on pre-
Socratic philosophy, to distinguish ‘the kinds of things whose originative causes are 
invariable’ from ‘variable things’. This distinction was similarly observed by Heidegger 
(2007a, p. 175);  
‘…there are two distinct regions of be-ing, that which always is [eternal being] and 
that which also can be otherwise [changeable being].’ (see also: Heidegger, 2008, p. 
153, 2003, p. 20, 1998a).  
Kisiel and Sheehan (2007, pp. 174-175) also argued that Aristotle had an, ‘…ontological 
distinction between beings that always and necessarily are and “beings that can be 
otherwise”, usually translated as “changeable beings”’. According to Aristotle the unmoved 
                                               
In a footnote to the quote Sheehan references a relevant passage from Nichomachean Ethics Book VI.7, 1141b3-
8 that helps to explain what he means. In this passage Aristotle (2009, p. 108) distinguishes sophia, philosophic 
wisdom, from phronesis, practical wisdom, and argues that the philosophers ‘…know things that are 
remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless; namely, because it is not human goods that they seek’. 
Sheehan is cheekily likening Heidegger and Feuerbach to the unworldly Anaxagoras and Thales - 
philosophically wise but practically and ethically useless.  
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first mover always and necessarily is, and natural entities, growing things or the self-
emergent are always as they are, for example, in terms of not needing to be produced. On the 
other hand, changeable beings or entities that can be different to what they are now include 
artefacts and human beings (Heidegger, 2007b).  
 
According to Aristotle one way the distinction between growing things, artefacts and human 
beings can be understood is that they are different on account of being meaningfully present 
in different ways, for example on the basis of what Brogan (2005) suggested - movement or 
what Kuhn (1977) suggested - change of quality (Sheehan, 2018c, 2014b). According to 
Sheehan (2014a, p. 45), ‘Aristotle understands movement as always for the sake of a goal; 
whatever is in movement strives for full appearance and stable constancy’. Heidegger (2008, 
p. 149) and Bröcker (2008, p. 240) similarly observed that Aristotle suggested all beings 
‘desire’ and ‘strive for’ pure actuality or ‘pure, autonomous, constant presence based on 
nothing but itself’, or to put this another way all beings strive to be like the unmoved first 
mover – everlasting, enduring, all knowing, complete. At the same time, the movement, or 
motion or ‘movedness’, of growing things, artefacts and human beings differs. According to 
Heidegger (2008, p. 142), movement ‘is an essential determination’ of beings, or put this 
another way, an important way beings can be understood is in, by, or through their 
movement. For example, the movement of growing things can be understood as for the sake 
of itself, e.g., a bud of an oak tree moves for the sake of itself to become a blossom (Brogan, 
2005, p. 108; Hegel, 1977, p. 2). The movement involved in producing artefacts can be 
understood as for the sake of someone or something else, e.g., the lump of wood is moved by 
the carpenter for the sake of becoming a table. And the movement of human beings can be 
understood as for the sake of which a human action is carried out, e.g., the human being 
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move for the sake of becoming less ignorant and more knowledgeable (Aristotle, 2009, 2004, 
1996; Heidegger, 2007b; Sheehan, 2018c).  
 
In modern times this is a controversial way of thinking about the movement or motion of 
beings (e.g., Heidegger, 1998a). At the same time, Aristotle’s claim that there are different 
kinds of beings continues to be made - and it reverberates in my thesis - even if those who 
participate in these debates make their case in ways that do not always resonate with 
Aristotle’s arguments (e.g., Flyvbjerg, 2001; Gadamer, 2004, 1987; Hayek, 1945; Heidegger, 
1998b; Hesse, 1980; Popper, 1979; Snow, 2013; 1993; Vico, 1999; Vogel 1996; Winch, 
1958). Rittel and Webber’s (1973) account of tame and wicked problems and solutions offers 
another distinction between different kinds of beings, and I also draw on their framework for 
opening up the line of enquiry I was keen to develop and pursue.  
 
At the same time Aristotle distinguishes between different types of beings he connects these 
different beings to different form of knowledge, action and ends. At least this is how these 
ideas and relationships are understood in conventional interpretations (Aristotle, 2009; 
Brown, 2009). Dunne’s (2005, 1997) account of practice is indebted to these ideas, as is the 
case I make in this thesis for understanding practice and good practice in human services. 
However, other authors suggest that these ideas can be understood differently. For example, 
what I refer to in my thesis as ways of knowing – the five intellectual virtues: sophia, 
episteme, nous, techne and phronesis - Heidegger (2009, 2008, 2007a, 2007b, 2003, 1997, 
1962) describes as modes of disclosure, modes of revealing the real, possibilities of 
disclosing beings, ways of uncovering beings, ways of being-true, habits of truth, ways in 
which the soul possesses truth, and dianoetic virtues. These ideas also function differently in 
Heidegger’s philosophy compared to the accounts I draw on and the arguments I make, e.g., 
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Heidegger (2007, pp. 226-227, 2003, p. 20) argues that nous is present in the other four 
modes of disclosure (see also: Nicholson, 2014a; Ross, 2002; Sheehan, 2017, 2014a).  
 
Heidegger (1997, 1977) is also consistently critical of the modern interpretation and usage of 
telos as aim or purpose and insists that telos is end or limit. For example, according to 
Heidegger (2009, p. 57), ‘The end can be encountered in the character of purpose or aim, but 
only because telos is end’. Heidegger’s criticism of interpreting telos as purpose or aim 
follows closely conventional translations of Aristotle’s final cause as telos or end. The final 
cause or telos was one of Aristotle’s four causes that were critical to his account of 
understanding and explaining the natural or physical and human or social beings (Aristotle, 
2009, 2004, 1996). Contrary to Heidegger, in this thesis I am inspired by broader accounts of 
telos in the relevant literature that conceptualise it as proper, preferable or better purposes, 
goals, aim, goods, as well as ends of practices (e.g., Carr, 2004; Dunne, 2011; MacIntyre, 
1984; Midgley, 1984; Sandel, 2009; Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010). And drawing on Derrida, I 
am also inspired to think about telos as an aim, end or commitment that is always carefully 
reconsidered in each instance of practice and is determinedly pursued but is never fully 
attained because there is always more that can be known and done (Derrida and 
Dufourmantelle, 2000).  
 
Something else articulated by Aristotle, but which did not originate with him and was far 
from being specific to his ethics, provides some other resources for addressing my research 
questions. What I am referring to here is the insight that two opposing ideas are essential to 
and dependent on each other for their possibility. According to Brogan (2005, p. 170) 
Heidegger argued that this way of thinking was implied by Plato in the Sophist, however, 
Aristotle made it explicit.  
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‘In this dialogue [Plato’s Sophist], the mē on, non-being, is shown to be. Being and 
not being, sameness and otherness, tautological identity and multiplicity, are shown to 
be intrinsically woven together’. 
This idea was critical to Aristotle’s (2004, 1996) account of the relation between being and 
non-being, presence and absence, motion and rest, and potentiality or preparedness for and 
actuality. It seems to have inspired Hegel’s (1977) account of the dialectical relation between 
‘Master and Servant (‘Herrschaft und Knechtschaft’) which has been turned into a major 
contemporary theory of the ‘politics of recognition’ by Charles Taylor (1994) to deal with the 
plethora of unequal relations in which we find ourselves. Drawing on Hegel, Taylor suggests 
that relations of inequality increase the likelihood that we will misrecognise the Other rather 
than recognise them for who they are.  
 
On the one hand this raises important questions about how we can ever recognise the Other in 
relations of significant inequality whether these be in relations between child and adult, 
student and teacher, client and professional, analysand and analyst, or relations involving 
gender, sexuality, ethnicity and so forth. On the other hands this opens up questions about the 
relation between good and bad thinking. It parallels in part Nietzsche’s account of the relation 
between reactive and active forces (Deleuze, 2006) or Heidegger’s (1977, 1962) account of 
the relation between inauthentic and authentic being, and the danger and promise of the 
essence of modern technology. This cluster of ideas helped me to think that any idea of good 
practice relies on its opposite, which is bad practice. Moreover, achieving something referred 
to as good practice depends on thinking about and having an idea of something referred to as 
bad practice, keeping close to this ‘Other’, and resisting it, rather than ignoring or 
disregarding it, or trying to overcome or end it. What I am arguing here is that it is through 
knowing and resisting bad practice, and not overlooking and annihilating it, that good 
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practice is available. The problems I identify with how we typically think about practice and 
good practice are the problems that I resist to help get in touch with alternative and better 
ways of knowing and doing practice.  
 
 
Method 
 
My approach to answering the questions also entailed engaging in a critical normative inquiry 
that drew on a combination of interpretive or hermeneutical and critical theoretical traditions. 
The ones that matter here have been clearly outlined by thinkers such as Martin Heidegger 
(1977), Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004), and the Frankfurt School (Bohman, 2016). According 
to Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) and Blaikie (2007, p. 117) there are various ‘currents’ and 
‘subfields’ of hermeneutics but they share an interest in ‘making the obscure plain’. I was 
particularly drawn to what Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009, p. 95) described as ‘alethic 
hermeneutics’ and what Blaikie (2007) identified as a version of contemporary hermeneutics 
that continued the classical hermeneutics inspired by Heidegger who made the case that 
‘understanding is a basic way of existing for every human being’. 
 
Gadamer (1987) extended these ideas and argued that people are always already engaged in 
basic or pre-understandings of beings before any understanding or explanation is ‘discovered’ 
or generated by, for example, positivist-oriented methods in the natural or human sciences. 
Alethic hermeneutics is interested in ‘gaining access through interpretation to something 
underneath’, or to the preunderstandings that are always and already taking place (Alvesson 
and Sköldberg, 2009 p. 139). According to Gadamer (1987, p. 139); 
‘…every hermeneutical understanding begins and ends with the ‘thing itself’’.  
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Gadamer is suggesting that to understand beings then we need to begin with the thing itself, 
and this includes trying to understand how we are always and already involved and engaged 
with it, and trying to understand the claims it makes on us by allowing it to ‘speak to us’ 
(Bernstein, 1983, p. 137; Blaikie, 2007, p. 152). We need to do this to understand the ‘thing 
itself’, and not, unthinkingly and by default, employ a positivist scientific method to reveal it.  
 
According to Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009, p. 123) and Blaikie (2007), analysing and 
interpreting language and texts in a particular way was also central to getting to the 
hermeneutic pre-understandings for Gadamer. Gadamer (1987) suggested that 
preunderstandings are accessible by carefully thinking about trying to grasp the ‘historical 
tradition’ or the ‘way of understanding and seeing the world at a particular time and in a 
particular place’ that makes the text possible. I paid careful attention to how practice and 
good practice is spoken about in the human services literature to try to identify the basic ways 
these are understood at this time. Similarly, Gadamer (2004) argued that there are no neutral, 
detached, uninvolved, or context independent ways of disclosing and knowing entities being 
researched as often suggested by modern science. I was inspired by Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
to think carefully about the claims made about human service practice and good practice in 
the relevant scholarly and practice-oriented literature. This meant that I did not simply accept 
how practice and good practice are spoken about in human services literature, and instead I 
questioned and thought about these understandings, interpretations and judgments.  
 
Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) also identified the possibilities for combining hermeneutics 
and critical theory, and highlighted the relationships between these two traditions:  
‘Critical theory is characterised by an interpretive approach combined with a 
pronounced interest in critically disputing actual social realities. It is sometimes 
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referred to as critical hermeneutics. Its guiding principle is an emancipatory interest in 
knowledge’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 144).  
I follow Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2009, pp. 145-148) suggestion and bring together both 
hermeneutics and the critical theory of the Frankfurt school. Both have been critical of 
positivism and its relationship with a calculative, impersonal kind of reasoning because of its 
implications for the manipulation, domination and oppression of human beings. Gadamer, 
following Heidegger’s (1977) account of the dangers associated with the essence of modern 
technology for human being, was similarly concerned about the implications of the 
domination of technology based on modern positivist science.  
 
Bernstein (1983, p. 165) argued Gadamer’s ‘whole project’ was interested in finding ‘…an 
alternative way of thinking and of understanding our being-in-the-world’ compared to the 
prevailing scientism or the application of methods from the natural sciences to human and 
moral phenomenon. Gadamer (2004, 1987) engaged with Aristotle’s practical philosophy to 
help develop this alternative (Malpas, 2016). In particular, Gadamer was indebted to 
Aristotle’s (2009) claim in Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics that there are different 
possible ways of human knowing and doing and that these correspond to or accord with 
different ways that beings can be. I aimed to understand how practice and good practice in 
human services was typically and could be revealed and spoken about according to these 
ideas in the relevant literature.  
 
Like Gadamer’s hermeneutics and the critical theory established by the Frankfurt School, 
Flyvbjerg’s (2001) account of a phronetic social science offers other ways of knowing and 
doing compared to the prevailing technical rationality and this influenced how I answered my 
questions. In a similar vein to Gadamer, Flyvbjerg argued that for social science to have 
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value then it needs to give up trying to emulate the natural sciences and forgo attempts to 
produce universal, explanatory, context independent and predictive theory. Flyvbjerg added 
that the social sciences should not even attempt or claim to provide ‘objective’ and universal 
accounts of human activity because such attempts have always failed (see also: Bernstein, 
1983; Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram, 2012; Rabinow and Sullivan, 1987). Instead 
Flyvbjerg proposed that the social sciences are strong where the natural sciences are weak. 
‘…just as the social sciences have not contributed much to explanatory and predictive 
theory, neither have the natural sciences contributed to the reflexive analysis and 
discussion of values and interests, which is the prerequisite for an enlightened 
political, economic, and cultural development in any society, and which is at the core 
of phronesis’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 3).  
Flyvbjerg stressed that the social sciences are valuable because they provide;  
‘…input to the ongoing social dialogue about the problems and risks we face and how 
things may be done differently (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 61).  
 
One of the ways Flyvbjerg explained the value of a phronetic social science was by 
reinvigorating a distinction between three of Aristotle’s intellectual virtues, something that 
Gadamer also did to develop his hermeneutics. According to Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 2); 
‘Phronesis goes beyond both analytical, scientific knowledge (episteme) and technical 
knowledge or know-how (techne) and involves judgments and decisions made in a 
manner of a virtuoso social and political actor’.  
Flyvbjerg’s phronetic social science provides a solid basis for engaging in this study in the 
ways that I do. For example, his approach to value rationality offers an alternative to 
technical rationality. In particular, whereas technical rationality relies on claims of value 
neutrality, value rationality relies on overly deliberating about and analysing values and 
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interests. To do this Flyvbjerg proposed asking a series of ‘value-rational’ questions in his 
methodological guidelines for a phronetic social science. I draw on Flyvbjerg to explore how 
practice and good practice in human service work is typically conceived in the relevant 
literature, to ask if this is desirable, and to explore whether there are there other and better 
ways to think about it.  
 
The method I deployed was also inspired by and aligns with the claim that we have a problem 
with thinking in modern times. As I observed earlier, this problem was recently articulated by 
Babette Babich (2018, 2012) who echoed a claim that has been made by many other thinkers. 
Babich was a student of Hans Georg Gadamer, who was a student of Martin Heidegger, and 
both Gadamer (1987) and Heidegger (1977, 1968) made the case before Babich that we are 
not thinking, and Heidegger included universities in his derision. William Lovitt (1977, p. 
xvi) captured Gadamer and Heidegger’s concern when he argued, ‘We are trapped and 
blinded by a mode of thought that insists on grasping reality through imposed conceptual 
structures’.  
 
Another student of Heidegger’s Hannah Arendt (2003, 1977, 1958) made a similar claim and 
directed it, among others, to those intellectuals who fail to ‘think what they do’, which 
ironically included Heidegger. Arendt was also critical of an unthinking approach to human 
activity characterised by habitual and repeated performance, and Arendt’s account of action 
that draws on Aristotle’s praxis as well as over two thousand years of thinking about practical 
activity since then has influenced my thinking. Many other modern philosophers have made 
the case for thinking before Heidegger, Arendt, Gadamer and Babich. For example, a key 
influence on Heidegger was Friedrich Nietzsche whom according to Babich (2016) argued 
we should always question ourselves and question the things we assume or take for granted, 
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which Babich acknowledged is easy to think that we are doing but much harder to do. 
Immanuel Kant (1977), an antagonistic philosopher for many of these thinkers, 
acknowledged the importance of thinking, and for him it was particularly the thinking 
provoked by David Hume who awoke him from a ‘dogmatic slumber’ or the unthinking 
sureness in what he thought to be true. And we should not forget that thinking was critical for 
three key philosophers, Socrates, who argued the unexamined life was not worth living, and 
Plato and Aristotle, who both distinguished between opinion (doxa) and knowledge 
(episteme) but offered different ways of understanding the distinction and implications. In 
this thesis I attempted to engage in thinking of the type that Babich, and many others - Pierre 
Bourdieu immediately comes to mind - suggest is lacking at this point in time. In particular, 
thinking that is not fixated on demonstrating or equating good practice with calculable impact 
and industry relevance, thinking that question the things we assume or take for granted to be 
good practice, and thinking that questions the sureness in what we think good practice to be.  
 
Finally, my method for answering the questions did not entail collecting and analysing first-
hand accounts of practice and good practice e.g., from personal experience as a youth and 
community worker, from human service practitioners or from people who have used human 
services. In other words, I have not used my own practice reflections as a human service 
practitioner, I have not spoken to youth and community workers about what they do and how 
they think about what they do, nor have I spoken to young people who have accessed youth 
services about what they experienced, and neither have I directly observed and analysed these 
observations of practice. Instead the data I used in this inquiry are accounts of human service 
practice in academic literature and policy and practice-based documents, which includes 
accounts of practice and good practice from human service workers. This material provides 
the conceptualisations of practice that I needed for my investigation and that I was interested 
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in examining. An advantage of using this material is that the data is readily available, which 
also enabled me to spend more time on investigating and developing the intellectual, 
interpretive and critical aspects of my inquiry. A disadvantage of using this material is that it 
is typically not rich and deep first-hand accounts of human service practice and good practice 
from people who deliver or use human services or from observations about such practice. It is 
possible that exploratory, ‘on-the-ground’, biographical, ethnographic, first-hand descriptions 
of practice and good practice may be different to the sorts of secondary-source, theoretical, 
conceptual accounts that I have drawn on and that I draw out. In particular, first-hand 
accounts may illuminate nuances and complexities that are not apparent in the literature that I 
use and the analysis that I do. At the same time, and following the interpretive and reflexive 
methods that I engaged with, whether first-hand accounts resonate with the approaches to 
understanding practice I am critical of and that I advocate for in this thesis will typically 
depend on whether they align with these accounts of practice.  
 
Pawar, Hugman, Alexandra and Anscombe (2017) provide a recent example of collecting 
stories from social workers to capture first-hand the central role of virtues, personal qualities 
and ethical character in ‘effective practice’. One thing that these rich biographical accounts 
reveal is the way expert social welfare practitioners try to navigate neoliberal technical 
practice and policy environments, which can get in the way of being most effective in work 
with people, by exercising and enacting virtues, discretion and good judgment. Rather than 
being distinct from the theory of practice I develop in this thesis, these narratives resonate 
with this theory of practice, in particular by illuminating complexities of practice and how 
ethical character and qualities can support workers to realise effective practice particularly in 
contexts that can be hostile to such dispositions and conduct. What Pawar, Hugman, 
Alexandra and Anscombe (2017) lack in their account is what I pursue in this thesis, a deeper 
41 
 
examination of the conceptualisation of practice that connects with these ‘on-the-ground’ 
descriptions from human service professionals of Aristotelian and virtue-ethics inspired 
practice.  
 
 
The narrative arc 
 
The problematic that this thesis attempts to contribute towards addressing is that we think we 
know what good practice in human services is, but I don’t think we do. More to the point, I 
think we have a problem with saying what good practice in human services is. In this thesis I 
examine the ways this is evident in the human services literature through a series of 
publications. Throughout my publications I explore what has been written about how to 
achieve good youth and community work and I identify problems that characterise these 
accounts. As well as outlining problems with how we typically think about and try to achieve 
good practice in human services I explore other ways to conceptualise and realise good 
practice. I think there are better ways to know and describe good practice compared to how 
this is typically understood. In the publications that form this thesis I embark on this 
ambitious project that seeks to explore other possibilities for how we could know and do this 
thing called good practice.  
 
In this thesis I do three things. I examine the youth and community work literature and I 
report on some of the ways achieving good practice is typically known and done. In other 
words, in my published work I investigate some of the prevailing ways good practice is 
thought about and I try to show what is present, known, enabled, identified, affirmed, 
disclosed and revealed in relevant literature. Then I critique these accounts and I identify 
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errors and gaps with these approaches. Moreover, I examine whether what is present is a 
problem, danger, limit or challenge, and I describe why this is the case. I identify what is 
wrong with how we typically think about and try to achieve good practice. And finally, I 
explore other possibilities for knowing and doing good practice in human services. To put 
this another way, I explore what is absent, ignored, constrained, foreclosed, denied, hidden, 
and concealed, and I consider whether what is absent is a solution, promise, possibility, or 
opportunity, and why. 
 
In Chapters One and Two I make the case that we are not thinking carefully about what we 
mean by good practice. I argue that in light of this failure what we tend to see in the relevant 
literature are claims that achieving good youth and community work is simple, 
straightforward and uncomplicated. I try to show that these accounts are inadequate. In 
Chapter One I also suggest a number of lines of inquiry to explore other ways of thinking 
about, understanding and realising good practice. I pursue these in subsequent chapters. And 
in Chapter Two I also explore the possibilities afforded by practice theories for thinking 
about good practice in human services. In particular, I explore how practice theories help us 
to think about and do practice in ways that contribute to and enhance the theory of practice I 
am developing.  
 
In Chapter Three I examine how we should conceive the stuff that human services deal with. 
I argue that we are not thinking carefully about the entanglements between how we 
understand human beings and how we understand practice. I try to show that in light of this 
failure what we tend to see in the relevant literature are conceptualisations of people that 
align with neoliberal rationalities of government and that imagine people as objects of 
modern positivist science. I argue that these accounts are inadequate, and I make the case that 
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people, and their lives and relationships should be constituted. I also explore the implications 
of these ways of understanding human beings and practice for achieving good practice in 
subsequent chapters.  
 
In Chapters Four and Five I examine further whether practice that aligns with neoliberal 
forms of government and neoliberal policies should be thought of as good practice. I argue 
that human service practices entangled with neoliberalism afford promises and dangers, 
however typically only the possibilities are revealed at the same time the risks are concealed. 
Overall, I suggest that neoliberal inspired approaches to practice are inadequate. I also 
acknowledge that an alternative political economic framework is unlikely at this point in time 
and I recognise that human services are deeply entangled with neoliberalism. In light of this I 
suggest that thinking about and doing other forms of practice is more difficult than it seems. I 
make the case that, at the very least, the problem with neoliberal practice approaches need to 
be acknowledged and attempts should be made to try to avoid and alleviate them. I explore 
possible practices that might help do just that in other chapters.  
 
In Chapter Six I try to show that the people, problems and practices of human services are 
often thought about in ways that align with positivist conceptions of science and technical 
rationality. I argue that these conceptualisations are inadequate, and I argue that we are not 
thinking carefully about the kinds of knowing and forms of action that are most suited for 
human service practice. I pursue other ways of knowing and doing good practice. In 
particular, I explore the possibilities afforded by Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian accounts of 
practice and I make the case for thinking about and articulating a defensible theory of good 
practice in human services.  
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In Chapter Seven I argue that we are not thinking carefully about the ethically worthwhile 
ends that ought to guide good practice. I try to show that in light of this failure what we tend 
to see in the relevant literature are aims that align with neoliberal technical approaches to 
practice and that reproduce the problems associated with such forms of practice that I 
describe in other chapters. I make the case that these are not the goals that youth and 
community work should be interested in pursuing and securing. And I argue for a better and 
more proper purpose of youth work that coheres with the theory of practice I am developing.  
 
In Chapters Eight and Nine I show that what we tend to see in the relevant literature are 
approaches to education that align with neoliberal technical approaches to practice and that 
reproduce the problems associated with such forms of practice. I argue that these approaches 
to education are inadequate for achieving good practice in human services and I argue that 
the education of human service professionals should be reframed if we are interested in 
achieving good practice. In particular, I make the case for thinking about education in human 
services in ways that align with and support the theory of practice I propose.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
In this thesis I argue that what we tend to see in the relevant literature are ‘common-sense’ 
accounts of human service practice that are often informed by and support a complex mix of 
neoliberal political and policy imperatives and various kinds of technical rational styles of 
administration and management both of which slowly seep often invisibly or unconsciously 
into the daily practice of human service workers, educators and so on, to become as Bourdieu 
would put it part of the habitus of these workers’ practice (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; 
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Maton, 2008). I show that these accounts of practice can inadvertently contribute to the 
problems they are meant to address and can do more harm than good. I add that common-
sense accounts of practice align with how human services are typically regulated and they 
align with prevailing ways the education of human services takes place, including in 
universities, and because of this we see the same types of problems with the 
institutionalisation and reproduction of human services that I argue we see with human 
service practice. I argue that if we are serious about achieving good practice in human 
services then we need to think more clearly about what practice in human services is.  
 
I make the case for articulating a theory of human service practice to inspire new and better 
ways of achieving good practice. This theory of practice draws on the philosophy of Aristotle 
and neo-Aristotelian accounts of practice. In particular, I draw on Dunne who argues that a 
theory of practice is a defensible account of how we should conceptualise the stuff that 
human services deal with, and the sorts of knowing, action and ends that best accord with 
such conceptualisations. I argue that this theory of practice then corresponds to and supports 
the education of professional practice.  
 
I try to show that the beings at the centre of human services should be understood as complex 
(Blaikie, 2007; Davis and Sumara, 2006), unpredictable (Schön, 1987, 1983), wicked (Rittel 
and Webber, 1973), and emergent (Osberg and Biesta, 2008), and this includes the possibility 
that the people, problems and practices of human services can be revealed in multiple and 
contrary ways. I argue that human services hold both promises and dangers for people and 
that good practice is far from self-evident and is highly contestable in each individual case.  
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I argue that phronesis (practical wisdom) is the way of knowing that best corresponds to and 
is most suited to deal with the uncertain, messy, contingent and context-dependent beings of 
human services, which require and deserve ongoing deliberations and good determinations on 
each occasion that are at the same time always tentative and remain open to other suggestions 
and modification especially because our knowledge may be erroneous and incomplete. I 
argue that good practice also requires reflexivity and value rationality to help identify and 
alleviate the problems associated with neoliberal approaches to practice and as an alternative 
to technical rationality and value neutrality.  
 
I make the case for praxis (good action) along with a range of other human activities 
including value-rational deliberation as the forms of action that best align with and are most 
appropriate for dealing with the ever-changing, often inexplicable and always difficult beings 
of human services. I observe that praxis is in accordance with phronesis and can be 
understood in part as durable practice and in part as responding to each case in new ways. It 
involves figuring out and enacting the most desirable course of action in each instance of 
practice while at the same time remaining receptive to other possibilities and doing things 
differently particularly because we might not always be immediately aware of what we are 
doing, and our actions could be doing more harm than good.  
 
I try to show that clarity about our telos will help to re-orient human services to pursuing 
preferred ends and securing goods that are better suited to the entities of human services 
compared to instrumentally designed relations between widely applicable and transferable 
techniques and pre-determined outcomes. I make a case for the telos of youth work to be 
enabling young people to live the good life. Following my accounts of phronesis and praxis 
this orientation of human services towards more desirable and ethical purposes takes the form 
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of a commitment that is always carefully reconsidered at the same time as determinedly 
pursued. However, unlike outputs that can be wholly predetermined, efficiently sought after 
and completely achieved, this is an end that is never fully attained. This is especially the case 
because there is always more that can be known and done and because there are always 
disagreements on the goods to be secured.  
 
Finally, I make the case that education in human services should align with and support this 
theory of practice. In particular, I argue the education of human services need to reproduce 
how the beings of human services are to be conceptualised and the ways of knowing, forms 
of action and ends that cohere. I argue that we should support the development, exercise and 
experience of good practice-as-praxis guided by phronesis in university-based human service 
education.  
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Chapter 1: Not So Straightforward: Achieving Good Youth and Community Work 
 
A significant body of academic work suggests that good practice in youth and community 
work is fairly easy to define, identify, and achieve. Robyn Miller (2009), the Chief 
Practitioner for child protection and youth justice in Victoria, offered a case in point by 
arguing, “while the work can be complex, the essence of good practice is simple”. This 
essence of good practice in human services is typically said to include quality relationships, 
early intervention, a code of ethics, evidence-based practice, and altruism. However, 
perennial failures in social services including statutory child protection systems, youth justice 
centers, and out-of-home care services suggest that good practice is not so straightforward 
(Bessant, Hil and Watts, 2005; Victorian Auditor General, 2014; Victorian Ombudsman 
2011, 2010a, 2010b, 2009). 
 
In this chapter, I follow Lather’s (2007) lead and ‘trouble’ common and popular accounts of 
good practice in human services. I also draw on Bacchi’s (2009, 2012) “what’s the problem 
represented to be?” approach to critically interrogate representations of how good human 
service practice can be achieved. These approaches suggest that if we are serious about 
articulating and achieving good practice in human services, then a good place to start is to 
investigate the gaps, errors, and failed attempts in the literature to explain what good human 
service work is and how it can be achieved. 
 
I make the case that descriptions of good practice in fields such as social work, youth work, 
aged care, and disability care are often flawed. In particular, two problems with the literature 
are examined and these concerns are illustrated with relevant case studies. First, I identify 
deficiencies with accounts of good practice in the human services. I analyse the Australian 
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Youth Affairs Coalition’s (AYAC) (2013b, 2013c) definition of youth work to demonstrate 
the failure in the literature to articulate an adequately complex account of good practice. 
Second, I explore shortcomings with the sort of regulation that is characteristically suggested 
for good practice. The Community Sector Reform project that took place in Victoria, 
Australia is analyzed as a case in point (Shergold, 2013; Victorian Council of Social Services 
(VCOSS), 2014). This chapter complements my other critiques of what has been written on 
good practice in youth and community work (Emslie, 2014a, 2014b). Collectively these 
criticisms challenge common approaches to theorising, reproducing, and institutionalising 
good practice in human services (Dunne, 2005).  
 
 
Accounts of good practice: The AYAC definition of youth work 
 
A significant problem with the literature is that attempts to spell out what good practice in 
youth and community work looks like are often simplistic, not well thought out, and lack 
intellectual rigour. Such representations of good practice can be found in official reports, 
academic literature and social service sector documents. A recent example is the AYAC 
(2013) definition of youth work: 
‘Youth work is a practice that places young people and their interests first. Youth 
work is a relational practice, where the youth worker operates alongside the person in 
their context. Youth work is an empowering practice that advocates for and facilitates 
a young person’s independence, participation in society, connectedness and 
realization of their rights.’  
AYAC’s definition of youth work is a typical attempt to describe good human service work 
and features flaws typically found in such accounts. 
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AYAC claims that good youth work places young people and their interests first. Prioritising 
the person being helped as the primary client, constituent or consideration features in 
accounts of good practice in caring work and is often described as person- or client-centered 
care (Casemore, 2011; Rogers, 1965; Tolan and Wilkins, 2012). However, contrary accounts 
argue that youth and community work serves other interests, regardless of the intent or claim 
to serve the interests of service users (Bessant, 2004a, 2004b; France and Wiles, 1997; Skott-
Myhre, 2006a). According to Habermas (1971, 1974), there are complex links between 
different types of human interests, knowledges and actions. Habermas’s account of 
knowledge-constitutive interests – the idea that humans have deep-seated interests that are the 
foundations of how we know the world and how we act in it – suggests that helping-
professionals may be deluded when they claim to put clients’ interests first. More to the 
point, and drawing on Grundy (1987, p. 17), "the coercion of technical [interest] and the 
possible deceit of the practical [interest]" could be at play in human service work regardless 
of any claim to client-centredness. The challenges associated with achieving client-centred 
care are overlooked or minimised. For example, care workers have to take into consideration 
and negotiate a vast range of powerful interests in their everyday work. These include service 
agreement and funding conditions, organisational demands, and the concerns and 
perspectives of other people such as parents, managers, policymakers, and other practitioners. 
According to Higgins (2011), good practice in the helping professions relies on securing the 
interests of the helpers, not just those being helped. Much human service work takes place in 
involuntary and statutory circumstances or incorporates mutual obligation elements that 
require people to do nominated activities to be eligible to receive assistance (Trotter, 2014; 
Yeatman, 2000). People who have no choice but to get such services may argue the 
interventions are punitive and are not serving their interests first. 
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AYAC claims youth work is a relational practice. The idea that good practice in human 
service work relies on quality relationships between practitioners and the people they help 
has been asserted ad nauseam (Hubble, Duncan and Miller, 1999; Morphitis, 2014; Rodd and 
Stewart, 2007, Rogers, 1965). However, this claim is often made with inadequate attention 
paid to the possible problems of such relationships. This includes how human service 
relationships can and do contribute to reproducing inequalities and prejudices, and may be 
used as a way to control and dominate people (Bessant, 2004b, 2004c; Furedi, 2004; Szasz, 
2008). According to Foucault (1995), helping relationships are an example of a disciplinary 
practice that promotes “docile bodies” and normalization, and such effects may be contrary to 
the goods that quality relationships in caring work claim to realise. On a different note, 
approaches to caring work that focus on relationships, such as case work, counselling, and 
group work, can individualise the responsibility for problems and fail to engage with, or 
attempt to change, social and economic conditions that may contribute to producing and 
exacerbating such problems (McDonald, 2006; Moore, 2009). Somewhat paradoxically, 
Szasz (1961) suggested relationship-based individual-oriented interventions such as 
psychotherapy are used to absolve personal responsibility for wrong-doing.  
 
AYAC argues that youth work is an empowering practice. Accounts of human service 
practice regularly make reference to empowerment as something worthwhile to pursue 
(Fitzsimons, Cooper, Russell and Hope, 2011; Nicholls, 2012). However, empowerment is 
not necessarily a good worth securing, and should be pursued critically (Fook, 2002; Pease, 
2002). According to Dean (2010), practices and processes of empowerment can be 
understood as ways of governing that serve to foster certain forms of self-understanding or 
subjectivity, and self-rule or conduct. These kinds of subjectivities and types of conduct may 
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not be in the best interests of those being empowered. Representations of empowerment in 
accounts of good practice in the helping professions too often overlook such critiques. 
 
AYAC suggests a range of actions and goals that youth work should advocate for and 
facilitate. Accounts of good caring work often feature an assortment of such activities and 
purposes. However, as the AYAC definition demonstrates, often these lists are incoherent 
and contradictory. AYAC argues that youth work ought to facilitate goods that can be 
incompatible: independence and connectedness. For example, should youth work facilitate 
young people’s independence from or connection to their family? AYAC also claims youth 
work should enable young people’s participation in society and realisation of their rights; 
ends that may also oppose one another. In particular, problems with the concept of society 
aside, it could well be that ‘society’ is the problem for young people. Encouraging 
participation in society may exacerbate rather than address young people’s concerns and do 
nothing to help with realising their rights. The suggestion youth work ought to be rights-
based aligns somewhat with diverse accounts of human service work variously described as 
structural, critical, radical, constructive, and anti-oppressive (Allan, Briskman and Pease, 
2009; Dominelli, 2002; Ife, 2012; Mullaly, 2012). However, according to McDonald (2006, 
pp. 171-186), such perspectives are often abstract and have little relevance to what takes 
place in practice. For example, there is a growing trend in social service provision towards 
emphasising welfare recipients’ responsibilities rather than their rights. This is not to suggest 
caring work should not have good intentions. Clarity on the purpose of the helping 
professions is only one aspect of an account of practice that has integrity (Dunne, 2005). 
Articulating good youth and community work is more complex than the AYAC definition 
suggests. 
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Deficiencies with descriptions of good human service work 
 
As well as the aforementioned problems, further shortcomings are found in typical 
representations of good human service work. For example, descriptions of good practice in 
human services typically lack defensible conceptualisations of the key concepts ‘good’, 
‘practice’, and ‘human services’. The ‘good’ in good youth and community work is often 
conceived as outcomes that are distinct to the processes involved in achieving them 
(Australian Research Alliance for Children and Youth (ARACY), 2009; AYAC and 
ARACY, 2014). However, means and ends may not be separable in good human service 
work (Arendt, 1958, pp. 206-207; Dunne, 1997; Schön, 1987, p. 78). Since Aristotle (2009, p. 
3) first argued, “all human activities aim at some good”, there has been debate concerning the 
goods that practices ought to realise. Too often, there is a failure in the literature to 
adequately deliberate on the goods that good practice in youth and community work should 
be interested in securing. For example, McDonald (2006) is preoccupied with the 
implications of the changing institutional context for social work but does not adequately 
engage in value-rational deliberation on whether emerging kinds of social work practice are 
desirable, and subsequently what should be done (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  
 
Turning to the concept ‘practice’, accounts of human service work typically fail to engage 
with the rich and growing practice theory (Bourdieu, 2001; Green, 2009; MacIntyre, 1984; 
Reckwitz, 2002a; Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and Von Savigny, 2001; Shove, Pantzar and 
Watson, 2012). According to this literature, the relationship between theory and practice, or 
knowledge and action, is more complex than is generally suggested in representations of 
human service work. More to the point, good practice in the human realm is not simply the 
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result of practitioners applying knowledge that has been delivered to them (Bondi, Carr, 
Clark and Clegg, 2011; Dunne, 2005; Polkinghorne, 2004; Schön, 1991). Descriptions of 
social work also typically lack the kind of discursive articulation or theory that, according to 
Dunne (2005), is critical for such practice to have integrity. Furthermore, practice in the 
helping professions is often conceptualised as a ‘science’ or an ‘art’, or a combination of the 
two, without a clear articulation of what these are, or whether there are other and better 
conceptualisations of good youth- and community work, for example as a ‘praxis’ (Green, 
2009; Kelly and Stanely, 2012; Morphitis, 2014; Samson, 2015). Even trying to understand 
or map the field of social services is not an easy task (Australian Council of Social Services, 
2014; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2017; Australian Youth Affairs Coalition, 
2013a; Healy and Lonne, 2010; Lyons, 1993; 2001; Martin and Healy, 2010; Powell, Cortis, 
Ramia and Marjolin, 2017; Productivity Commission, 2010; Steering Committee for the 
Review of Government Service Provision, 2014a). For example, it is unclear whether the 
terms used in the literature to describe human services, such as caring work, youth and 
community work, welfare and social work, helping professions, and social intervention work, 
refer to the same thing. 
 
The literature on good caring work demonstrates a penchant for tame solutions. Textbooks 
and good practice guides demonstrate this trend that suggests good practice is fairly easily 
defined, identified, and demonstrated (Egan, 2010; Scales and Leffert, 2004). Other examples 
include claims that the key to good practice in people professions is workers possessing a set 
of transferable and generalised skills, or implementing a particular intervention or technique 
such as therapeutic residential care, motivational interviewing, mentoring, cognitive 
behavioural therapy, or mindfulness (Schön, 1991; Trotter, 2006, pp. 13-26; Wilson and 
Wilson, 2014). These approaches may have something to offer a project interested in 
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achieving good youth and community work outcomes. However, achieving good practice in 
social welfare is better characterised as a ‘wicked problem’ (Australian Public Service 
Commission, 2007; Rittel and Webber, 1973; West Churchman, 1967). According to the 
literature on wicked problems, tame solutions to achieving good practice in the helping 
professions are deficient. For example, tame solutions are represented as the way to achieve 
good practice and disregard, foreclose, and ignore critiques and other possibilities. Tame 
solutions are reductionist and fail to adequately acknowledge or deal with the complexity of 
good practice in human services. Proponents of complexity theory provide useful 
characterisations and comparisons between complicated and complex systems (Blaikie, 2007, 
206-214; Davis, Sumara and Luce-Kaplar, 2008, 75-89). According to this perspective, tame 
solutions resonate with a complicated account on achieving good caring work, which 
suggests that all the components and their relationships can be isolated and known to enable 
linear causal explanations and subsequently universal predictive theory. According to 
Flyvbjerg (2001, pp. 29-30), this is where the value of complexity theory ends for the social 
sciences and for answering the question: how can good practice in youth and community 
work be achieved? Tame solutions also insist that caring workers obey and follow 
instructions rather than think carefully about what they are doing and whether it is the good 
or right thing to do. In other words, they lack a substantial ethical or moral dimension. 
 
Accounts of good youth and community work have a contradictory tendency towards being 
simultaneously relativist and universalist (Flyvbjerg, 2001, pp. 99-101, 120). The trend to 
relativism or nihilism is demonstrated by claims that there is no correct or wrong way of 
doing human service work, and that any account of good practice is as good as any other 
(Gharabaghi and Anderson-Nathe, 2013; Skott-Myhre, 2006b). For example, Belton (2014, 
xi-xxi) argues, “youth work is not what one person says it is, youth work is what all youth 
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workers do”. The suggestion that anything can or should count as good practice in the helping 
professions is problematic. Often, this point of view corresponds to a belief that people 
should not impose their values or morality on others. However, this is a moral position that 
aligns with liberalism and therefore is an imposition of a moral framework. It is also difficult 
to defend the idea that good practice is all about individual preferences and people doing 
whatever they want, particularly when social service interventions harm, oppress, exploit, 
deceive, or control people. The affinity with universalism aligns with an interest in 
discovering rationally and universally grounded norms and predictive theories of human 
action (Flyvbjerg, 2001). The penchant for rules, laws, codes of ethics, evidence-based 
practice, and replicable interventions is evidence of a trend that, according to Dunne (1997), 
Flyvbjerg (2001), and Polkinghorne (2004) demonstrates the inappropriate use of methods 
commonly found in, and privileged by, the natural sciences, which are unreflectively adopted 
by those working in the social sciences. To claim value judgments cannot be made about 
good social welfare work or to argue the opposite – that good practice is dependent on 
context-independent norms – represents a failure to argue a defensible conceptualisation of 
the good. Moreover, it demonstrates a failure to provide a solid answer to the moral, 
practical, or ethical question: what should one do? 
 
Representations of good practice in the people professions too often fail to explore the critical 
philosophical question that does and should shape conceptualisations of good human service 
practice: who or what are we? For example, some writers have argued that the way young 
people, or adolescents, are constructed and understood, is fundamental to understanding 
youth work (Bradford, 2012; Jeffs and Smith, 1999, pp. 45-66). However, most of the time 
no attention is given to such concepts, their criteria, or the implications of how they are used 
to describe what youth work is. Also, typically absent in the literature on human service work 
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is a consideration of the relationships between how practitioners should be understood and 
achieving good practice. According to Freire (1985, p. 43), “every educational practice 
implies a concept of man [sic] and the world”. In the same way, any description of caring 
work entails a conceptualisation of the things that the practice is dealing with. Similarly, 
Dean (2010, p. 27) argues, we “govern others and ourselves according to various truths about 
our existence and nature as human beings”. Accounts of good human service work typically 
overlook articulating ‘truths’ about how people are and ought to be constituted or known, as 
well as the implications of these constructions for understanding and achieving good practice 
(Yeatman, Dowsett, Fine and Guransky, 2009). These flaws demonstrate a failure in the 
literature to articulate an adequately complex account of good practice in youth and 
community work. 
 
 
Regulating for good practice: The Community Sector Reform project 
 
Another key problem found in the relevant literature is that the sort of regulation typically 
suggested to achieve good practice in the helping professions is inadequate. In an advanced 
industrial country such as Australia, the funding and regulation of human services is 
extensive and encompasses laws, policies, and approaches operating in different jurisdictions 
as they apply to various activities. These include government processes and budgets, 
industrial relations and workplace related matters, the planning and administration of social 
services, the care and protection of specific populations (for example: children, families, 
people with disabilities and mental health concerns), and the professional organisation of 
particular occupations. A recent example is the Victorian Government’s Service Sector 
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Reform Project (Shergold, 2014; VCOSS, 2014). This initiative provides a good illustration 
of four strategies that feature in such projects. 
 
Plans to regulate social services tend to focus on achieving economic efficiency and not 
burdening government with added expenditure. This is demonstrated by an obsession with 
the budget bottom line, cost-cutting, pursuing lower costs, reducing waste, securing value for 
money, ensuring the good management of scarce resources, getting a return on investment, 
and creating public value (Shergold, 2014, p. 5). This practice is aligned with the use of 
market mechanisms that supposedly reduce the financial liability on governments such as 
privatisation, corporatisation, competitive tendering, contracting, contestability, procurement, 
commissioning, social finance, social enterprise, efficiency dividends, and enhancing 
productivity. Similarly, Shergold (2014, p. 5) argues, “more effort is needed to leverage 
private capital for public good,” and techniques to achieve this include introducing market 
processes and for-profit providers into the welfare sector. According to this approach to 
regulating the human service sector, governments do not have the revenue, capacity, or 
willingness to fund and invest in welfare services to meet demand. Therefore, funding models 
are proposed that prioritise constraints on public spending and reduce pressure on 
government expenditure (Harper, Anderson, O’Bryan and McCluskey, 2014). These models 
are based on two assumptions. First, that the private sector is more efficient at delivering 
social services compared to the public sector. Second, that competition leads to better quality 
goods and services. These strategies also rely on a conception of government as best suited to 
act as a ‘steward’ and play particular roles such as policy developer and service planner, 
contractor and purchaser, and leave the responsibility of service delivery to others (VCOSS, 
2014). 
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Human service regulatory projects generally emphasise attaining predetermined targets or 
outcomes. For example, Shergold (2014, p. 5) argues, “an outcomes framework should be 
developed to establish metrics against which impact performance will be audited, monitored, 
measured and reported over time”. Other techniques suggested to secure planned results 
include benchmarking, comparative performance reporting, quality auditing, provider 
oversight, accountability regimes, service standards, evidence-based practice, behavioural 
objectives models, and funding outputs (ARACY, 2009; Pearson, 2010; Productivity 
Commission, 2010; Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 
2014a). An enthusiasm for defining, measuring, and evaluating outcomes in human services 
corresponds to the production of instruments and methods that claim to be able to do just that, 
which include Results Based Accountability, Social Return on Investment, and the Australian 
Government’s ‘RoGS’ (Friedman, 20019; Millar and Hall, 2013; Steering Committee for the 
Review of Government Service Provision, 2014b). This approach to regulating caring work 
suggests social welfare services lack accountability and transparency, and youth and 
community workers can and should be more carefully controlled to reduce waste and secure 
good practice. The emphasis on outcomes frameworks also demonstrates an interest in 
improving social services by “shifting the focus from [increasing] the level of resources to the 
efficient and effective use of those [available] resources” (Steering Committee for the Review 
of Government Service Provision, 2014b, p. 1.4).  
 
Initiatives interested in regulating the helping professions to achieve good practice are 
typically fixated on enhancing integration and partnerships between stakeholders. This 
preoccupation is variously described as: better and increasing collaboration; embedded 
partnerships; holistic planning and coordinated provision; a joined-up approach; interagency 
cooperation; networked governance; a whole of government approach; and players 
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cooperating and working together (Doyle, 2013; Pearson, 2010; Productivity Commission, 
2010). In addition, Shergold (2014, pp. 405) suggests “intergovernmental cross-sectoral 
collaboration” and that “services need to be wrapped around the individual”. The focus on 
integration relies to some extent on a particular problem-framing exercise. The service 
system is criticised for operating with silos, dealing with problems in an isolated manner, 
being fragmented, lacking coordination, and exhibiting duplication (Webb and Vulliamy, 
2001, pp. 315-332; Wood, Westwood and Thompson, 2015, pp. 103-115).  
 
Finally, projects aimed at regulating good human service practice usually have an interest in 
improving workforce capabilities and skills. At times, this is represented as a workforce 
strategy or a workforce capability framework (Doyle, 2013). This proposal recognises that 
caring work is increasingly complex and requires a high level of knowledge and expertise. 
Shergold (2014) identifies a number of examples of changes to practice that place significant 
demands on practitioners, including new models of public administration such as 
individualised funding and place-based solutions, the adoption of new technology, and the 
need for culturally competent practices. In this instance, the relationship between achieving 
good practice and having a quality workforce is acknowledged, but is limited to skills gaps or 
care workers lacking the required competencies. 
 
These key approaches to regulating the people professions may contribute to achieving good 
practice. However, these strategies are often proposed and pursued without adequate scrutiny. 
At the same time, other kinds of regulation are overlooked. 
 
 
Problems with social service regulatory projects 
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The sorts of regulation typically suggested to achieve good practice in youth and community 
work are inadequate. One significant problem is the failure to understand, explain, and 
address chronic under-resourcing. The underfunding of welfare services is well documented; 
however, this is typically ignored or downplayed by official social sector reform projects 
(Australian Council of Social Services (ACOSS), 2014a; Cortis, et al., 2013; McKail, 2015; 
Productivity Commission, 2010). The obsession with reducing the burden on public funding 
and cost-cutting overshadows any investigation on the question: is cheaper better? The 
negative implications of short-term funding contracts and erratic changes to funding and 
service models that often follow election cycles are overlooked (ACOSS, 2014b). Failing to 
get a mention is the fact that insufficient funding impairs the capacity of the helping 
professions to deliver quality services. Also missing is any reference to how inadequately 
funding welfare services can end up costing governments and care providers more in the long 
run. An example of such a false economy is the plethora of government inquiries and 
compensation schemes for survivors of institutional abuse; costly exercises which may have 
been avoided if quality social services were funded and delivered in the first place (Pearson 
and Portelli, 2015; Swain, 2014).  
 
On a similar note, social service regulatory projects fail to examine whether human services 
should simply be treated as another form of business (Davidson, 2014; Kerr, 2014; Smyth, 
2014). In the quest to reduce pressure on public expenditure, it is assumed that the welfare 
sector can and should mimic the private sector. However, the rationalisation for reforming 
social services using market-oriented principles and processes, fails to acknowledge that the 
ideal purpose of the helping professions should not be to maximise profit but to provide care. 
Since the 1970s, Australian governments have increasingly been using market-based 
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mechanisms in the public sector as a way to cut costs (Jamrozik, 2009; Pusey, 1991). 
However, human service sector regulatory projects fail to provide an adequate assessment of 
whether such reforms secure more effective and efficient services (Bessant, 1997; Bessant 
and Emslie, 1997; Eddy, 2004; Hodge, 1999; O’Connor, Wilson and Setterland, 2003; Stone, 
2013; Verspaandonk, 2015; Webber and Bessant, 2001). At the same time, they overlook the 
negative impacts of welfare reform, including government outsourcing and commissioning, 
on service providers and service users, particularly in cases where less than full cost funding 
is provided (Barrett, 2000; Catholic Social Services Victoria, 2014; Marston and Watts, 
2004). Most recently, the Australian Government’s commissioned Competition Policy 
Review recommended the further extension of competition policy in human services (Harper 
et al., 2014). This is a curious proposition in light of the role of the community welfare sector 
to address the flaws of free markets; the proposal for a ‘fully marketised’ social service 
system has received criticism for promoting inequality (Cahill, 2014). The logic of bounded 
rationality suggests contracting processes fail to take into account the benefits of social 
services that are difficult to observe and measure. These include positive externalities and 
goods, such as human service providers’ mission to promote the common good, reducing 
inequality, and incidental improvements to wellbeing associated with human contact and 
relationships. Another problem typically not considered is the cost of privatisation and 
performance regulation. Often, not-for-profit and welfare services incur contract procurement 
and management cost burdens (National Council of Nonprofits, 2014; Pearson, 2010; 
Pettijohn, Boris and Farrell, 2014). Priority is given to transferring financial and other risks 
away from the public sector over ensuring the delivery of quality services. Meaningful 
deliberation on the role of the state to invest in social services is evaded in the enthusiasm to 
transform welfare services into another form of business. A key question that fails to be 
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answered is this: should governments be shirking their responsibilities to deliver civic staples 
such as good youth and community work? 
 
Plans to regulate the people professions typically ignore shortcomings with outcomes 
frameworks. A substantial body of work critical of the preoccupation with achieving clearly 
defined and measurable outcomes in helping professions is disregarded (Bondi, Carr, Clark 
and Clegg, 2011; Dunne, 1997; Grundy, 1987; Ord, 2014; Polkinghorne, 2004; Schön, 1991). 
According to critics, outcomes-oriented practice aligns with a technical or instrumental 
rationality that may not be best suited for good practice in the human realm. For example, the 
emphasis on a technical approach to caring work and all that it entails, such as controlling 
practice to produce pre-determined goals, overshadows practical reasoning as well as the 
roles played by intuition, good timing, and luck. The eagerness to employ a technical 
rationality to achieve good practice in youth and community work forgets that the ‘material’ 
being dealt with are unique and complex human beings, and not stable or passive objects that 
can or should be fashioned into ‘outcomes’. We need to adequately consider the potentially 
harmful consequences of rigidly implementing outcomes frameworks into the lives of human 
beings. 
 
The limits and contradictions associated with evidence-based practice raise another range of 
complications for outcomes frameworks (Grey and McDonald, 2006; Marston and Watts, 
2003; Taylor, 2003). The critiques of evidence-based practice suggest good practice in human 
services relies on the fine-tuned adjustment of decision-making and service provision to 
context. This is in stark contrast to the imposition of interventions or “cookie-cutter, top-
down, one-size-fits-all approaches” to social welfare that often characterise outcomes- and 
evidence-based approaches (Cox, 2014). Paradoxically, as Cox (2015) observes, governments 
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have ignored the evidence on outcomes from social welfare interventions. The challenges and 
limits associated with ascertaining, quantifying, and tracking outcomes and impacts are also 
often overlooked. For example, any representation of an outcome in human services is 
interpretive and contestable, and not everything of value can be measured or calculated. 
Outcomes frameworks are generally associated with empirically tested and rationally 
grounded evidence and as a result are presented as scientific, value-neutral, and objective. 
However, the interest in defining, measuring, and evaluating outcomes in the people 
professions typically aligns with a focus on managing scarce resources and attaining cost 
savings rather than pursuing adequate investment or questioning under-resourcing. 
 
Orienting practice to achieve tightly defined outcomes typically relies on hierarchical modes 
of organisation that comply with inflexible procedures and prescriptions (Hocking, 2005; 
Walter, 2007). This runs counter to the idea that good practice in human services requires 
phronesis and workers exercising good professional judgment (Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; 
Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010). It also ignores the pitfalls and dangers associated with being 
compliant in the helping professions (Kelly, 1991). According to Schwartz and Sharpe (2010, 
p. 12), “rules can kill skill”, and demanding compliance in practice of care can erode 
practitioners’ moral skill and capacity to provide good care. Generally missing from lists of 
pre-determined measurable outcomes are the vital role youth and community workers ought 
to play in critiquing government policy, critically questioning public institutions, and publicly 
advocating for social change when appropriate. 
 
Outcomes frameworks usually ignore the value of ongoing deliberation on worthwhile ends. 
Outcomes are typically decided well in advance of practice taking place. Subsequently, the 
focus of practice becomes figuring out the most efficient and effective way to achieve the 
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pre-determined outcomes. In other words, the means become the ends. However, identifying 
techniques to secure outcomes may not be ends worth pursuing. Rutter and Brown (2012, p. 
31) make the salient point, “we need to not only ask if we are doing things right, but also if 
we are doing the right thing and how do we decide what is right”? Practitioners and service 
users should be adequately supported so they can actively engage in shaping and debating the 
goods that human services should pursue. It may well be that a fundamental purpose of good 
social service work is to promote democracy, which includes encouraging and enabling 
people to think deeply about, critically examine, and publicly discuss living well and having a 
good life. 
 
The fixation with enhancing integration between stakeholders is incoherent. For example, it 
ignores the inherent tensions between and among government departments and service 
providers competing for scarce resources, at the same time as demanding that they all 
cooperate and work together. The extensive networking, partnerships, and collaboration 
taking place is disregarded (Cortis and Blaxland, 2014, p. 1). The value in having a diversity 
of service providers, including the choice this offers service users, is overlooked. At the same 
time government-commissioned regulatory projects criticise social services for lacking 
coordination, they fail to mention governments’ role in defunding and devaluing networks. 
Networking is not seen as direct service delivery and is therefore generally not considered a 
funding priority. According to Ryan (2003), “there is actually very little objective evidence 
that integrating services leads to measurable changes for people”. Focusing on enhanced 
integration also fails to adequately address the complexity and challenges associated with 
interagency collaborations and partnerships (Atwool, 2003; Pearson, 2010; Webb and 
Vulliamy, 2001). Finally, promoting collaboration between all stakeholders can sideline, 
marginalise, or drown out the voices or role of those people who should be central or critical 
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– the people who the work is meant to help. However, are service users simply another 
stakeholder? 
 
The concern with skills gaps in the workforce is insufficient. There is a failure to 
acknowledge and address inadequate wages and working conditions in caring work. Well-
documented workforce concerns missing from social service regulatory projects include job 
insecurity, casualisation, underemployment, unmanageable workloads, the lack of career 
structures, and poor-quality supervision (ACOSS, 2014a; Healy and Lonne, 2010; National 
Disability Services Victoria, 2011; Productivity Commission, 2010). The poor recognition 
and low status of caring work does not receive enough, if any, attention. This is surprising in 
light of the significant acknowledgment this issue was accorded in Australia as part of the 
Social and Community Service Workers Equal Remuneration Case (Layton, Smith and 
Stewart, 2013). Associated concerns such as workforce shortages, and challenges with 
recruitment, retention, and staff turnover, are similarly overlooked (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare, 2013; Cortis and Blaxland, 2014; Cortis et al., 2013; Healy and Lonne, 
2010; Martin and Healy, 2010; McArthur and Thomson, 2012; Productivity Commission, 
2010, 2011a). A false economy is produced by underfunding a low paid, inexperienced, 
demoralised, churning workforce – but this fails to rate a mention. The social service 
workforce is unprofessionalised and unregulated; the implications of this to achieving good 
practice are ignored (Emslie, 2012; Healy and Lonne, 2010). Many workers lack credentials 
or have only a vocational level certificate, but competency-based training is insufficient 
(Bessant and Emslie, 2014; Healy and Lonne, 2010). Much more needs to be done to recruit, 
develop, and retain a high-quality workforce than is typically suggested (Healy and Lonne, 
2010; Laragy et al., 2013). Basically, the point missed in official social sector regulatory 
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projects is that a good quality, high capacity, and sustainable welfare sector relies on good 
quality carers who are well educated, well paid, and well supported. 
 
These silences, omissions, inadequacies, gaps, contradictions, uncertainties, and oversights 
demonstrate the failure in the literature to argue a good case for the kind of regulation needed 
to achieve good practice in youth and community work. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that representations of good youth and community work are 
often deficient. In particular, too often descriptions of good caring work are overly simplistic 
and not well thought out. I have suggested that far more complex accounts of practices of 
care are warranted. These should draw on the expanding literature on practice theory that 
offers valuable intellectual resources for thinking about and articulating good human service 
work. 
 
I have also made the case that common approaches to funding and regulating the helping 
professions to achieve good practice are inadequate. In particular, I have critiqued a number 
of strategies that typically feature in human service regulatory projects. I observed the types 
of regulation that are often overlooked but could go a long way towards achieving good 
social welfare work, including investing in a well-educated, well paid, and well supported 
workforce.  
 
68 
 
Understanding and achieving good practice in human services is not as simple or 
straightforward as much of the literature suggests. These problems warrant further research 
into the question: how can good practice in youth and community work be achieved?  
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Chapter 2: ‘One-eyed hobby horses’, practice theories and good youth work 
 
“Practice” is typically represented in the youth and community work literature in Australia, 
European Union countries (EU) and the United States of America (USA) in three ways. First, 
there is a tendency to dichotomise, compare and subjugate the idea of practice to a range of 
other ideas that include theory, policy, research, knowledge, discourse and education (herein I 
refer to these different ideas as theory); that is, something referred to as practice is usually 
conceptualised as ‘Other’ and inferior to something else described as theory (Green, 2009; 
Nielsen, 2007). Second, a thing called practice is conceived as something that emerges from 
and is dependent on another thing called theory (Buchroth and Parkin, 2010; Schön, 1991, 
1987). And, finally, the concept of practice does not receive comparable intellectual attention 
to that of theory. For example, Drury Hudson (1997), Gambrill (2013) and Thompson (2000) 
examined types of theory and kinds of knowledge that they argued are relevant to human 
service work. However, the authors did not explore sorts of practice. These observations 
point to a failure to adequately examine the idea of practice in the youth and community work 
literature.8 This failure helps to explain the significant body of work that suggests good 
practice in youth work is fairly obvious. This can be described as the commonsense account 
practice that relies on a good deal of talk about quality relationships, empowerment, skills, 
passion and other “one-eyed hobby horses” (Stanner, 2010, p. 218). In this article I examine 
some of the prevailing approaches to youth work, and I explore some more sophisticated 
ways of thinking about good youth work practice. 
 
                                               
8 Whether this same literature adequately examines the idea of theory is another question that is beyond the 
scope of this paper and in need of further investigation.  
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I begin by analysing three ways good practice in youth work is commonly described and 
pursued. I argue that such approaches are based on inappropriate reasons, overlook criticisms, 
and are inadequate because good practice in youth and community work is better thought of 
as a wicked problem that requires wicked solutions (Rittel and Webber, 1973). I make the 
case that practice theories, which are missing from the youth work literature, offer more in 
the way of wicked solutions compared to the conventional approaches to practice that I 
critique. I examine three theories of practice and discuss their implications for 
conceptualising and achieving good youth work.   
 
 
Three prevailing approaches to youth work 
 
Youth engagement in education and training 
 
Youth engagement is typically conceived as a good in youth work practice. Youth 
engagement practices in youth work encompass young people’s engagement with peers, 
family and community, young people’s involvement in political processes and decisions 
affecting their lives, and youth participation in policy and program development and 
evaluation (Sapin, 2009; Slattery, 2001; VeLure Roholt and Cutler, 2012). At the same time 
in Australia, the EU and the USA, there has been a preoccupation with engaging all young 
people in education and training and to a lesser extent employment (Australian Government, 
2010; Bessant and Watts, 2014; Council of Australian Government, 2009; European 
Commission, 2015; Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs, 2013, p. 7). In 
Australia, for example, this interest has coincided with numerous funded youth work 
initiatives that aim to contribute to young people’s participation, attainment and retention in 
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education and training, to support young people’s “positive” pathways into the labour market 
and school-to-work transitions, and to identify and respond to vulnerable and disadvantaged 
young people “at-risk” of leaving school early (Australian Government, 2015; te Riele and 
Gorur, 2015). Programs have included the Transition to Work program, Youth Connections, 
Local Learning Employment Networks (LLEN), School Focused Youth Service (SFYS), 
truancy officers, career advice and various supports services that include youth workers in 
schools and other educational settings. Engaging all young people in extensive periods of the 
right sort of education and training is represented as good way to address critical youth issues 
and to create opportunities for young people. For example, proponents argue that such 
engagement promotes and enables young people’s employability, workforce participation, 
productivity, income stability, financial security, social mobility and development of the right 
skills and capacities to adapt to economic and technological change (Deloitte Access 
Economics, 2012; Foundation for Young Australians, 2015a, 2015b; Ministerial Council on 
Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs, 2008; Wyn, 2009a). It is suggested that 
engaging in education contributes towards preventing a range of social, health and wellbeing 
problems (Australian Youth Affairs Coalition, 2012; Education to Employment (e2e) 
Working Group, 2015; KPMG, 2009; The Smith Family, 2014; Wilson, Stemp and McGinty, 
2011). And investment in quality education and intellectual or human capital is said to result 
in positive economic payoffs that include increased economic growth, improved employment 
prospects and better paying jobs (Becker, 1993; Foundation for Young Australians, 2014; 
Gillies, 2011).  
 
However, a number of “inconvenient facts” and “uncomfortable knowledge” suggests 
problems with these reasons for youth engagement in education and training (Bessant and 
Broadley, 2016; Weber, 1946). For example, in Australia, youth unemployment, long-term 
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youth unemployment, youth underemployment and child and youth poverty are significant 
and intractable problems (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2015; Foundation for 
Young Australians, 2014; Headley and Moffatt, 2015; Phillips et al., 2013). Parker (2016) 
reported that at the same time higher education has expanded, a fact that coincides with 
increasing participation and retention in other levels of education, social inequality, income 
inequality and wealth inequality have also risen. There are reports that it is taking many 
young Australian longer to find full-time work after graduating from higher education and 
that precarious low-paid insecure jobs and incomes are becoming the norm for many young 
people (Campbell, 2015; Chohan, 2016; Foundation for Young Australians, 2015a, 2015b; 
Jackson, 2015; Standing, 2011). Basically, there are not enough full-time well-paid jobs for 
all the young people who want one. It is well recognised that income support measures for 
young people and students in Australia are inadequate especially in light of Australia’s high 
costs of living (Marsh and McGaurr, 2013). These problems are coupled with high rates of 
deprivation, financial stress and housing affordability stress among Australia’s university 
students and young people and increasing higher education and other debts that contribute to 
a range of social, health and wellbeing problems (Bexley et al., 2013; Davie, 2015). Similar 
problems have been reported in many EU countries and the USA (Giroux, 2012; Howker and 
Malik, 2013; Males, 1996; OECD, 2014; Putnam, 2015). It is unclear whether and how 
engaging all young people in education and training is addressing these “inconvenient facts” 
and achieving the goods that such engagement is reasoned to secure. Žižek (2015, 2011), 
Vally and Motala (2014) and Quiggin (2012) suggest that the “inconvenient facts” indicate 
fundamental problems with global capitalism and neoliberalism, and no amount of engaging 
all young people in any sort of education and training will resolve them. In light of these 
problems youth work practice that aims to improve young people’s engagement in education 
and training for the reasons previously mentioned might be an example of what Berlant 
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(2011) describes as “a relation of cruel optimism”. Moreover, these critiques suggest that 
engaging young people in education and training is not necessarily good youth work. 
 
 
Practice models 
 
A significant body of literature in Australia, the EU and the USA suggests good practice in 
youth work is achieved by mastering and implementing a specific intervention, framework or 
model. This is the idea of theory as a model of, or for, practice that is exemplified by Egan 
(2010) and includes approaches such as strength-based practice and integrated service 
models, developing young people’s emotional intelligence and mindfulness and using 
assessment and screening instruments (e.g., Carr-Gregg, Enderby and Grover, 2003; 
Elkington et al., 2006; Gullone et al., 2000). Given the space constraints of a journal article, I 
cannot examine every example and instead provide a case study to demonstrate the 
limitations with such accounts. The Search Institute’s approach to positive youth 
development provides a good example (Search Institute, 2015).  
According to the Search Institute (2015, n.p.);  
‘…40 Developmental Assets, which…[are] a set of skills, experiences, relationships, 
and behaviours…enable young people to develop into successful and contributing 
adults…Data collected from Search Institute surveys of more than 4 million children 
and youth from all backgrounds and situations has consistently demonstrated that the 
more Developmental Assets young people acquire, the better their chances of 
succeeding in school and becoming happy, healthy, and contributing members of their 
communities and society.’ 
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Moreover, according to the Search Institute, good youth work involves ensuring young 
people’s positive development, and this can be unambiguously articulated, measured and 
evaluated using the 40 developmental assets.  
 
However, a number of critiques suggest that this may not be good youth work. For example, 
the approach uncritically relies on developmental theory and ignores the many and varied 
criticisms of such theory (Bessant, 2012; Pacini-Ketchabaw, 2011). The approach also relies 
on a universal, essential and linear account of transition from vulnerable, risky and dependent 
adolescence to caring, responsible, productive and independent adulthood. According to 
Bradford (2012), Kelly (2000b), Wood and Hine (2009) and Wyn and Woodman (2006), 
young people’s lives are far more complex, fragmented and non-linear, and any account of 
youth (or childhood, or adulthood) is a social construct and an artefact of power/knowledge 
or expertise rather than a normal or natural process. The Search Institute’s approach also 
follows the logic of risk-based and technical or instrumental approaches to youth work 
practice that have also undergone significant scrutiny (Bessant, Hil and Watts, 2003; Kelly, 
2007; Lupton, 1999). Furthermore, the Search Institute’s approach frames and focuses the 
responsibility of problems and their resolution with individual young people, rather than 
emphasising social, political and economic conditions, such as income inequality, poverty, 
underemployment, austerity and bad policy that may be more significant to young people 
experiencing problems than a lack of Developmental Assets. Constituting young people as 
deficient and in need of Developmental Assets can paradoxically serve to produce the very 
problem it aims to address, as young people can take on and enact the ideas that they are 
weak, vulnerable, at-risk and deficient. Thinking about young people in such ways also 
uncritically reproduces stereotypically and prejudicial ways of knowing young people as 
troubled and troublesome, incapable of making good decisions and not to be trusted. 
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In light of such criticisms it is unclear whether the Search Institute’s framework is the way to 
conceptualise and achieve good youth work. The critique also suggests that simply 
implementing practice models, or using theory and applying a model for practice, might not 
be good youth work. 
 
 
Service user feedback 
 
Another prevailing approach to youth work is the claim that good practice can be assessed 
and achieved by obtaining and acting upon service user feedback or young people’s voice (te 
Riele and Gorur, 2015; Youth Affairs Council of Victoria, 2013). Moreover, it is common 
practice in the human service sector to assess the efficacy of an intervention by accessing the 
voice of those receiving the help and using this feedback to argue that practice is useful, 
effective or good. For example, according to Miller, Duncan and Hubble (2004) practitioners 
in human services can and should get regular feedback from service users on their 
interventions, and they argue that doing just that is a helpful way of making services more 
effective. Continuous feedback from clients is a critical component of the “PCOMS” 
approach to therapy, which according to Duncan (2012) and Duncan and Reese (2015) has 
been clinically tested and proven to improve client outcomes. D’Cruz and Jones (2014, p.38) 
argued social workers “risk practicing in oppressive ways by disallowing … clients’ voices”. 
And getting feedback on the effectiveness of support services is typically suggested as a 
worthwhile way to involve and empower young people and aligns with rights-based practice 
that includes respecting the rights of consumers to have a say (Head, 2011). 
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However, according to McCord (1978, p. 288) “…the subjective judgment of…[a program’s] 
value as perceived by those who received its service” or feedback from service users is not a 
good indicator that good practice has been achieved. McCord (1978, p. 284) reported on a 30-
year follow-up study of over 500 men, half of whom had been assigned to a treatment 
program that lasted approximately five years, involved regular contact with counsellors and 
social workers, and aimed to prevent “delinquency”. McCord (1978, p. 284) reported; 
‘Although subjective evaluations of the program by those who received its benefits 
would suggest that the intervention had been helpful, comparisons between the 
treatment and control groups indicate that the program had negative side effects as 
measured by criminal behaviour, death, disease, occupational status, and job 
satisfaction.’ 
Similarly, Egan (2010) argued there are problems with “client satisfaction studies”. “It has … 
been demonstrated that client satisfaction does not always mean that problems are being 
managed and opportunities developed” (Egan, 2010, p. 20). 
 
Client satisfaction research and service user feedback cannot tell us whether the client would 
have improved anyway if the intervention had not been used and doing research on just that is 
not possible. There are also problems with using feedback from service users because it may 
be skewed towards only getting responses from those who found a service effective. 
Moreover, people who found an intervention ineffective or harmful may be reluctant to 
provide feedback. Feedback that puts a support service in a positive light also does not 
definitely tell us whether a similar intervention will work for others, and such research is 
unreliable. Finally, reports from service users on the effectiveness of an intervention do not 
necessarily indicate whether or not a practice is good. Bourdieu (1998) suggests people might 
follow and reproduce relations of domination, exploitation and marginalisation without 
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realising they are doing just that when they give feedback on service interventions (Grenfell, 
2008). Farthing (2012) similarly argued the merits of youth participation practices, such as 
getting service user feedback, need to be critically unpacked and may not be desirable or 
intrinsically a good thing. Privileging young people’s voices may distort or erase aspects of 
the cultural contexts in which the stories are embedded and that might be more relevant to 
achieving good practice. Moreover, these critiques suggest that good youth work should not 
just uncritically rely on young people’s voices or young people’s feedback.  
 
 
Wicked problems call for wicked solutions: the case for practice theories 
 
Criticisms of the three aforementioned approaches to youth work have a number of 
implications for youth work practitioners, managers, policy-makers, educators and 
researchers. For example, the critiques suggest that the prevailing ways practice is 
conceptualised, described and pursued may not be good. Problems with these approaches also 
suggest that other ways of thinking about practice are needed for good youth work. Rittel and 
Webber (1973) provide a useful suggestion of what this could be in their critical framework 
for thinking about tame and wicked problems and solutions. In particular, Watts (2015, p. 
162) argued: 
‘[Rittel and Webber’s framework] offers nothing less than a unifying account of the 
conjoint ontological and epistemological features of those social problems which 
humans in general, and politicians and policy-makers in particular, confront.’ 
Watts (2015, p. 162) made the case that “The entire field of juvenile justice is best thought of 
as a field of wicked problems”. Similarly, Bessant and Broadley (2015, p. 2) argued the 
“Child protection system is a system characterized by wicked problems”. And the problems 
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that youth work aims to address, that often coincide with the field of juvenile justice and the 
child protection system, also correspond with Rittel and Webber’s characterisation of wicked 
problems. According to the Australian Public Service Commission (2007) and Rittel and 
Webber (1973) wicked problems are characterised by a number of distinguishing features that 
include being difficult to define, having no clear solution, being socially complex and having 
many interdependencies. I previously demonstrated that there are disagreements on the 
problems that youth work is trying to solve as well as how to solve them. For example, I 
argued there is a lack of agreement on whether engaging young people in extensive periods 
of education and training will address critical youth issues such as youth unemployment. 
Furthermore, according to the relevant literature, youth and community work is better 
conceptualised as complex, unpredictable, context-dependent and messy (Schön, 1991; 
Spence, Devanney and Noonan, 2006). And youth work practice involves a diverse range of 
entangled elements that includes many and varied people, institutions, settings, intentions, 
knowledges and practices. Moreover, youth work is characterised by wicked problems and 
this calls for wicked solutions.  
 
Wicked solutions are more than the “one-eyed hobby horses” or the “one-best answer” that 
are prevalent in the youth work literature and that include the approaches I critiqued (Rittel 
and Webber, 1973, p. 169; Stanner, 2010, p. 218). The Australian Public Service Commission 
(2007) and Rittel and Webber (1973) describe wicked solutions, and I do not repeat their 
accounts here. Instead, I pursue theories of practice, which up to this point have been missing 
from the youth work literature and that also offer fruitful ways for tackling wicked problems. 
A number of practice theories recognise that achieving good practice is not so 
straightforward. In particular, Arendt, Bourdieu and Shove, Pantzar and Watson’s 
characterisations of practice resonate with the Australian Public Service Commission (2007) 
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and Rittel and Webber’s (1973) descriptions of wicked problems. These practice theories also 
offer more sophisticated ways of thinking about and pursuing good youth work. 
 
 
Arendt 
 
According to Dunne (1997, pp. 88-103) and Higgins (2011, pp. 85-110), Arendt retrieved 
ideas from Aristotle and recovered the ancient divisions between and within the vita 
contemplative and the vita activa to make the case that there are different modes or categories 
of activity in practical life. However, whereas Aristotle differentiated poiesis (making) to 
praxis (action), Arendt (1958) explored the distinctions, relationships and complementarities 
between labour, work and action. Arendt characterised labour as a cyclical process through 
which people are immersed in the urgent, unremitting and futile struggle with nature’s 
implacable demands on them, repetitiously and endlessly reproducing the needs of life 
(Dunne, 1997, p. 400; Higgins, 2011, p. 92). Arendt (1958) argued that due to the necessities 
and aspirations revealed by her conceptualisation of the human condition or the six 
conditions of human existence – natality, mortality, biological survival, worldliness, plurality, 
and the sixth that Arendt does not define but could be understood as Arendt’s take on 
reflexivity – there is no complete escape from reproductive practices or labour (or work or 
action for that matter). At the same time and in response to the human conditions, people 
engage in other sorts of activities that ease the burdens associated with reproductive labour. 
In particular, work, or making or fabrication, rises above the imperatives of nature by 
creating a world of durable objects (Dunne, 1997, p. 400; Higgins, 2011, pp. 92-93). Key 
features of work or productive practices are the division and linear sequence between 
knowing and doing. Moreover, work involves knowing the ends-to-be, and then figuring out 
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and implementing the most efficient doing, means, instrument or technique to achieve those 
pre-specified ends. Arendt recognised that productive work has its place in the life of humans 
and most concrete occupations that require relatively high degrees of foresight and 
predictability are forms of work (Higgins, 2011, p. 86). However, Arendt argued that in 
modern times “human life has been reduced to labour and the scientific-technological pursuit 
of aids to that labour” (Higgins, 2011, p. 92). And practising all human activities as this form 
of entangled labour/work is a problem because it can lead to imprudently doing without 
thinking, thoughtlessly following orders, foolishly obeying authority, irresponsibly being 
compliant and, worse still, unethical conduct, wrongdoing and evil (Arendt, 1963; Midgley, 
1984). According to Arendt, the conventional approaches to youth work practice previously 
described fall into this characterisation of human activity and have these accompanying 
problems. 
 
The third category of practical activity, which according to Higgins (2011, p. 101) Arendt 
argued is the “pinnacle of human activity, the sine qua non of leading a fully human life”, is 
action. Arendt argued that action is characterised by meaningful stories that are singular, do 
not follow a pattern and are produced by the inseparability of action and speech or deeds and 
words (Arendt, 1958, p. 236; Higgins, 2011). Other features of action include “the 
unpredictability of its outcome, the irreversibility of the process, and the anonymity of its 
authors” (Arendt, 1958, p. 220). Conceptualising youth work as a form of action suggests 
those involved in the practice ought to constantly think about what they should do and are 
doing, reflect-in-and-on-action, make moral judgments, and act with care, empathy, 
imagination and thoughtfulness – or phronesis (Midgley, 1984; Schön, 1991; Schwartz and 
Sharpe, 2010; Williams, 1985). Furthermore, when thought of as action, everyone involved in 
youth work should share as a common object of concern exactly what good youth work is and 
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how it should be achieved rather than just relying on pre-determined outcomes or being 
preoccupied with the implementation of a prefigured process. Arendt elevated action above 
the other the modes of practical activity at the same time as arguing that practices consist of 
entanglements and complementarities between labour-like, work-like and action-like 
dimensions. Moreover, Arendt suggested that the roles and relations between reproduction, 
production and action are ambiguous, unresolvable, and require ongoing consideration. This 
aspect of Arendt’s account of the complexities of practice suggests that youth workers should 
be supported to think deeply about practice so they can distinguish and navigate the 
possibilities and limitations associated with each of the modes of practice. 
 
 
Bourdieu 
 
According to Shove, Pantzar and Watson (2012, p. 5), “Bourdieu did not develop a consistent 
theory of practice over his works”. These authors also argued that within Bourdieu’s writings, 
habitus and practice are in a recursive relationship (Shove, Pantzar and Watson, 2012, p. 5). 
On the contrary, Maton (2008, p. 51) argued that Bourdieu represented practices as the result 
of a relation that can be summarised in the form of an equation; 
‘[(habitus)(capital)] + field = practice … This equation can be unpacked as stating: 
practice results from relations between one’s dispositions (habitus) and one’s position 
in a field (capital), within the current state of play of that social arena (field).’ 
 
Maton (2008, p. 52) made the case that practices for Bourdieu are “not simply the result of 
one’s habitus but rather of relations between one’s habitus and one’s current circumstances” 
(emphasis in original). In the same way Bourdieu (1998, p. vii) argued his philosophy of 
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action notes the relations between “the potentialities inscribed in the bodies of agents and in 
the structure of the situations in which they act”; 
‘This philosophy is condensed in a small number of fundamental concepts – habitus, 
field, capital – and its cornerstone is the two-way relationship between objective 
structures (those of social fields) and incorporated structures (those of the habitus)’.  
 
In this instance, Bourdieu acknowledged his reduction of his theory of practice; as Grenfell 
(2008, pp. 213-216) observed, Bourdieu (e.g., 1977, 1990, 1998) had many more concepts 
that formed a framework for capturing, constructing and validating practices. Given the space 
constraints of a journal article I cannot give a more thorough account of Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice, and, like Bourdieu (1998, p. vii), I stick with his elementary and fundamental 
description of human action. At the very least, this abbreviated account demonstrates 
Bourdieu’s attempt to break with what he argued was the inadequacy of a series of opposing 
traditions for understanding human action, including structuralism and existentialism, 
objectivism and subjectivism, and determinism and free will (Grenfell, 2008, pp. 43-47). This 
basic formulation also illustrates that Bourdieu’s theory of practice is complex and wicked 
and provides useful lessons for conceptualising and understanding good practice in youth 
work.  
 
For example, unlike Aristotelian inspired accounts of ethically oriented conduct, that includes 
Arendt (1958) and MacIntyre (1984), or Weber’s (1968) account of rational social action, 
Bourdieu suggests that people cannot assume that they are always aware of what they do or 
why they are doing what they do. Furthermore, people may be unaware of their biases, 
privilege and disadvantage, and oblivious of latent but influential interests and values at play 
in their views, choices and actions. And people can believe they are doing something other 
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than what they are doing, and reproducing prejudices, inequalities, and relations of 
domination without realising it. Moreover, people may be oblivious to the ways that their 
habitus (and capital) is structured by and structuring of the field in which practice takes place, 
how these underlying relations and processes shape and constitute what they think, feel and 
do, and how this can result in social suffering and symbolic violence (Schubert, 2008). Youth 
workers, policy makers and others involved in the institutionalisation and reproduction of 
youth work might think that a particular practice is good, for example the conventional 
practices I critiqued, but such practice may be serving other more powerful interests, 
reproducing prevailing “doxa”, and not benefiting young people as intended (Deer, 2008a). 
Bourdieu (2004) and Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) suggested that people involved in youth 
work need to do reflexivity to understand these two-way relationships and the underlying 
generating principles or structures of action, as well as their implications, for example, on 
what can and cannot be thought, felt and done and the potentially harmful effects of that. 
However, Bourdieu (1977, 1990) argued not everyone is capable of this genuine reflexive 
approach, only those who have been educated on his method (Deer, 2008b). Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice and his suggestion that achieving something that might be conceived as 
good practice in youth work requires the practice of reflexivity has implications for the 
education and ongoing professional development of youth workers. For example, youth 
workers should be taught Bourdieu’s thinking tools and practice theory. And, subsequently, 
youth worker’s capacities to be reflexive and recognise and control the effects and influence 
of their own perceptions and comprehensions of the social world, youth work and young 
people on their understanding and approach to practice should be developed (Deer, 2008b).  
 
 
Shove, Pantzar and Watson 
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Shove, Pantzar and Watson’s (2012) account of the dynamics of social practices somewhat 
breaks from Bourdieu’s and Arendt’s theories of practice. In particular, these authors follow 
Gidden’s (1984) structuration theory rather than Bourdieu’s two-way relationship between 
objective structures and incorporated structures or Arendt’s take on the recursive relation 
between people’s condition to make things and how the things people make condition them 
further (Higgins 2011, p.88; Shove, Pantzar & Watson 2012, pp.2-4). Shove, Pantzar and 
Watson also borrow from many other practice theorists, in particular Schatzki (2012, 2002), 
Reckwitz (2002a, 2002b) and, to a lesser extent, Lave and Wenger (1991) and Wenger 
(1999), to present a practice theory with accompanying language and array of concepts that 
offers a way of understanding good practice in youth work. According to Shove, Pantzar and 
Watson (2012, pp. 119-120), “The bare bones of our account can be put in just a few 
sentences”, and this includes: 
‘Practices-as-performances involve the active integration of elements (materials, 
meanings, competences). Practices-as-entities are constituted through such 
integrations…Practices change when new elements are introduced or when existing 
elements are combined in new ways…If practices are to survive they need to capture 
and retain practitioners willing and able to do this integrating’.  
There is considerably more to their theory; however, this brief introduction to some of the 
key aspects suggests good practice in youth work involves recruiting and retaining faithful 
and committed carriers who are willing and able to make and sustain links between a diverse 
range of interdependent elements that constitute that practice. 
 
Shove, Pantzar and Watson suggest achieving good practice in youth work is better thought 
of as a wicked problem and their practice theory offers a wicked solution. For example, 
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according to the authors, approaches to practice are typically informed by “a thoroughly 
individualistic understanding of both action and of change”, in particular “a view that 
behaviour change is an outcome of personal preference”, individual attitudes and choice 
(Shove, Pantzar and Watson 2012, pp. 140-46). The prevailing approaches to youth work I 
described earlier, such as engaging young people in extensive periods of education and 
training and using models of practice that are based on standardised interpretations of youth 
development and transitions, generally focus on encouraging, supporting and enabling 
individual young people to make better choices for themselves. Shove, Pantzar and Watson 
(2012, pp. 3, 164) argued this is a problem because “it locates both the problem and the 
response as a matter of individual behaviour” which downplays the recursive relationship 
between “human activity … and the social structures which shape it”. Shove, Pantzar and 
Watson (2012, p. 146) add that practice is better understood as emergent and unpredictable 
and involving processes of emergence, persistence and disappearance (e.g., of practice 
elements) that are essentially uncontrollable. In light of this, the authors suggest that those 
interested in good youth work should consider how they can influence, facilitate and hinder 
the availability, circulation and connection of elements of which better and worse youth work 
are formed, as well as secure and maintain resources and practitioners willing to keep these 
elements alive (Shove, Pantzar and Watson 2012, pp. 147, 156). And this involves ongoing 
deliberation on what these elements are. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The practice theories I examined in this article suggest that conventional approaches to 
practice in youth work are inadequate. In particular, Arendt and Bourdieu and Pantzar, Shove 
86 
 
and Watson suggest that good youth work needs to involve more than engaging young people 
in education and training, implementing practice models, and obtaining and acting upon 
young people’s feedback. According to Arendt, these approaches are examples of a particular 
mode of practical activity that prevails in modern times and that emphasises means ends 
efficiency, which is a problem because it can lead to doing without thinking, unethical 
conduct, wrongdoing and evil. Bourdieu suggests such practices might be serving prevailing 
interests, reproducing relations of social dominance, and not benefiting young people as 
intended. Shove, Pantzar and Watson suggest these activities focus on encouraging, 
supporting and enabling individual young people to make better choices for themselves, and 
this is a problem because it conceals the role of contextual factors and social conditions in 
shaping people’s lives. 
 
I made the case that Arendt, Bourdieu and Pantzar, Shove and Watson’s theories of practice 
offer more sophisticated and fruitful ways of thinking about and pursuing good youth work. 
A key lesson from Arendt is that youth workers should be supported to think about practice in 
more complex ways than is typically the case and to act in ways that are aligned with an 
activity she described as “action”. Bourdieu suggests achieving good practice in youth work 
requires a particular way of thinking and acting that he characterised as reflexivity, and this 
involves practitioners recognising and controlling the effects and influence of their own 
perceptions and comprehensions of the social world, youth work and young people on their 
understanding and approach to practice. And according to Shove, Pantzar and Watson, 
practices feature the integration and enactment of a diverse range of interdependent elements 
that include materials, competence and meaning. These authors suggest that good practice in 
youth work involves ongoing deliberation on what these elements are as well as securing and 
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maintaining the resources and practitioners willing and able to keep these elements and 
connections alive. 
 
This article focused on aspects of youth work in Australia, the EU and the USA. Further 
research is needed to examine the relevance of the arguments made herein to other practice 
approaches and other countries. Arendt, Bourdieu and Pantzar, Shove and Watson are not the 
only authors that recognise practice is better conceptualised as complex and wicked. For 
example, Aristotle and neo-Aristotelian Weber, and Habermas’s theories of practice may also 
offer valuable lessons for conceptualising and achieving good practice in youth work. Shove, 
Pantzar and Watson (2012, pp. 139-164) described some of the challenges associated with 
promoting and making transitions from conventional approaches to practice to more 
sophisticated practice-theory orientations. More work is needed to understand these 
challenges and to promote and make these transitions in youth work practice. 
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Chapter 3: The entanglement of the stuff and practice of human service work: A case 
for complexity 
 
Accounts of the nature of practices, or practice ontologies, are flourishing following the 
‘practice turn in contemporary theory’ and growing intellectual interest with neo-
Aristotelianism (Dunne, 1997; Greene, 2009; Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von Savigny, 2001). 
One way these practice theories can be deployed is to conceptualise good practice in human 
services (Emslie, 2014a; Kemmis and Smith, 2008). Something that different practice 
ontologies have in common is that practices ‘consist of interdependencies between diverse 
elements’ (Shove, Pantzar and Watson, 2012, p. 7). According to Reckwitz (2002a, p. 249) 
these interdependent elements include ‘forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, 
“things” and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, 
states of emotion and motivational knowledge’. Shove et al. (2012, p. 14) similarly argued 
social practices are made or enacted by people actively combining a number of elements, in 
particular; 
‘materials – including things, technologies, tangible physical entities, and the stuff of 
which objects are made; competences – which encompasses skill, know-how and 
technique; and meanings – in which we include symbolic meanings, ideas and 
aspirations’. 
On a similar note Schatzki (2012, pp. 14-15; 2002, pp. 77-80) made the case that practices 
feature ‘open-ended, spatially-temporally dispersed nexus of doings and sayings’ that are 
organised by and are expressions of ‘practical rules, [practical] understandings, teleoaffective 
structures, and general understandings’. And, according to neo-Aristotelian perspectives 
practices consist of a correspondence between a material that is being dealt with, and a form 
of knowledge and a type of action best suited to deal with the material in question (Aristotle, 
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2009; Dunne, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Polkinghorne, 2004). In this article I examine one 
element that is critical to human service practices, which are the people who human service 
practitioners work with. I explore the question how should we conceptualise the stuff that 
practices of care deal with - the lives and relationships of human beings – particularly if we 
want to achieve good practice in the people professions? 
 
There are good reasons to ask this question. Different accounts of the nature of practices have 
acknowledged that practices deal with stuff or things. For example, this claim is shared by 
Schatzki (2012) and Dunne (2005) even though other aspects of their conceptualisations of 
practice differ. According to Schatzki (2012, p. 16); 
‘Just about every practice…deals with material entities (including human bodies) that 
people manipulate or react to. And most practices would not exist without 
materialities of the sorts they deal with, just as most material arrangements that 
practices deal with would not exist in the absence of these practices.’  
On a similar note Dunne (2005, p. 378) argued good practice depends upon getting clarity on 
the subject of, 
‘…just what kind of material we deal with...the material will determine the kind of 
activity we are engaged in and, in turn, the kind of knowledge that is required or the 
type of rationality that is appropriate.’ 
When it comes to the caring professions the critical material or phenomena that practices 
such as social work, youth work, aged care and disability care deal with are people and their 
lives and relationships. In light of the significance of this stuff to practice of care, if we are 
serious about conceiving and achieving good practice in human services then we need a good 
conceptualisation of what it is that such practices are dealing with.  
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Carlile, Nicolini, Langley and Tsoukas (2013) similarly suggested that the conceptualisations 
of what it is that practices of social welfare deal with have practical, ethical and ontological 
implications. According to the authors; 
‘…matter does matter because it generates consequences and, therefore, an ethical 
dimension grows out of a natural inquiry into the sources of those 
consequences…matter matters not only as an intellectual effort, but also in an 
ontological and practical sense, i.e., it generates consequences for how we experience 
and act in the world’ (Carlile et al., 2013, p. 3). 
The stuff or things that human services deal with, which I am examining in this article, may 
not be matter in the sense Carlile et al. (2013) proposed. At the same time the imaginings and 
representations of human beings and their lives and relationships, which are entities and 
phenomena that the people professions work with, have ethical, practical and ontological 
consequences of the kinds that the authors suggest. Freire (1985) and Kemmis (2008) 
illustrated the point in the field of education. Freire (1985, p. 43) argued, ‘Every educational 
practice implies a concept of man (sic) and the world’, and how these things – ‘man’ and ‘the 
world’ – are constituted are significant for teaching and learning as well as teachers and 
learners. Kemmis (2008) demonstrated just that by arguing that praxis in education relies on 
particular conceptualisations of students. 
‘They are not ‘raw material’ to be moulded into pre-given shapes and lives, but co-
participants in a shared social life, in which we have shared fates. The educator 
always encounters them as persons worthy of the recognition and respect due to the 
Other’ (Kemmis, 2008, p. 290). 
 
It is important to acknowledge that there are many material things and different kinds of stuff 
used in and entangled with human service practices. These include technologies such as ICT, 
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instruments including assessment tools, and objects of which cars are a good example. Such 
matter, and how it is conceived and used, are important elements for practice in the people 
professions, but these are not the phenomena that are the chief focus of this paper. I 
concentrate on examining the conceptualisations of one thing that is critical to practices of 
care, and that is the people and their lives and relationships that such practices work with and 
for. What's more I am not simply referring to the aspects of people that have been brought 
into focus recently among practice theorist, namely the physical body, the body as a material 
entity, or ‘nonpropositional bodily abilities’ (Schatzki, 2012, pp. 14-16). I begin by 
examining the human services literature and identify and critique typical ways that the stuff 
and practice of the caring professions is imagined and represented. I then explore what these 
characteristic conceptualisations miss and conceal, and I draw on a range of relevant debates 
in the social sciences to do just that. Finally, I make a case for how people and their lives and 
relationships should be constituted or constructed if we are interested in achieving good 
practice in social, youth and community work. 
 
 
Conceptualisations of the stuff and practice of human services in the literature 
 
In the human services literature there is generally a failure to adequately acknowledge and 
examine the interdependencies and entanglements between the phenomena that the helping 
professions deal with and understandings of practice. McDonald (2006) and Neukrug (2012, 
pp. 69-82) are an exception and the authors provide examples of attempts to make 
connections between how people or human nature are conceived and approaches to human 
service practice. For example, McDonald (2006, p. 119) argued the case for five ‘discourses 
of welfare’ that involved such entanglements. 
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‘The first of these is the charitable discourse, in which welfare or service delivery is a 
gift or donation directed towards a needy supplicant (usually a member of the 
deserving poor)…The second is the professional discourse…[in which] welfare is a 
service for the client…The third and more contemporary discourse is that of NPM 
[New Public Management] in which welfare is a product for the consumer-
citizen…The fourth (also contemporary) discourse is that of the market which 
promotes welfare as a commodity for the customer…The final discursive formation of 
welfare…is that of community, a contradictory and confusing set of discourses in 
which welfare promotes participation for the citizen-user…(italics in original) 
(McDonald 2006, pp. 119-120). 
As McDonald demonstrates these accounts fail to make a good case for how we should 
imagine and represent the lives and relationships of human beings if we want to achieve good 
practice. 
 
Another common problem in the relevant literature is a discrepancy between how people and 
practice are conceived. For example, people and their lives and relationships are often 
conceptualised as ambiguous, unpredictable, indeterminate and messy. Fook, Ryan and 
Hawkins (2000) provided such a characterisation of the stuff that human services deal with. 
However, these authors subsequently resorted to a technical conceptualisation of practice to 
deal with this phenomenon, which does not correspond. In particular they argued good 
practice involves the application of knowledge in practice, which constitutes the matter being 
dealt with unambiguous, predictable and a type of stuff that can be made into something other 
than what it is with the proper use of theory. Fook, Ryan and Hawkins (2000) demonstrated 
that the matter of human service work is often conceptualised as complex in the literature, but 
this is not linked to consistent account of practice. More often there is gap in the human 
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services literature. In particular what is missing is an attempt to articulate a well-thought out 
account of the stuff that the people professions deal with. Instead accounts of practice imply a 
conceptualisation of human beings and their lives and relationships and what follows are two 
examples of just that. 
 
 
Following neo-liberal rationalities of government 
 
The stuff that human services work with is often conceptualised in one-dimensional ways that 
correspond to and reproduce neo-liberal rationalities of government. More to the point people 
are conceived as individual subjects with capacities and responsibilities to exercise freedom, 
autonomy and choice. And this freedom enables and requires people to pursue, manage and 
achieve interests in markets along with other autonomous, competitive and self-responsible 
agents. A key function of practices in the caring professions, when they are organized as an 
element of this regime of government, is to elicit, promote, facilitate and foster these 
identities and capabilities (Dean 2010). One way this takes place is with the constitution of 
people engaged with practices of care as customers or consumers (McDonald, 2006). Dean 
(2010) argued social welfare has been reconfigured using rationalities and techniques of 
markets and these reforms contribute to the production of such subjects. A problem with 
these conceptualisations is that people’s different experiences of economic and social 
advantage and disadvantage, which impacts on the capacity to make choices, is minimised. 
Another problem is that the responsibility for achieving economic and social well-being is 
placed onto vulnerable individuals, rather political, economic or social institutions and 
conditions. 
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Another basic conceptualisation of people in the human services literature that is entangled 
with neo-liberal forms of government is as cases or risks to be managed (Rose, 1999). In this 
instance, individual subjects have inadequately demonstrated the exercise of freedom, 
autonomy and choice. Subsequently they are ‘at-risk’ and need the ‘case-management’ 
support of social services to ‘erase risky behaviours’ and to nurture and enhance capacities to 
manage themselves and pursue interests in responsible ways (Dean, 2010, p. 195). Again 
economic, social and political differences are erased, and individual responsibility for 
addressing inequality, disadvantage and vulnerability is emphasized. In Australia we have 
also witnessed the superficial and condemnatory characterisations of people who use social 
services as dole bludgers, welfare dependents, ‘leaners’, and the undeserving poor (Hockey, 
2014). The problem with these conceptualisations is that they are dehumanising, demeaning 
and demonising of people who demonstrate a need for and are engaged with human services. 
At the same time such portrayals of people align with neo-liberal rationalities of government. 
In particular they discourage the reliance on government funded social services. They also 
justify more intensive interventions and surveillance by governments to promote self-
responsibility and the desirable exercise of freedom.  
 
 
Objects of modern science and technology 
 
Another way people are imagined and represented in the human services literature is as stuff 
that can be observed, measured, explained and dominated by intellect and reason. In 
particular what it is that the caring professions deal with is conceived as something that is 
‘inevitable, essential, self-evident and universal’, and that can be unambiguously, completely 
and objectively known (Dahlberg and Moss, 2013). These ways of conceptualising people 
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correspond to Heidegger’s (1977) account of the essence of modern technology as a mode of 
revealing, which he called Enframing. 
‘Enframing…demands that nature…reports itself in some way or other that is 
identifiable through calculation and that it remains orderable as a system of 
information’ (Heidegger 1997, p. 23).  
Heidegger (1997) suggested a danger of Enframing is that people conceive themselves and 
other people as calculable and orderable. Constituted or revealed as being completely 
knowable, explainable and predictable make human beings amenable to submission, mastery 
and exploitation by human ingenuity. Put another way, people are thought of in ways that 
resemble raw material like stone or wood that can be efficiently crafted or engineered with 
the application of the right sort of rational and scientific aka positivist knowledge. 
Conceptualisations of people as stuff that can have practice done to and on them are 
entangled with linear, prescriptive and deterministic approaches to practice that are typically 
referred to as technical, instrumental, standardized, managerial, rule-based, and procedurally 
orientated. This includes evidence-based practice, outcomes-based practice frameworks, risk-
based approaches to practice, transferable skills handbooks, and instruction manuals 
(Hamilton, 2005; Schön, 1983, 1987). Other examples include practice based on 
psychological and neuroscientific theories of human beings (Bessant and Watts, 2012; 
Milevsky, 2014).  
 
Such approaches to conceiving people and practice are common and actively embraced and 
pursued by governments and human service providers because of their promise to improve 
cost-efficiency and enhance service effectiveness. The social sciences and affiliated 
researchers and practitioners also have a long history of imagining and representing the 
human as ‘objects of science’ as a way to gain intellectual legitimacy on par with the natural 
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sciences (Olsen, 2013, p. 175). Moreover, there have been desperate and enduring attempts in 
much social research and theory to transfer and apply the methods of the positivist natural 
sciences, used to conceptualise and explain a solid, certain, immutable, predictable, and rule-
following account of matter, onto things and entities such as culture, the social, morality, and 
people and their lives and relationships (Dunne, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Polkinghorne, 2004). 
If the conceptualisations of people and practice inspired by neo-liberal rationalities of 
government and modern science and technology are inadequate, then how should they be 
imagined and represented? 
 
 
Exploring other ways of conceiving what it is that human services deal with 
 
Conceptualisations of the stuff and practice of human service work that are inspired by and 
entangled with neo-liberal rationalities of government and technical approaches to practice 
miss and, according to Heidegger (1977), conceal ways of imagining and representing people 
and their lives and relationships. A range of relevant debates within the social sciences 
demonstrate just that and these controversies suggest that what it is that the people 
professions deal with is different and more than being one-dimensional, unambiguous, 
calculable and orderable. 
 
 
A fixed structure of meaning or an effect of power/knowledge 
 
Contemporary cultural studies have undermined the idea that people are born into the world 
already formed with, for example, an innate and natural potential for good or bad. According 
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to Mansfield (2000, p. 11) there is a consensus amongst theorists since Heidegger that the 
subject is constructed rather than an authentic, autonomous and naturally occurring thinking, 
feeling and acting thing. Mansfield (2000) argued there are two broad approaches to 
theorising the self that have dominated the second half of the twentieth century. The 
subjectivist camp is illustrated by Freud, Lacan, and most accounts of psychiatry and 
psychology. It also includes structural accounts of Marxism and feminism, and much 
subcultural theory. This approach;  
‘…attempts to explain the truth of the subject…Its authority rests on the 
assumption…that its object of analysis is quantifiable and knowable – in short a real 
thing, with a fixed structure, operating in knowable and predictable patterns…For 
these theorists, the subject has a knowable content, and is measurable against a 
normative path of development’ (Mansfield, 2000, pp. 9, 66). 
Human service practice that follows and is based on this account of the self focuses on 
supporting, organising and correcting individuals to be normal and self-sustaining, including 
preventing and healing abnormal behaviour. Such practice also reproduces the belief that 
people have an essence and a true, authentic, complete, essential and inevitable self that 
needs to be helped, protected, liberated, and empowered in the face of power, oppression, 
adversity and alienation. 
 
Alternatively, according to anti-subjectivist approaches ‘the subject is an effect of power, 
science or technologies’ (Mansfield, 2000, p. vi). In other words, there is no true self to be 
liberated and any account, thought, feeling, or idea of the self is a construction emanating 
from power/knowledge, such as that exercised by human service professionals. Proponents of 
this position include Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari. 
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[This] approach to the subject…believes neither that the subject has a fixed or 
knowable content, nor in fact that subjectivity exists outside of the demands power 
places on individual bodies to perform in certain ways. Power, in its drive to 
administer human populations, contrives the subject as an ideal mode of being to 
which we must conform…We are the very material of power, the thing through which 
it finds its expression’ (Mansfield, 2000, p. 66, 55).  
To put this another way, the idea of subjectivity, ‘has been invented by dominant systems of 
social organisation in order to control and manage us’ (Mansfield, 2000, p. 10) 
‘…‘subjectivity’…is the way we are led to think about ourselves, so we will police 
and present ourselves in the correct way, as not insane, criminal, undisciplined, 
unkempt, perverse or unpredictable’ (Mansfield, 2000, p. 10) 
According to the anti-subjectivist camp any practice of social welfare, which is entangled 
with a conceptualisation of the human, is a technique of power and social administration 
making demands of and disciplining us. The anti-subjectivist position raises insurmountable 
hurdles for knowing and realising good practice in human services. Any conceptualisation of 
caring work produces and reproduces the subject in limited and limiting ways, and caring 
professionals should be interested in examining the conceptualisations they are producing and 
reproducing, as well as the forms of power/knowledge, interests and ideologies these 
meanings serve. The subjectivist anti-subjectivist debate suggests that those who work in the 
people professions should not delude themselves that they are doing good practice.  
 
 
The natural science and social science distinction 
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According to the subjectivist approach to theorising the self, people and their lives and 
relationships have a truth that can be observed, measured, explained and predicted. The anti-
subjectivist position is one critique of this account. Another criticism can be found in debates 
between the natural, physical or theoretical sciences and social, human or practical sciences 
(Blaikie, 2007, pp. 30-55; Egan, 2010, p. 16-17; Giddens, 1993; Thompson, 2000, pp. 43-53). 
As previously argued many approaches to human service practice conceptualise human 
beings in ways that matter is typically conceptualised in the natural sciences as completely 
knowable and subsequently explainable, calculable, predictable, and tameable. Conceived in 
this way people can be known in decontextualized, universal, value-free and rule-based ways 
that are entangled with forms of practice based on such knowledge.  
 
However, there are many arguments and proponents for conceptualising the stuff of human 
service work as a different to this account (Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram, 2012; Hamilton, 
2005). For example, in the eighteenth century Vico (1999, p. 114) argued, ‘Sciences must 
begin at the point where their subject matter begins’, and he argued for a distinction between 
natural sciences that dealt with the physical universe, and poetic sciences that focus on the 
human world. Vico conceptualised the substances or stuff of the physical domain and the 
human realm as distinct and deserving of different ways of knowing. Similarly, Einstein 
argued, 
‘...one of the strongest motives that lead men to art and science is escape from 
everyday life with its painful crudity and hopeless dreariness, from the fetters of one's 
own ever-shifting desires. A finely tempered nature longs to escape from the personal 
life into the world of objective perception and thought.’ (Schweber, 2008, p. 6). 
Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 32) agreed arguing there are critical differences between the material that 
the natural and social sciences deal with; 
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‘…the former [natural sciences] studies physical objects while the latter [social 
sciences] studies self-reflecting humans and must therefore take account of changes in 
the interpretations of the objects of study. Stated in another way, in social sciences, 
the object is a subject’. 
Put simply Chenoweth and McAuliffe (2012, p. 205) argued; 
‘One of the main distinguishing features of human service organisations is the nature 
of the work undertaken – that is, human service work with people rather than with 
objects’. 
If the things and entities that the people professions deal with are better known for their 
introspective, not always apparent, fluid, ephemeral, self-reflecting, reflexive, and emergent 
meaning making qualities then they are not amenable to the sorts of practices that are 
interdependent with the knowledge traditionally produced by the approaches and methods of 
the hard sciences. Moreover, the conceptualisations of the stuff of human service work as 
objects of the natural positivist sciences or subjects of an interpretive, critical and phronetic 
social science have irreconcilable epistemological, ethical and practice entanglements and 
implications. Recent accounts of complexity theory, aspects of practice theory, and the 
conceptualisation of the human as cyborg counter and complicate the object/subject split 
(Blaikie, 2007, pp. 206-214; Carlile et al., 2013; Haraway, 1991; Introna, 2013; Latour, 2002; 
Schatzki, 2012, pp. 13-24). However, these theories typically provide further rebuttal to the 
conventional natural science conceptualisation of matter.  
 
 
Knowable versus aporia 
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One of the differences between the positivist and interpretivist conceptualisations of human 
beings is that they are or are not completely knowable. This debate warrants further attention. 
Since Descartes (2009) famously argued ‘I think therefore I am’ people have been conceived 
as individuals with conscious minds that have the capacities of intellect and reason that can 
be put to use to search for, know and explain a complete, coherent and consistent truth of the 
world. This definition of the self was a bedrock of the Enlightenment and Rationalism and 
remains influential. According to Barad (2013, p. 20) humans have an ‘ultimate wish for 
complete knowability’ and conceptualise matter as entirely knowable. Moreover, Descartes’ 
Cogito was the precursor to the conceptualisation of the stuff that human services deal with 
as absolutely unambiguously intelligible. This frames the problem of knowing and achieving 
good practice as a problem-solving exercise that is amenable to right or wrong, correct or 
false answers. And though this puzzle may be complicated, according to this 
conceptualisation the various elements to achieve good practice, including the stuff that 
practice deals with, can be broken down and linear and predictable relationships between 
variables established on the basis of calculable and calculated probabilities, correlations and 
causations. 
 
However, as Mansfield (2000, p. 20) observed this account of the self relies on suppressing 
and obscuring other dimension of subjectivity, including the unconscious, inconsistent, 
irrational, obscure and unknown. Heidegger and Bourdieu are examples of philosophers who 
argued that people may not be immediately aware of why they do what they do, and rational 
explanations of human action can be inadequate. According to Hume passions precede and 
shape reason. And Burke, Midgley and Roberto Unger argued humans have ethical and 
emotional capacities and the intellectual and rational dimensions of self should not be 
privileged. In other words, conceiving people and their lives and relationships as completely 
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knowable has sustained significant critique and does not stand up to scrutiny. More to the 
point we cannot easily articulate and know everything about people and their lives and 
relationships. Other examples of elements of human beings and human service practice that 
are arational include tacit knowledge, intuitions, instincts, gut feelings, passions, emotions, 
counter-transference, unconscious bias, spontaneity, chance, luck or tuche, good timing or 
kairos, and a ‘good eye’ (Benner, 1984; Collins, 1990; Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Ericsson, 
2006; Pannebecker, 1994; Polanyi, 1996, 1962; Schön, 1983). Other tendencies of humans 
that get in the way of our rational capacities include scotoma, or not seeing bad practice, 
wickedness and ‘shadows’, inertia, and ignorances (Cohen, 2001; Gambrill, 2013, p. ix; Jung, 
1973; Midgley, 1984; Nussbaum 2013). It should as no surprise in light of these 
characterisations of people and practice that Green (2009, p. 11) argued professional practice 
is characterised by aporia, or the confrontation with unresolvable problematics, paradoxes, 
perplexities and impossibilities. 
‘In professional practice there are always moments of undecidability and decision, 
moments when one must act, even if the way forward is not clear, or – more radically 
– is uncertain.’ (Green, 2009, pp. 11-12).   
Imagining and representing people and practice as not completely knowable, enigmatic, and 
unable to be known by reason alone suggests that figuring out and doing good caring work is 
not amenable to right or wrong, correct or false answers. Instead such a conceptualisation 
suggests the problem and the solution are forever uncertain and always incomplete, and ‘are 
part of the same emerging complex system which is never fully “present” in any (discrete) 
moment in time’ (Osberg, Biesta and Cillers, 2008, p. 213).  
 
 
Simple or complex 
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A further series of debates echo the controversies just mentioned. The differences between 
conceptualisations of tame and wicked problems and solutions is one example (Australian 
Public Service Commission, 2007; Rittel and Webber, 1973). Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) 
contrast between the stable and unified arborescent system and the dynamic multidimensional 
rhizome is another. These distinctions resonate with the dissimilarities between 
characterisations of simple, obvious, linear and complicated phenomena, and complex, 
emergent, non-linear and chaotic phenomena (Blaikie, 2007, pp. 206-214). For example, 
Davis and Sumara (2006, p. 11) argued; 
‘…although a complicated system might have many components, the relationship 
among those parts is fixed and clearly defined. If it were carefully dismantled and 
reassembled, the system would work in exactly the same way. However, there exist 
some forms that cannot be dismantled and reassembled, whose characters are 
destroyed when the relationships among components are broken. Within these sorts of 
complex systems, interactions of components are not fixed and clearly defined, but are 
subject to ongoing co-adaptations’. 
Similarly, Snowden and Boone (2007, nd) argued; 
‘Simple and complicated contexts assume an ordered universe, where cause-and-
effect relationships are perceptible, and right answers can be determined based on the 
facts. Complex and chaotic contexts are unordered—there is no immediately apparent 
relationship between cause and effect, and the way forward is determined based on 
emerging patterns.’ 
In the same way Schön (1987, p. 3) made the case for a distinction between straightforward 
and difficult problems; 
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‘In the varied topography of professional practice, there is a high, hard ground 
overlooking a swamp. On the high ground, manageable problems lend themselves to 
solution through the application of research-based theory and technique. In the 
swampy lowland, messy, confusing problems defy technical solution…in the swamp 
lie the problems of greatest human concern’ 
Barad (2013, p. 18) echoed Schön by contrasting ‘bedrock of solid and certain knowledge’ to 
‘the swamp of ignorance and uncertainty’. Conceiving the stuff that human services deal with 
as like hard bedrock or a swampy mess are interdependent with conceptualisations of good 
practice as complicated but technically possible compared to complex and always uncertain.  
 
 
Complex people, complex practice 
 
These debates suggest that the usual ways that the stuff and practice of the people professions 
are imagined and represented are inadequate. In particular human services and the human 
beings they deal with are more than the one-dimensional, unambiguous, calculable and 
orderable conceptualisations that typically feature in the relevant literature. The controversies 
also suggest that the phenomena and practice of social, youth and community work are better 
conceived as complex, unpredictable, wicked, and emergent. A key to good practice in the 
people professions is acknowledging and attending to this complexity and aporia and a 
number of approaches to practice suggest ways of doing just that. In particular, if 
conceptualisations of people and practice are effects of power/knowledge then the way 
subjects and practices are constituted warrants constant reflexive attention and value rational 
deliberation (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Flyvbjerg, 2001). And if conceptualisations of 
people and practice are interpretive, interest-laden and value-based judgments rather than 
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scientific facts then neo-Aristotelian inspired approaches to human service practice that 
promote the role of practical wisdom or phronesis may have something valuable to offer 
(Bondi, Carr, Clark and Clegg, 2011; Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010). And if conceptualisations 
of people and practice are wicked and emergent then ongoing attention to detail and context, 
and continuous interpretation and deliberation about problem setting and problem framing is 
worthwhile (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Schön, 1983).  
 
Greene (2001), to some degree following Heidegger’s (1977, p. 25) account of ‘the mystery’, 
also makes a salient point. She argued that in the domain of art there is ‘the wonder, the 
challenge, the surprises…And, yes, the mystery, that goes beyond explanation’ (Greene 2001, 
p. 141). Similarly, when it comes to imagining and representing people and human service 
practice; ‘There is always, always more’ (Greene, 2001, p. 14). And any conceptualisation of 
people and practice is limited and limiting. People are always more than any construction that 
forecloses possibility such as equations to be solved, objects to be produced, machines to be 
optimized, matter to be mastered and controlled, or investments to render future benefit. 
People are always more than any label, and they are always more than any conceptualisation 
such as being programmable like computers or stuff that can be manipulated, fashioned, 
controlled, exploited, mechanized, designed or engineered into things. Similarly, good human 
service practice is always more than the reductionist and limited ways of thinking about and 
doing caring work inspired by neo-liberal forms of government, technical rationality, and 
positivist natural sciences that suggest everything can be unambiguously and completely 
known, ordered, controlled, planned, predicted, and streamlined.  
 
 
Conclusion 
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According to recent accounts of practice theory the way people and their lives and 
relationships are conceived is entangled and interdependent with how practices of care are 
constructed and enacted. This logic suggests that a critical element for achieving good 
practice in youth and community work is a good conceptualisation what it is that such 
practices deal with. I argued that in the human services’ literature representations of the stuff 
that people professions deal with are often flawed. The lives and relationships of human 
beings are often constituted in a one dimensional way that follow and reproduce neo-liberal 
rationalities of government. And they are constructed as phenomena that can be 
unambiguously and completely known and that is amenable to technical approaches to 
practice. And there are discrepancies and inadequacies with how people and practice are 
conceived. 
 
I explored a range of debates on the nature of what it is that the people professions work with. 
These controversies suggested that there is no certain, solid, ordered, objective, absolute, 
factual, perfect, eternal, universal, unchanging account of people. Instead human beings and 
their lives and relationships are better imagined and represented as wicked, complex, 
emergent, non-linear, difficult, forever uncertain, and always incomplete. Furthermore, any 
construction is an interpretation that is prejudiced, interest-laden and value-based. In light of 
these disagreements and possibilities I argued that the nature of the things and practice of 
human service work should be conceptualised as complex, unpredictable, wicked and 
emergent. I suggested a key to good practice in the people professions in acknowledging and 
attending to this complexity and aporia, and I provided examples of approaches to practice 
that aim to do just that. There is a need for further research on how those who are interested 
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in achieving good practice in caring work can and should work with phenomena that are 
forever uncertain and always incomplete.  
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Chapter 4: Social enterprise and the paradox of young people and risk taking: A view 
from Australia 
 
In Australia young people have emerged as a popular target for social enterprises and 
enterprising activities (Barraket, Mason and Blain, 2016). The reasons for engaging young 
people in enterprise-based projects include claims that they help address young people’s 
deficits in entrepreneurialism and risk-taking as well as prepare young people to thrive in 
risky futures characterised by uncertain labour markets and precarious work (Foundation for 
Young Australians, 2015a, 2016a, 2017a). The risk category is also central to a good deal 
of policy concerning young people and underpins many agendas and programs that aim to 
govern what many people claim to be young people’s ‘natural’ tendencies to experiment and 
take risks (Bessant, 2008). This article explores how differing and arbitrary accounts of the 
relationships between young people and risk help to justify enterprise-based initiatives into 
young lives that might not serve young people’s best interests. 
 
 
The rise of the social enterprise 
 
Social enterprises are a worldwide phenomenon that can be found in the Australia (Victorian 
Government Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources, 2017); 
the UK (Harding, 2004; Temple, 2017); Canada (Social Enterprise Council of Canada, 2017); 
and throughout Europe (Defourny and Nyssens, 2008; Social Enterprising Europe, 2013). 
Proponents claim social enterprises use the power of the marketplace to solve pressing 
societal problems, improve communities, provide people with access to employment and 
training, and help the environment (Social Traders, 2017). Social enterprises are considered 
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to be part of a broader social movement that exists to benefit the general public and particular 
vulnerable communities, rather than shareholders and owners, and includes startups, social 
ventures, social firms, benefit corporations, change making and impact investment (B Lab, 
2017; Galera and Borzaga, 2009; Logue, 2016; Teasdale, 2011).  
 
Social enterprises and enterprise-based projects are widespread and flourishing in Australia’s 
social care and community services sector (Social Enterprise Awards, 2016). And they are 
particularly popular in work with young people, for example; STREAT (2015), The Social 
Studio (2015), Charcoal Lane (2014), and Impact Social Enterprise (2017). Even schools are 
getting in on the enterprise for young Australians juggernaut (Camberwell High School, nd). 
And students can pursue their interest in social entrepreneurship at Australian universities at a 
time when university educators globally are being encouraged to act as entrepreneurs 
(Compass, nd; Rae, 2010; RMIT University, 2017).  
 
 
An example of the marketisation of human services 
 
Social enterprises are often heralded as a cutting-edge policy and practice innovation (Mason 
and Moran, 2014). At the same time social enterprises can be seen as part of a long history of 
something referred to as the co-operative movement (Williams, 2016). And social enterprises 
can be viewed as a manifestation of the use of market-based mechanisms and commercial 
strategies in the public and community sectors that have been popular in Australia since the 
1980s and that are claimed to reduce the financial liability of governments, and improve 
economic welfare and wellbeing (Brussaard, Price and Watts, 2016; Harper, Anderson, 
McCluskey & O’Brien, 2015; Pusey, 1991). Elizabeth Povinelli (2011, 22-23) suggests that 
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social enterprises are currently thriving because they accord with neoliberal governmentality 
and reproduce ‘values according to market logic’ (e.g., individual enterprise and self-
responsibility) and produce a market value (e.g., young ‘workers compensated and supported 
by nothing expect the market’).  
 
Other features of current trends in social policy that social enterprises exemplify were 
suggested by Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnball’s declarations on what his Liberal 
government stands for - ‘believing in the individual, his right and his enterprise’ (Shepherd, 
Jean and Holderhead, 2017). Social enterprises align with Australian Government enthusiasm 
for promoting individual responsibility, choice, entrepreneurialism and all that this entails 
including taking risks. 
 
 
Is risk taking good or bad for young people?  
 
On the one hand, the fervour for social enterprise indicates risk taking and all that is 
associated with it such as experimentation and being entrepreneurial is positioned as good for 
young people (Headley and Moffatt, 2015). According to the Foundation for Young 
Australians young people face a new work order characterised by significant disruptions, 
uncertainties, and risks that will require them to be enterprising (Foundation for Young 
Australians, 2016b; Pearson et al, 2016). However, young people are revealed as ill-fitted and 
ill-prepared for all of this risky business. The Foundation for Young Australians is calling for 
a national enterprise skills strategy because it is claimed young people lack the key enterprise 
skills needed to navigate the complex career pathways of the future (Foundation for Young 
Australians, 2017b). On a similar note Nicole Peterman and Jessica Kennedy (2003) and 
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Rosemary Athayde (2009) argued that young people’s enterprise potential can and should be 
measured and fostered.  
 
On the other hand, there is a long intellectual tradition that identifies risk taking and 
experimentation as natural but bad for young people (Kelly, 2000a). Here we see a lot of 
popular prejudices and classic stereotypes of youth as a period of storm and stress marked by 
risk-taking, experimentation, impulsivity, and testing the boundaries (Bessant, 2012a; Tait, 
2000). However, this account not only positions adolescence as a period of normal and 
expected risk-taking. On this occasion risk-taking is typically viewed as harmful and 
dangerous and something that young people need to be actively discouraged and policed from 
doing (France, 2000). 
 
 
Or can we have it both ways? 
 
So, which is it, is risk taking and experimentation good or bad for young people? And are 
young people naturally equipped or deficient at risk taking and enterprise? Another more 
sophisticated answer to these questions suggests there are different domains of risk that 
require young people to engage in risk taking in different ways. According to this point of 
view young people’s risk taking should be discouraged in some risk realms, for example 
when the risks are to do with early school leaving (Australian Institute of Family Studies, 
2013); alcohol and drug misuse (Nathan, Hayden, Rawstorne and Jayasinha, 2016); 
dangerous driving (Scott-Parker, Watson, King and Hyde, 2014); radicalisation (Australian 
Government Attorney-General’s Department, 2015); and, suicide and self-harm (Daraganova, 
2016). And then in other areas of risk, young people’s experimentation and enterprise should 
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be promoted, for example when it comes to navigating precarious job markets, participating 
in the gig economy, setting up startups, and engaging in social enterprises. It seems that 
various social science experts, policy makers, and professionals interested in improving the 
lives of young people want it both ways. 
 
 
In whose interests?  
 
All of this demonstrates that regardless of claims as to whether young people’s risk taking 
should be discouraged or encouraged it is possible to constitute young people as having 
deficits in taking risks in various ways (Kelly, 2010). Moreover, the problem is located in and 
with young people, who are constituted as having too much or too little riskiness. And these 
differing accounts of young people and risk can be and are used to justify different 
interventions such as social enterprises into young people’s lives. However, are young people 
the problem or is the problem the cultural, political and economic contexts and expert 
discourses that conspire to produce many of the problems that young people face? And are 
young people’s best interests always being served by the programs and practices that result 
from constituting young people as risk deficient? More to the point, are enterprise-based 
interventions that rely on arbitrary accounts of the relations between young people and risk 
taking actually good for young Australians? 
 
Social enterprises and other enterprise related activities do provide young people 
opportunities (Ferguson and Islam, 2008). For example, young people can be revealed as 
capable, resourceful and resilient. Young people can also realise a sense of achievement, 
belonging and hope. And young people can develop skills and capabilities, secure an income, 
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and contribute to worthwhile social, environmental and cultural projects. However, these 
potential benefits are not the full story when it comes to assessing the desirability of social 
enterprises and enterprising initiatives (Gerrard, 2017; Pantea, 2018). In particular, enterprise 
based projects do little if anything to change dominant policy approaches and other 
contemporary cultural, political and economic circumstances that many argue are harmful for 
young people and limit their potential to flourish and live good lives (Bessant, Farthing and 
Watts, 2017; Giroux, 2012; Kelly and Pike, 2017; Putnam, 2016; Rayner, 2016).  
 
One criticism has an affinity with the critical theory tradition, think the Frankfurt School 
(Bohman, 2016) and Paulo Freire (1996), that suggests social enterprises accord with and 
reproduce prevailing neoliberal policies that value ‘the individual’ and ‘his enterprise’. 
Subsequently and paradoxically enterprise related activities contribute to oppressing rather 
than liberating young people because they reinforce the very conditions that produce a range 
of challenges and limits facing young people. These problems include a growing wealth 
divide between younger and older Australians (Wilkins, 2017); and the prospect that the 
younger generation will be worse off than their parents’ generation (Daley and Wood, 2014). 
Young Australians are also experiencing declining rates of home ownership (Committee for 
Economic Development of Australia, 2017); and increasing rates of mortgage debt (Wilkins, 
2017). Young people in Australia also face high rates of youth unemployment (Muir, Powell 
and Butler, 2015); underemployment (Campbell, Parkinson and Wood, 2014); insecure 
employment (Crofts et al, 2015); and stagnant wage growth at a time when many already 
receive lower ‘junior’ pay rates (Australian Government Fair Work Ombudsman, nd; Dixon 
and Borland, 2016; Foundation for Young Australians, 2016c). There has also been the 
removal of social supports for young Australians (Author, 2014); and threats to cut and 
suspend welfare allowances to young people (Farrugia, 2016); at a time when levels of 
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income support measures for young people and students in Australia are already described as 
grossly inadequate (Saunders and Bedford, 2017). Young Australians also face ongoing 
efforts to increase their education debts (Norton, 2016). It is difficult to see how enterprise 
related initiatives can disrupt, challenge and change the political, economic and cultural 
circumstances and policies that conspire to produce these problems for young Australians.  
 
Another criticism of social enterprises and enterprising activities inspired by Michel Foucault 
(Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991) and governmentality theorists (Dean, 2010) similarly 
proposes that they are far from benign. However, rather than simply oppressing young people 
this criticism suggests that neoliberal policies and enterprise-based initiatives that are 
entangled with them can be understood as affording possibilities and limits for knowing, 
doing and being a young person. And, at the same time young people actively enact these 
ways of being they might not always be in their best interests (Mansfield, 2000). In particular, 
according to this point of view enterprise related projects correspond with contemporary 
forms of government that produce and incite self-responsibility for dealing with uncertainties 
and risks and individualise achieving economic and social wellbeing (Kelly, 2007). In light of 
this it is unsurprising that so many young people actively produce what Peter Kelly described 
as ‘the entrepreneurial Self’ and energetically pursue education in social enterprises and other 
enterprising opportunities as a good and normal thing to do (Kelly, 2006; Kelly and Harrison, 
2009). Lauren Berlant (2011) suggests however that young people’s investments in 
enterprising projects constitutes a relation of cruel optimism, in particular young people’s 
desire for enterprise is an obstacle to their flourishing. In other words, social enterprises 
promise the good life but as an example of neoliberal governmentality they cannot be counted 
on delivering just that.  
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Managing a risk for young people 
 
We should not forget that the current appetite for engaging young people with social 
enterprises and enterprising activities takes place at the same time there is no overarching 
Youth Policy that even comes close to trying to systematically address the range of critical 
challenges facing young Australians. We are led to believe that enterprise based initiatives 
such as social enterprises can alleviate social problems and can deliver to young Australians 
the sorts of lives most of us want that include job security, permanent employment, and 
enough pay to plan weekly expenses around (Woodman and Jackson, 2016). And it is fair to 
say that social enterprises hold many promises for some young people to gain employment, a 
sense of hope, and feelings of dignity. However, as I suggested social enterprises and 
enterprise-based projects also carry dangers for young people. In particular, they can 
unwittingly contribute to the mess young people find themselves in by reproducing the 
cultural, economic and political conditions that have demonstrated to be harmful to young 
lives. A risk that needs to be managed is the tendency for governments, policy makers, 
researchers, and human service professionals to produce assumptions and expectations about 
youthful identities and risk taking that are used to rationalise and justify interventions into 
young people’s lives such as social enterprises but that often don’t serve young people’s best 
interests.  
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Chapter 5: Using allegory to think about youth work in rich countries that fail young 
people 
 
In ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas’, Ursula K. Le Guin (1993) tells the tale of a 
utopian city whose prosperity depends on a shocking and shameful truth. The city, known 
as Omelas, is characterised by extraordinary beauty and joy. Le Guin portrays Omelas as a 
wondrous and thriving place full of marvels, splendour and delight. However, Omelas’ good 
fortune and pervasive happiness is dependent on the abhorrent neglect of a small child who is 
kept alone and destitute in a locked room. By the age of twelve the people of Omelas learn 
the child is there. Omelas’ residents are shocked, outraged and sickened at the sight of the 
child and they would like to do something to help. But they do nothing to alleviate the child’s 
appalling circumstance. As Le Guin explains, all the people of Omelas understand that 
everything, from ‘the beauty of their city’ to ‘the abundance of their harvest’, all ‘depend 
wholly on this child's abominable misery’. Le Guin adds one more piece to the puzzle of 
Omelas. Sometimes a resident who is aware of the child singlehandedly leaves the city. 
Alone they exit ‘into the darkness, and they do not come back…But they seem to know 
where they are going, the ones who walk away from Omelas’ (Le Guin, 1993). 
 
In this article I explore the opportunities that Le Guin’s story presents for thinking about role 
of youth work in rich modern cities and societies that fail some young people. I use 
Melbourne and Australia as examples of prosperous places in which some young people 
experience immiseration and mistreatment. I begin with reports that reveal Melbourne and 
Australia in ways that resonate with Le Guin’s wealthy, progressive and beautiful Omelas. 
Then I draw on secondary source material to describe some of the intractable problems 
experienced by some children and young people in Melbourne and Australia that resemble 
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the neglect of the child in Le Guin’s tale. I follow the link Le Guin makes between the joy of 
Omelas and the child’s misery to make the case that the prosperity of Melbourne and 
Australia coincides with the failing of some children and young people. I explore some of the 
practices and processes that help to produce the thriving places and the disadvantaged young 
lives being discussed. These have been suggested by Bessant, Farthing and Watts (2017, p. 
185) and Kelly and Pike (2017, p. 1) who claim respectively that contemporary neoliberal 
policymakers and globalising neo-liberal capitalism are ‘eating’ young people. Povinelli 
(2011) also uses Le Guin’s allegory in her social research and also offers opportunities for 
understanding the denials of, justifications for, and failures to adequately alleviate the neglect 
experienced by some young people in thriving places. 
 
Following this analysis, I turn my attention to youth work in prosperous places such as 
Melbourne and Australia where some young people experience adversity. Le Guin only gives 
people in Omelas the option to walk away from the child’s misery and Le Guin provides no 
explanation on why or where they are going. In contrast to Le Guin and again following 
Povinelli (2011) I explore reasons why youth workers and others might walk away as well as 
the alternatives and challenges youth workers have to walking away from the injustices 
experienced by young people in rich places. While much of the material used in this article is 
Australian, my arguments are applicable to other successful cities and countries with policy 
contexts that negatively affect young people and with youth workers trying to make a 
difference. 
 
 
A note on method 
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The research process I use draws on and combines social scientific scholarship and 
imaginative and literary work. This method invites imagination on possibilities that other 
knowledge practices in the social sciences typically do not offer. In particular, my approach 
has been inspired by Kelly’s (2011) use of allegory to re-enchant a social scientific 
imagination. Kelly (2011) argues standardised, rule-bound and institutionalised knowledge 
practices in the social sciences, which are characterised by scientific, statistically based and 
probabilistic thinking and evidence-based processes and practices, frames the limits and 
possibilities of what can be known and what counts as truth and evidence. Drawing on Law 
(2004) and many other authors, Kelly (2011) makes the case that such governmentalized 
knowledge practices are not the only way to produce truths about and accounts of the social 
world that are worthwhile and useful. Kelly (2011) demonstrates the possibilities allegory 
provides for knowing and understanding the messiness and complexity of human experiences 
and existence that typical knowledge practices generally fail to produce.  
 
In a similar way I use Le Guin’s (1993) allegory and Povinelli’s (2011) use of Le Guin’s tale 
to help unsettle how we might typically understand impoverished young people in rich 
countries and what others do and don’t do about it. I read Le Guin’s ‘The Ones Who Walk 
Away from Omelas’ as an allegorical tale about the sacrifice of the young and the failure of 
others to act. At the same time and similar to Povinelli I use Le Guin allegory to provoke 
imagination and thinking on the mistreatment of some young people, policy contexts that 
negatively affect some young people, and ethics and action, including why people might walk 
away. One benefit of using allegory is that it can help unsettle what the relevant literature 
typically suggests youth workers should do, and a breadth of other possibilities and insights 
can be imagined and articulated. A limit of this speculative and imaginative work is that 
many of these possibilities cannot always be explored in sufficient depth. 
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Marvellous Melbourne, Exciting Australia! 
 
Reading Le Guin’s depiction of Omelas provokes a feeling of familiarity for those who live 
in Australia’s second largest capital city, Melbourne. You see the description of Omelas 
resonates with many accounts of Melbourne, which has been rated the world’s most liveable 
city seven years running to 2017 by The Economist Intelligence Unit and is typically ranked 
high on other similar comparative measures (Chalkley-Rhoden, 2017; The Economist, 2017; 
State Government of Victoria, 2017). Actually, the similarities between Omelas and 
Melbourne are uncanny. For example, similar to Omelas, Melbourne hosts a plenitude of 
festival and major events, and as the capital of Victoria, which is nicknamed the Garden 
State, Melbourne is lavished with beautiful parks and green spaces. Akin to Omelas 
Melbourne is adorned with world-class architecture, tree-lined boulevards, and boasts a river, 
a lake and sits close to a gorgeous bay, all of which enable all manner of water sports. 
Melbourne is lauded the sporting capital of the world that includes the Melbourne Cup, the 
horse race that stops the nation, which sounds just like the horse race described by Le Guin. 
Melbourne is often designated as the cultural capital of Australia with many galleries, 
theatres and a thriving arts, music and literary scene that resonates with the celebration of 
music and dance that took place in Omelas. Just like the residents of Omelas, Melbournians 
love food and the city has been voted as having the world’s best cafes and coffees. 
Furthermore, echoing Omelas, Melbourne is officially promoted as a good place to raise a 
family and a good place to live, work and study (City of Melbourne, 2016; Quacquarelli 
Symonds, 2015; State Government of Victoria, 2015). And in a similar fashion to the 
120 
 
residents of Omelas the people of multicultural Melbourne could be described as ‘mature, 
intelligent, passionate’ and mostly a happy lot. 
 
The richness and wonder of life in Omelas also echoes accounts of Australia, which is often 
branded the ‘lucky country’ and that according to Prime Minister Malcolm Turnball (2015) 
has so much going for it that he declared ‘there has never been a more exciting time to be an 
Australian’. Similar to the depictions of Omelas, Australia is often praised as a wealthy, 
progressive and beautiful country that boasts a high standard of living compared to 
comparable countries. For example, the OECD (2017) reported; 
‘Australia performs very well in many measures of well-being relative to most other 
countries in the Better Life Index. Australia ranks at the top in civic engagement and 
above the average in income and wealth, environmental quality, health status, 
housing, jobs and earnings, education and skills, subjective well-being, and social 
connections.’ 
The Australian Government actively promotes Australia’s triumph of achieving 26 years of 
consecutive annual economic growth to 2016, outperforming other major advanced 
economies for the last two decades (Australian Government Australian Trade and Investment 
Commission, 2017). Australia is also ranked second on the UN (2016a) Human Development 
Index that, according to the UN (2016b), ‘is a summary measure of average achievement in 
key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and 
have a decent standard of living’. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013) also measures 
Australia’s progress and reported improvements in health, learning and knowledge, economic 
opportunities, the provision of jobs, economic prosperity, living standards, International 
economic engagement, the health of built environments, and opportunities to participate. And 
according to the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index the level of personal wellbeing in 
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Australia has been rising since the year 2000 (Capic et al., 2016; Cummins, 2015). 
Melbourne and Australia appear to have much in common with Le Guin’s Omelas. 
 
 
Suffering younger people 
 
Similar to Omelas there are reports that indicate problems with the treatment of some 
children and young people in Melbourne and Australia. For example, like the child in Le 
Guin’s story there have been allegations and reports of Australian children being locked in 
cupboards, cages and sheds (Burrows, 2015, Proudman, 2015). Some children seeking 
asylum in Australia are detained in detention centres, a practice that has been deplored for 
being detrimental to the children’s well-being and the cause of serious harms (Amnesty 
International. 2013; Australian Human Rights Commission, 2016; UNHCR, 2013). The 
Australian Child Rights Taskforce (2016a) and the United Nations Committee on the Rights 
of the Child (2012) reported the many and varied ways the Australian Government has failed 
to implement the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the negative 
implications of that failure for younger Australians. The Australian Child Rights Taskforce 
(2016b) argued; 
‘…that despite two decades of consecutive economic growth, one in six children in 
Australia still lives below the poverty line and more than 70,000 received assistance 
from specialist homelessness services, with no view of a long-term solution.’ 
There is a plethora of reports on problems in Australian child protection, youth justice and 
out-of-home care systems and that some children and young people experience abuse when 
involved with such systems (Lonne, Harries and Lantz, 2012; Oakes, 2014; Swain, 2014; The 
Senate Community Affairs References Committee, 2015, 2005). This takes place in the 
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context of a history of institutional abuse of children and young people in Australia that 
includes the experiences of The Stolen Generation and The Forgotten Australians, the 
practice of forced adoptions, and widespread abuse reported as part of the ongoing Royal 
Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission, 1997; McClellan et al., 2014; The Senate Community Affairs 
References Committee, 2012, 2004). 
 
Many other Australian children and young people are doing it tough and don’t appear to 
share fully in the countries’ success. This includes some children and young people who are 
not in employment, education or training, who have a disability, and who rely on some form 
of income support; who are homeless, who live in nursing homes, and who live in rural areas 
and areas of entrenched disadvantage; who are in or have been involved with out-of-home 
care and child protection; who live with a chronic health illness and who have serious mental 
health concerns; who are sexually and gender diverse; who are refugees and newly-arrived to 
Australia and who have experienced torture and trauma; and who are survivors of intimate 
partner and family violence (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2015; Flood and 
Fergus, 2010; Homelessness Australia, 2016; Marsh and McGaurr, 2013; The 
Commonwealth Youth Programme, 2016; Vinson, Rawsthorne, Beavis and Ericson, 2015). It 
is well documented that there is a gap in health, education and employment outcomes 
between Indigenous children and young people and other Australians, and Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander young people are over-represented within juvenile justice and out-of-
home care systems (Australian Government Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
2017; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014, 2012). Young Australians are also 
growing up in circumstances characterised by a range of challenges that limit their potential 
to flourish and live good lives. These challenges include increasing social, economic and 
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health inequalities, poverty, education-related debt and housing unaffordability; risky labour 
markets, precarious employment and economic insecurity; the removal of social and 
economic supports and the prospect of a lower standard of living compared to previous 
generations; and human produced climate change (Daley and Wood, 2014; Davidson and 
Evans, 2014; Denny and Churchill, 2016; Phillips, Miranti, Vidyattama and Cassells, 2013; 
Rayner, 2016). 
 
Not all younger people in Australians are abused, mistreated, marginalised or struggling. 
Some children and young people are privileged, wealthy and revel in social and economic 
advantage. And many young people are quite ordinary and share in Australia’s prosperity in a 
similar way most of the young people in Le Guin’s story do. However, similar to the child in 
Omelas there are children and young people in Melbourne and Australia who are harmed, 
neglected and do not fully share in the success of these places. 
 
 
The relationships between successful societies and the neglect of some young people 
 
Unlike Omelas, in Melbourne and Australia there is not, literally, a destitute child locked in a 
room whom all Melbournians and Australians are aware of and upon which their prosperity 
and wellbeing depends. Le Guin’s story is not intended to be read as real or empirical fact. 
Instead, and following Kelly (2011, p. 439), the allegory can be read as truthful in terms of 
the ways it can provoke us to imagine the relationships between successful societies and the 
neglect of some young people. Le Guin clearly made the link between the joy of Omelas and 
the child’s misery. However, Le Guin does not say why this was the case. The picture I 
provided of Melbourne and Australia and on the condition of some children and young 
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people in these places resembles Le Guin’s Omelas and the child in her story. In a similar 
way to Omelas, the problems for some children and young people in Melbourne and 
Australia seem intractable and as if they were a part of the fabric of the city and country. This 
begs the question, does the success of Melbourne and Australia depend on the failing and 
mistreatment of some children and young people? I suggest that these phenomena coincide. 
The literature that tries to explain how and why successful societies neglect some young 
people can help to understand how and why this takes place for some young people in 
Melbourne and Australia.  
 
Many authors have observed that some children and young people are disenfranchised and 
deprived and their health and well-being is being neglected in developed and rich cities and 
countries that include and resemble Melbourne and Australia (Abrams, 2010; The Lancet, 
2016; The Commonwealth, 2016; UNICEF Office of Research, 2016; Woodman and Wyn, 
2014). Other writers have made the case that young people are scapegoated and blamed for 
the problems they experience in such places (Giroux, 2012; Howker and Malik, 2013; Males, 
1996; Putnam, 2015). And according to other commentators childism, or aged-based 
prejudice against children and young people, is rife in these same locations (Bessant, 2012a; 
Young-Bruehl, 2012). Moreover, an abundance of literature suggests that successful cities 
and societies such as Melbourne and Australia, that typically claim to be caring, supportive 
and beneficent towards the young, are economically, politically and socially structured in 
ways that, first, produce fundamental inequalities that are often detrimental to some young 
people, second, actively blame young people for the adversity they experience, and third, 
make discrimination against, neglect and sacrificing the wellbeing of some younger people 
the norm. In other words, the same cultural, economic and political practices and processes 
that produce the successes also produce the failures and these include successful countries 
125 
 
and cities governments’ fiscal and social policies that are informed by, are in accord with and 
advance neoliberalism, processes of individualisation, and utilitarianism. 
 
 
Neoliberal policies 
 
In particular what is at fault are neoliberal policies that actively promote free-market 
capitalism, that have been dominant since the 1980’s, and that have been linked to the global 
financial crisis, recessions and other failures in economic systems, austerity, the 
concentration of wealth, and increasing inequalities and disadvantage that have taken place 
since that time (Dumenil and Levy, 2013; Hall, Massey and Rustin, 2013; Harvey, 2005; 
Pusey, 1991; Žižek, 2010). Bessant, Farthing and Watts (2017), Cantillon, Chzhen, Handa 
and Nolan (2017), Kelly and Pike (2017), and Woodman and Wyn (2014) are among the 
many researchers who provide detailed analysis of neoliberal policies and austerity measures 
in developed and rich countries that include Australia and how these contribute to producing 
problems facing young people such as increases in poverty and material deprivation, insecure 
employment landscapes and precarious labour markets, obstacles to participate in civic life, 
and social, economic, intragenerational and intergenerational inequalities.  
 
Povinelli (2011) adds another perspective typically missing from the aforementioned 
literature that can help with imagining and understanding the complex relationships between 
neoliberal policies in prosperous places and the denials of, justifications for, and failures to 
intervene and adequately alleviate the neglect and misery experienced by some young people 
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in these places.9 I am particularly interested in Povinelli (2011) because she used Le Guin in 
an imaginative way to generate possibilities in her social research and argued; 
‘Le Guin’s account of temporality, eventfulness, and ethics opens a productive avenue 
for critically engaging the affective attachments and practical relationship of subjects 
to the unequal distribution of life and death, of hope and harm, and of endurance and 
exhaustion in late liberalism’ (italics in original) (Povinelli, 2011, p. 3). 
For the purpose of my work, Povinelli (2011, p. 11) suggests that particular configurations of 
temporality or social tense, eventfulness, and ethics or ethical substance accord with and are 
deployed to support neoliberal policies, the inaction in alleviating concerns facing young 
people, and the scapegoating of young people. For example, the fact that young people have 
not lived as long as older people can be used to justify claims that young people are less 
deserving and have not earnt the protections and supports afforded to others. Following 
Povinelli (2011, p. 3) imagined hopeful futures and conceptions of youth development and 
transitions that normalise hardships and struggles can also be deployed to justify inaction into 
younger lives. Again, drawing on Povinelli (2011, pp. 3-4) the problems that some young 
people are going through can be conceived as mundane, cruddy, ordinary, or even novelty 
that can be consumed as spectacle. As a result, young people’s misery and adversity does not 
attract the sorts of government interventions that take place for events that are constituted as 
crisis-laden and requiring something be done as a matter of urgency. The suffering and 
adversity some young people experience can also be conceived as a good that can help to 
                                               
9 Povinelli (2011, pp. 16, 25) uses the phrase, or what she refers to as a ‘chronotrope’, ‘late liberalism’ instead 
of liberalism, neoliberalism, postcolonial liberalism or diasporic liberalism. I do not examine Povinelli’s (2011) 
definitions, similarities, relations and distinctions between these terms. However, I deploy some of the 
arguments she makes in relation to late liberalism and neoliberalism in my examination of neoliberal policies in 
this section.  
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build character, endurance, and other qualities that will help young people to cope with the 
challenges associated with precarious labour markets, unaffordable housing markets, and 
uncertain futures. And young lives can be conceptualised as more resilient and capable of 
enduring problems to a greater extent compared to other people, and it would be unfair to 
direct scarce resources away from those who are deemed to be in more need. 
 
 
Individualisation 
 
Another problem linked with neoliberal policies identified in the relevant literature is that 
they emphasise individual responsibility and choice at the same time they downplay a 
collective responsibility and the obligations of governments to care and provide for citizens. 
Mansfield (2000), Foucault (1995) and Rabinow (1984) argue that neoliberal policies align 
with and are an effect of particular cultural, economic and political processes that were made 
possible by dramatic social changes that have been taking place since the 16th century. 
According to the authors these processes involve, among other things, an intense interest in 
developing knowledge about and knowing the individual, particularly so that the individual 
can be constituted in particular ways and disciplined, optimized, reformed, objectified, 
calculated, classified, distributed, regulated, manipulated, corrected, educated, transformed, 
or to put it bluntly governed. As suggested by Dean (2010), Miller and Rose (2008) and 
Taylor (2011) this is a particular way of governing that includes placing the onus on 
individual young people to navigate complex social, political and economic circumstances 
that are typically not of their making in any significant way compared to the role of cultural, 
political and economic institutions, practices and processes. The role of contextual factors 
such as neoliberal policies that substantially shape young lives and generate the challenges 
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and opportunities available for young people become less visible. Differences between 
individuals’ access to wealth, resources, forms of capital and capacities are also erased. 
Subsequently young people are praised and blamed for what happens in their lives and for 
their successes and their failures in education, employment, relationships and wellbeing. In 
other words, neoliberal policies reveal individual young people as the makers and breakers of 
their lives at the same time governments that make and implement neoliberal inspired 
policies are let off the hook for addressing problems young people face and can instead 
govern in ways that further hold young people responsible for ‘making it’ or not. Of course, 
in these circumstances some young people do well, either through processes of social 
mobility or by maintaining and improving social, cultural and economic capital, and as the 
descriptions of Melbourne and Australia attest there are opportunities and successes. But 
there are also failures and the accounts of some young people in these places illustrate the 
challenges and limits that modern and contemporary processes of individualisation generate. 
 
 
Utilitarianism 
 
The utilitarian moral framework is also implicated in successful cities and societies policies 
and practices that cause misery for and neglect some young people (Sandel, 2009). Similar 
to the city of Omelas, Australian governments have pursued a path to prosperity for the 
nation or State jurisdictions that rely on the failure to adequately care for all young people 
and especially those who need it. For example, time and again Australian Federal 
Governments’ have demonstrated a single-mindedness to ‘bring the budget back into surplus’ 
and have announced 'tough' measures to do just that and have justified such actions and 
policies on the basis that they are in the National interest and are what is good 
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for the country. In other words, governments promote and make policy for the general 
welfare of the majority over that of a minority. And this is precisely utilitarian. However, as 
Le Guin demonstrates, pursuing the greatest good for the greatest number comes at a cost. 
And in ‘successful’ cities and societies such as Melbourne and Australia it is struggling 
young people among those to pay the highest price. Just like the destitute child in Le Guin’s 
story, the unabashed mistreatment of young people is justified for the good of Australia. 
Similarly, Povinelli (2011) suggests that in late liberalism present action and government 
policy is justified on the basis of a future perspective on what it will have been for, and that 
the child’s sacrifice can be explained and their suffering disappears when viewed from this 
temporal point of view. While the effects of Australian governments’ policies are a serious 
problem for many young Australians, we need to remember that all Australians are 
implicated in their execution. The serious neglect of disadvantaged young Australians, 
which the Federal Government’s actions operationalise, relies on everyone’s complicity. 
Returning to Le Guin’s story, all of the fortunate and well-off people knew of the deprived 
child’s situation, however they did not do anything to rectify it. This is because 
helping the poor child would limit their own well-being and prosperity. And this was a fact 
that the privileged and wealthy in Le Guin’s story were well aware of. What Le Guin draws 
our attention to, and Povinelli (2011) suggests, is an example of the sort of ethics that 
functions to justify inaction to improve the situation of younger lives. People who have 
economic and social resources can be in full knowledge that an injustice is taking place but 
do nothing about it because doing something could substantially hurt them and their interests. 
The child in Omelas is sacrificed, and similar practices of scapegoating youth in ‘successful’ 
countries and cities takes place to ensure prosperity and as a way for others to avoid being 
caught up in being sacrificed themselves. Similar to a sacrificial lamb, the tendency to 
mistreat children and young people is justified for the sake of everyone. 
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Implications for youth work 
 
In Le Guin’s Omelas some residents walk away from the child and Le Guin does not explain 
why or where they are going. In contrast to Le Guin, next I consider why youth workers and 
others might walk away as well as the alternatives youth workers have to walking away from 
the injustices and adversity experienced by some young people in rich places such as 
Melbourne and Australia. 
 
 
An example of moral failure 
 
How we can understand the ones who walk away from Omelas? One interpretation is that the 
residents of Omelas who leave believe they are going to a happier and better place. 
Accordingly, the act of walking away can be taken as an example of moral failure. The ones 
who exit know that the child’s misery is wrong, they are not ignorant of that fact and they do 
not deny it, but they do nothing to end it. They act against the moral consensus, but they do 
not alleviate the child’s distress. Similar to the residents who stay the people who walk away 
could be regarded as engaging in what Midgley (1984) describes as wickedness and what 
Arendt (1963) suggests is evil. One thing this suggests is that action aligned with ethical 
frameworks other than consequentialism, which fails young people in the ways I described 
utilitarianism does, are called for. However, the fact that many Western developed countries 
and jurisdictions have bills and charters of rights, and governments in these places are 
signatories of international human and child rights conventions and covenants and claim they 
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are champions of such rights, but young people in these places continue to experience the 
hardships and victimization previously mentioned suggests that no ethical framework in and 
of itself offers a silver bullet for youth workers and others to address problems facing young 
people (Bessant, 2009a, 2009b). This suggests that a serious rethink of ethics in public life is 
long overdue for the sake of young people. 
 
 
Exit the only option 
 
Another way of understanding the ones who walk away is that it is quite possible that the 
residents of Omelas effectively only have the exit option (Hirschmann, 1970). In other words, 
the relation between the successful city and the neglected child is so entrenched and 
ubiquitous that attempting to effect change by direct action is unimaginable, unintelligible, 
and impossible. Similar to the lives of young people, youth work takes place in particular 
economic, political and cultural circumstances that afford certain challenges, limits, 
opportunities and possibilities for youth work practice (Kelly & Kamp, 2015). Youth workers 
are entangled with these conditions and inadvertently their practices can contribute to 
generating and reproducing the opportunities and possibilities for prosperous cities and 
countries and challenging and limiting conditions faced by some young people. One reason 
why this is the case is because most youth workers are employed in positions funded by 
governments, and this means that youth workers can and do end up doing more to support the 
interests of governments and neoliberal policy agendas rather substantially alleviating the 
concerns for young people. There are accounts in the relevant literature that make the case 
that youth work is co-opted and youth workers are appropriated by governments and 
subsequently enact and advance policies inspired by neoliberalism, individualisation and 
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utilitarianism in practices that include: case management (Lohmeyer, 2017; McGregor, 
2017); interventions into the lives of unemployed young people (Kelly & Harrison, 2009); 
engaging young people in entrepreneurial activities (Emslie, 2017); art based youth work 
(Bessant, 2014, pp. 242-247); youth participation (Bessant, 2003a); and youth clubs (Garasia, 
Begum-Ali and Farthing, 2015).  
 
It is important to recognise that youth work is diverse encompassing many different aims, 
models, interventions, skills, knowledges, sites, identities, and emotions, and every practice 
of youth work can be interpreted in multiple ways (Batsleer and Davies, 2010; Furlong, 2013; 
Pence and White, 2011; Pozzoboni and Kirshner, 2016; Wood, Westwood and Thompson, 
2015). For example, the practices just mentioned are claimed and reported to help alleviate 
personal and social problems experienced by young people as well as provide young people 
with a sense of belonging, personal achievement, possibilities, and hope. At the same time 
such practices can also be understood as aligning with and reproducing neoliberal policies 
that have contributed to generating and failing to alleviate the problems experienced by some 
young people that I described earlier. Moreover, following Heidegger (1977) and Olsen, 
Selinger and Riis (2009) it is possible that any practice of youth work and any intervention 
into young people’s lives holds promises and dangers. And it could be an awareness of such 
dangers that contributes to youth workers walking away.  
 
 
Unbearable emotional toil  
 
Another reason why the residents of Omelas may only have the exit option is because 
knowing about the child’s suffering and trying to address it could be too overwhelming, 
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distressing, and emotionally demanding. For example, people may only have the choice to 
exit because attempting to end the child’s misery could result in traumatization and 
victimization that can be experienced by isolated and unsupported bystanders who provide 
support (Stanley and Goddard, 2002). The emotional toll of having to deal with standing up 
to injustice as well as the various states of denial and ignorances that often take place when 
wrongdoing occurs could be too great a burden the bear, and people may choose to prevent 
and avoid the vicarious trauma and burnout that can be the result of such considerable 
emotional labour and investments (Cohen, 2001; Gross and McGoey, 2015). These potential 
and actual negative effects and consequences of dealing with misery and hardship are 
possible reasons why youth workers and others do not address the adversity and failings 
experienced by young people in prosperous places.  
 
 
Complex moral projects 
 
A further way of understanding the ones who walk away is that it could be from the place of 
exile and alienation that change is thinkable and can be generated. These different 
perspectives on the ones who walk away complicate the view acknowledged by Povinelli 
(2011) that it seems to be a cop-out that Le Guin allows some people to walk away from 
Omelas rather than stay and fight for the child. Rather than jumping to negatively judge and 
criticise the ones who walk away I have suggested it could be the only viable, justifiable and 
conscionable option available. The complexities and challenges associated with addressing 
the failings and mistreatment of some young people should not always be reduced to a simple 
dichotomy between ‘good’ individuals staying to do something about it and ‘bad’ people who 
do not. Povinelli (2011, p. 6) suggests just that when she argues the social worlds in which 
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people live and the projects in which they are engaged involve ‘thick subjectivities’ that 
‘provide the context of moral and political calculation’. 
‘…in any given social world, multiple moral and political calculations proliferate 
because no one ever lives the same project – in Omelas, for instance, the good life 
would be the contested space between the child in the broom closet and each and 
every citizen’s project, including those who decide to remain in the city and those 
who walk away from it’ (Povinelli, 2011, pp. 6-7). 
I have suggested only a few of the moral, emotional, personal, and political calculations that 
might be deployed by youth workers in response to the adversity and injustice faced by some 
young people. As Povinelli suggests this complexity and its implications for what youth 
workers do and understanding such action deserves much more attention that I can give it 
here. 
 
 
To stay and fight 
 
So, onto youth workers staying and fighting. Contrary to Le Guin and in solidarity with 
Povinelli (2011) I think alternatives to walking away are imaginable and possible. Some 
youth workers are examples of people in ‘successful’ places who do acknowledge the poor 
treatment some young people experience; hold strong commitments to justice, fairness, and 
other values that inspire challenging and changing the contexts that negatively affect some 
young people; and try to act in ways that aim to and are able to improve the lives of young 
people. However, addressing problems and inequalities facing some young people in rich 
countries is not as straightforward as it might seem to be. 
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Approaches to practice that aim to transform harmful contexts are characterised in the 
relevant youth work and human services literature as being rights-based, critical, radical, 
structural, transformative, anti-oppressive, post-colonial, emancipatory, advocacy-based, and 
politically progressive (Belton, 2009; Ngai Sek Yum, 2006; Nicholls, 2012; Skott-Myhre, 
2006; Wong, 2004). These accounts of practice have good intentions and have merits 
however they typically overlook many of the challenges and complexities associated with 
doing such forms of youth work. These include those I have previously mentioned as well as 
others observed by McDonald (2006) including the fact that these approaches to human 
services are often advocated within the hallowed halls of academia, however, typically have 
little traction in the ‘real world’ of practice. Moreover, the world of youth work practice and 
the problems it aims to address are typically more complex, messy, wicked, and difficult.  
 
One series of complexities that this article specifically draws attention to is the configurations 
of temporality, eventfulness and ethical substance that can accord with and function to 
support policies inspired by neoliberalism, individualisation and utilitarianism and that 
negatively affect some young people. Youth workers who want to stay and fight problems 
confronting some young people could engage in debates and actions that attempt to transform 
the temporal, eventful and ethical understandings that can conspire to support such policies 
and inaction (Povinelli, 2011). For example, compared to the accounts of social tense, event 
and ethics that can be deployed to justify failures to alleviate concerns facing young people, 
youth workers could argue that no justification can be given for the harmful and detrimental 
events taking place for some young people at this moment in time and there is an immediate 
obligation to recognise the crisis-laden situation for some young people and to do something 
about it. Youth workers could also argue that the serious and damaging problems young 
people are having to endure are getting worse because of our current and enduring inaction; 
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and any idea of the good is compromised because we allow this adversity and misery to occur 
with our full knowledge, our failure to act, and our abandonment of some young people 
(Povinelli, 2011, pp. 3-4, 30-34, 40-42).  
 
Other challenges relate to just how the young lives being dealt with and the problems they are 
experiencing should be understood and the youth studies literary is an example of the diverse, 
ever-changing and highly contested ways these can be conceptualised (Bradford, 2012; 
Furlong and Cartmel, 1997; Wood and Hine, 2009; Woodman and Bennett, 2015; Wyn and 
Cahill, 2015). There is also the possibility that youth work interventions might address the 
inequalities and adversities experienced by some young people but at the same time shift such 
problems and generate hardship and suffering for others rather than significantly transform 
the conditions that produce the problems in the first place. Another problem is that many of 
the arguments about the neglect and sacrifice of the child and young people that are made 
respectively by Le Guin and I could also apply to other people. This being the case attempts 
at social change with and for young people could involve activities directly to do with young 
people and collaborative, intergenerational and intersectional efforts that aim to address the 
immiseration and mistreatment of all people.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper I explored the opportunities afforded by Ursula Le Guin’s allegory ‘The Ones 
Who Walk Away from Omelas’ for thinking about the relationships between liveable cities 
and lucky countries and some young people who don’t fully share in that success. And I 
examined the implications for youth work. Following Le Guin I made the case that the 
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prosperity of Melbourne and Australia coincides with the failing and mistreatment of some 
young people. I described some of the intractable problems experienced by some young 
people and I explored some of the features or elements of successful cities and societies that 
contribute to producing them. In particular I argued that the same cultural, economic and 
political practices and processes that produce the successes also produce the failures and I 
suggested these include policies inspired by neoliberalism, individualisation and 
utilitarianism. 
 
I suggested that unlike the ones who walk away from Omelas youth workers can stay and 
fight adversity and injustice. However, I argued that this is not as easy or straightforward as it 
seems and I described some of the complexities associated with youth workers challenging 
and addressing the problems some young people encounter and the contexts and ideas that 
can conspire to produce and reproduce these. One of these challenges has to do with the fact 
that youth workers are entangled with and can reproduce the circumstances that generate the 
opportunities, possibilities, challenges and limits of prosperous cities and developed countries 
and for young people living there. Subsequently youth workers can inadvertently reproduce 
the suffering and inequalities faced by some young people.  
 
Further research is needed to help understand how youth workers can intervene into the lives 
of young people without unintentionally contributing to problems facing young people, 
shifting inequalities, or making things worse; or whether these results are unavoidable given 
the complex entanglements that characterise practice and the possibility that all youth work 
involves promises and dangers. The role of youth work in developing countries that also have 
policies inspired by neoliberalism, individualisation and utilitarianism and which negatively 
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affect young people also deserves further attention (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2008; The 
Commonwealth, 2016; UNICEF, 2015). 
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Chapter 6: On Technology and the Prospects for Good Practice in the Human Services: 
Donald Schön, Martin Heidegger, and the Case for Phronesis and Praxis 
 
It has become almost commonplace to hear our time described in terms that draw attention to 
the role played by new digital technologies. The publication of articles and books with titles 
like The Second Digital Revolution (Barnatt, 2001), the Information Revolution (Cote 2010), 
or the Great Disruption (McQuivey, 2013) suggests that many commentators are in furious 
agreement that the beginning of the 21st century has been marked by rapid and extensive 
technological disruption that is likely to or that already has occasioned social and economic 
change on a scale that far eclipses any antecedent. Rob Livingstone (2015, p. 1), for example, 
argues that while disruptive technologies are nothing new, “what is new now is the speed, 
extent and unpredictability of modern digital technology-induced disruption, and that this rate 
of change is dramatically increasing.”  
 
No less alarming, or exciting, is the proposition that the new order ushered in by the digital 
disruption will invert the relationship established in the past few millennia, in which humans 
used technology, as technology starts to use humans. The claim that many high-skilled 
professions will be transformed by the new digital and robotic technologies (Brooke, 2012) is 
among the predictions now being taken seriously. Indeed, Richard and David Susskind 
(2015) predict that in an Internet society, citizens will neither need nor want doctors, 
teachers, accountants, architects, clergy, consultants, or lawyers to practice in the ways they 
did in the 20th century. Others claim that many human service professions will be similarly 
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transformed by the affordances of new technologies (Watling and Rogers, 2012; Reamer, 
2013).10   
 
This often-breathless commentary has a powerful elective affinity with some older 
dispositions found in many fields of professional practice.11 Technology itself has been and 
continues to be typically understood and embedded in social service work. To help the reader 
better understand our approach to thinking about technology, we distinguish between two 
dominant understandings.  
 
 
Understandings of technology 
 
Technology as Knowledge 
 
The first understanding of technology that we consider is captured by the Oxford 
Dictionary’s primary definition of technology as “The application of scientific knowledge for 
practical purposes, especially in industry.”12 This conception treats technology as knowledge 
and, in the human services, involves a technical-rational understanding of knowledge evident 
in the constitutive assumption that good practice is achieved by the correct application of 
theory produced by rigorous, scientific research. This understanding typically relies on a 
positivist framing of knowledge and assumes, for example, that the social world, and more 
                                               
10 A sober assessment of the likely influence of digital automation is provided by Adam Corlett (2016). 
11 The idea of elective affinity, following Max Weber, points to a set of important correspondences between 
social phenomena that are not in any strict sense causal.    
12 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/technology 
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particularly the problems that social welfare deals with, can be known and responded to by 
knowledge of entities and processes that are empirically accessible, are regular, and behave in 
law-like or probabilistic ways. This conception of knowledge has had a significant influence 
on how social services are conceptualized and realized. This conception informs evidence-
based practice, the field of knowledge-utilization, and implementation science (Early 
Intervention Foundation, n.d.; The Campbell Collaboration, n.d.; Reamer, 1993; Osmond and 
O’Connor, 2006; Michie, Stralen and West, 2011; Gambrill, 2013; Cochrane Collaboration, 
2015; Heinsch, Gray, and Sharland, 2015). Perhaps this idea of technology as knowledge is 
most typically manifested in many kinds of caring work as the reliance on professional 
practice manuals, assessment tools, or instruments, including psychometric tests, intervention 
handbooks, best practice frameworks, client data management systems, and outcomes 
measurement guides.  
 
Technology as Tool 
 
The second understanding of technology that we consider, running in parallel with the 
representation of technology as knowledge, is the idea of technology as a tool that involves 
both hardware and software.13 The idea of technology as a tool is evident in practice 
innovations such as distance, telephone, online, and video counselling; digitalized medical 
diagnostics; avatar therapy; case management software; advances in assistive, adaptive, and 
rehabilitative technologies; and the use of information and communications technology in 
social service education, medical practice, and training (Kincaid, 2004; Martin and Hawkins, 
                                               
13 In this respect, the distinction drawn between technology as knowledge and technology as tool is permeable. 
Some of the instruments that could be categorized as technology as knowledge like psychometric tests are easily 
programmed into computerized form as apps, and so also become technology as tools.   
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2010; Perron et al., 2010; Reamer, 2012, 2015; Berzin, Singer, and Chan, 2015). Judith 
Bessant (2003, 2004a) provides another example of technology embedded in human service 
practice, pointing to the role played by risk technologies. According to Bessant, scientifically 
produced instruments, techniques, tools, and procedures are used extensively to identify who 
is at risk and to assess the type and level of risk, all with a view to determining the sort of risk 
management or intervention required (see also Dean, 2010). This has proved irresistible to 
those promoting a preventive justice agenda. 
 
These dispositions probably explain contemporary advocacy both for what is called evidence-
based policy and practice, and for the adoption of digital technology in various kinds of 
human service work (ReachOut.com, n.d.; Australian Government Department of Human 
Services, 2015; eheadspace, 2015). Lesley Chenoweth and Donna McAuliffe (2012, 260–62) 
argue that “advances in technology affect human service practice,” and their discussion 
focuses on technology as a tool used in practice with a particular emphasis on 
telecommunications and information technology. This advocacy assumes the potential of 
technology to variously solve problems, improve the lives of human beings, save money, and 
deliver efficient and high-quality services (ARACY, n.d.; CSIRO, n.d.; Slavin and Schoech, 
1999; Young and Well Cooperative Research Centre, 2013). While we are dealing with both 
technology as knowledge and technology as a tool, we are interested in the kinds of 
intellectual and ethical assumptions people make when they think about or use a 
technological frame of reference. 
 
As Steve Matthewman notes, although “ubiquity creates invisibility,” we can ill afford to be 
complacent about the actual value of digital technology simply because “we do not notice the 
obvious” (Matthewman, 2011, 173). Neil Selwyn, writing about the influence of digital 
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technology on education, is even more pointed when he argues that we need a more critical, 
even political, framework when thinking about new technology. He warns that too many 
professionals working in education simply assume, without good reasons or compelling 
evidence, that new technology will be benevolent or will promote efficiency, choice, and 
diversity (Selwyn 2014). Selwyn treats this as one consequence of an evangelical movement 
of advocates promoting the benefits of the new technology (Selwyn, 2014).  
 
Apart from some good reasons, such as those offered by Matthewman (2011) and Selwyn 
(2014), to worry about the claimed benefits of the new technology, this advocacy for a digital 
fix seems, among other failures, to conspicuously ignore or overlook the ongoing crisis that 
has been affecting many human service professions over the past few decades. This crisis 
includes a loss of trust and faith in the profession and the failure of the professions to solve 
critical problems (Schön, 1983; Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010). That crisis is an entirely 
appropriate context for thinking both about what has happened to professional practice to 
occasion that sense of crisis, and the likelihood that the new technology will automatically 
contribute to an outbreak of good practice. Social service professionals need to think more 
carefully about what we mean by good practice. 
 
In 2010, Barry Schwartz and Ken Sharpe wrote an acclaimed critique of modern professions 
including medicine, law, social welfare, and education in America. They point to evidence 
that Americans in general, and people relying on medical, social welfare, legal, or education 
professionals in particular, were not happy. In America, a 2012 Gallup poll reported that only 
29 percent of Americans had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in public schools. 
This was half the confidence level reported (58 percent) in 1973 when Gallup first asked the 
question about public schools. They point to teachers who want “to teach kids the basics” and 
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excite them about the prospect of educating themselves but who “… feel helpless faced with 
the challenge of reconciling these goals with mandates to meet targets on standardized tests, 
to adopt specific teaching techniques, and to keep up with the ever increasing paperwork. No 
one is satisfied—not the professionals and not their clients” (Sharpe and Schwartz, 2010, p. 
3). Through the first decade of the 21st century, Gallup polls also found that 72 percent of 
Americans were dissatisfied with the availability of affordable healthcare, while 50 percent 
were dissatisfied with the quality of medical care. In Britain, only 43 percent were satisfied 
with their access to affordable healthcare and only 42 percent were satisfied with the quality 
of that care.  
 
This general point about a loss of confidence or faith in modern professions needs a lot more 
careful discussion of much more evidence than what can be presented here. However, this 
article does engage with the question of why people would put so much trust or faith in a mix 
of technical rationality and/or in technological solutions. People’s faith in technical 
rationality and technology can be treated as two closely related themes suggested by history 
since the 18th century and the Age of Reason (or the Enlightenment) first set loose the idea 
that humanity was now surging into the future on a tide of progress powered by (modern) 
science and technology (Henry, 2008). This idea and a telos (or purpose) of progress have 
been tirelessly promoted by early advocates like Marquis de Condorcet and Auguste Comte, 
and also by more recent advocates for globalization. The idea that progress is powered by 
technology has also been shadowed by mordant critics like Theodor W. Adorno, Max 
Horkheimer, and more recently John Gray. Here, the focus is on the ideas of a surprising pair 
of critics of technology: Donald Schön (1983, 1987) and Martin Heidegger (1977). Each has 
made an important contribution to how we might think about the way in which we rely on 
both a conception of scientific knowledge (Schön) and a complacent representation of 
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technology (Heidegger). Each helps us begin to think about what good practice might look 
like for social welfare professionals. 
 
In this article, several questions are addressed. Was Schön right to point to a problem with a 
technical-rational model of theory and professional practice? What does Heidegger’s account 
of technology imply about good practice, especially practice based on the premise that a 
technological solution is available? This article explores the idea that technology has a role to 
play in achieving good practice in human services and examines whether technology is the 
answer to the puzzle of realizing good practice in human service professions. 
 
 
Donald Schön: The Crisis of Professional Practice 
 
In 1983, Donald Schön, a philosopher and professor of urban planning at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, published one of the most widely admired books on professional 
practice in the 20th century: The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action.14 
Schön (1983) is interested in how to achieve good professional practice, and this included 
examining the kinds of knowledge best suited to inform good practice. In particular, Schön 
explores the relationship between knowing and doing, research and practice, and thinking and 
acting. Schön’s book is about how professional lawyers, teachers, doctors, social workers, 
and urban designers think about and try to link their practice and theory. Schön argues that 
there is strong evidence of a conspicuous and widespread failure on the part of these 
                                               
14 Others have elaborated on Schön’s (1983) critique (e.g., see: Grundy, 1987; Dunne, 1997, 2005; Thompson, 
2000; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Eisner, 2002; Carr, 2004; Polkinghorne, 2004; Bondi et al., 2011; Hamilton, 2005; 
Schwandt, 2005; Kemmis and Smith, 2008). 
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professions to live up to their stated ethical values, to meet the expectations of their 
communities, and to solve major social problems like poverty, illness, injustice, and 
dysfunctional cities. He claims that this failure was evident even in the 1960s and 1970s.    
 
Schön attributes this failure to the way in which many professionals treat theory as a 
technical form of knowledge based in pure science, which they then use to guide their 
practice. In effect, he is saying that too many professionals believe they just need a kind of 
recipe, rather like a set of instructions for building an electronic device or for using a child’s 
Lego set to build a spaceship or train. We think Schön’s argument is worthy of further 
exploration in part because he opens up discussion about what we mean when we talk about 
theory and practice.15 
 
According to Schön, most professions have a story about how their theory and practice work 
that is reliant on what he calls technical rationality. Schön (1983, p. 21) argues, “According 
to the model of Technical Rationality— the view of professional knowledge which has most 
powerfully shaped both our thinking about the professions and the institutional relations of 
research, education, and practice—professional activity consists in instrumental problem 
solving made rigorous by the application of scientific theory and technique.” The technical 
rational model suggests that good professional practice relies on practitioners exclusively and 
correctly using knowledge produced by scientific research to achieve predetermined and 
agreed-upon ends. According to Schön (1983, pp. 3–4), “Technical rationality holds that 
practitioners are instrumental problem solvers who select technical means best suited to 
                                               
15 It is important to note that the words theory and practice are often used and misused with an almost callous 
disregard for the confusion set loose because those using these words cannot, or refuse to be, clear about what 
these words mean. 
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particular purposes. Rigorous professional practitioners solve well-formed instrumental 
problems by applying theory and technique derived from systematic, preferably scientific 
knowledge.” 
 
Schön argues that too many modern professionals treat theory as a body of clearly bounded, 
scientific, specialized, and standardized knowledge. This conception of theory relies on what 
has conventionally been referred to as the positivist conception of knowledge. This is an idea 
that evolved in the early 19th century and insists that the only way to say we know the truth 
of anything is if we have measured it and, preferably, subjected it to some kind of 
experimental procedure. Under positivism, anything that looks like it has to do with religion, 
feelings, or ethical ideas should be counted out as not being scientific. For positivists since 
Comte (who coined the term), the only true knowledge is grounded in a scientific, 
experimental method. As Schön (1983, p. 31) puts it, “technical rationality is the heritage of 
Positivism.” 
 
The three principal doctrines of positivism that were first outlined by Comte help us to 
understand technical rationality’s reach and influence. First, there is the conviction that 
empirical science is not just a form of knowledge but is the only source of positive 
knowledge of the world. Second, there is the intention to cleanse people’s minds of 
mysticism, superstition, and other forms of pseudo-knowledge. And finally, there is the 
program of extending scientific knowledge and technical control to human society, to make 
technology, as Comte said, “no longer exclusively geometrical, mechanical or chemical, but 
also and primarily political and moral” (Schön, 1983, p. 32). 
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The scientific method, when properly applied, avoids making religious, ethical, or emotional 
assumptions because proper science is grounded in empirical observation and rigorous 
mathematical testing in order to produce objective, timeless, invariant, and universal laws 
(Holton, 1988). Theoretical knowledge is, accordingly, best expressed as laws that ideally use 
equations and mathematical formulations and is successful when an explanation also works 
as a prediction written out as a theorem (Schön, 1983). Whether it is either possible or 
desirable that we generate this kind of theory in the human sciences is another matter 
altogether. Yet, what some call “physics envy” has proved highly seductive. 
 
As Schön goes on to explain, professional doctors, teachers, psychologists, town planners, 
and social workers claim to draw on a body of theory to develop more applied versions of 
that theory. This requires developing day-to-day diagnostic procedures and problem-solving 
techniques crafted into skill-based practices and accompanied by appropriate attitudes (like 
the doctor’s “bedside manner”) and professional values like altruism. According to this point 
of view, professional practice is a second-order activity subordinate to theory. It follows that 
the more basic and fundamental the scientific theory, the higher the status of the profession 
relying on that science.  
 
As Schön points out, this model of professionalism was already facing major problems by the 
1980s. First, positivism itself had already fallen into disfavour among 20th century scientists 
and mathematicians in the revolution led by Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, and Kurt 
Godel. That revolution, which included the theory of relativism and quantum physics, 
suggested that some core features of the universe were not able to be explained by the kind of 
classic scientific methods favoured by positivism, and that contemporary science needed to 
accept a degree of uncertainty (Heisenberg) and even mathematical undecidability (Godel). 
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This view was recognized by Thomas Kuhn (2012) and Karl Popper (1979) and has recently 
been described by Marcus du Sautoy (2016). 
 
Secondly, by the 1960s and 1970s many key professions were experiencing a crisis of 
legitimacy. For Schön, the central problem is the assumption, made by too many 
professionals relying on the technical rational model as a self-portrait, that the problems they 
address are technical problems. As Schön puts it, “Technical rationality depends on 
agreement about ends. When ends are fixed and clear then the decision to act can present 
itself as an instrumental problem” (Schön, 1983, p. 41). 
 
But what if the problems being dealt with by professionals were neither fixed nor clear? 
Worse, what if the problems being dealt with by professionals involved a complex set of 
ethical, emotional, aesthetic, or political judgements? This might go to a standard problem 
facing any doctor who has a patient facing death who he or she can technically save but who 
would be left in lifelong pain and suffering. Or, it might involve a planning decision that half 
of a small community wants but the other half loathes; how does a planner resolve such a 
problem?  
 
As Schön argues, real professionals in every field need to make complex judgements that 
acknowledge the fact that they are working in communities divided by economic, gendered, 
religious, and ethnic interests, differences, and inequalities. This implies that even working 
out the nature of the problem often relies on a mix of technical and non-technical and non-
rational abilities. This recognition led Schön to propose that professional practice be 
redefined as reflective practice.  
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One further observation is warranted. Schön’s account of the dominance of technical 
rationality in professional practice is as relevant today as it was when it was published more 
than 30 years ago, if not more so. The research, education, and practice of professional 
activities continue to resemble the model of technical rationality that Schön describes. If 
anything, there has been an intensification of research, education, and practice modelled on 
technical rationality since Schön wrote his seminal work. This has corresponded with the 
institutional reign of neoliberalism and New Public Management, which have become the 
dominant political, economic, and policy framework for many liberal welfare states like 
Britain, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand since the 1970s (Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Bessant, Farthing and Watts, 2017). And, unsurprisingly, neo-liberalism and New 
Public Management are interdependent with technical rationality, a link acknowledged 
extensively in the literature (Bessant, 2004a; Miller and Rose, 2008; Dean, 2010). One way 
this can be observed is through the sort of research that is valorised and respected by 
governments and policy makers. Research aligned with the model of technical rationality, 
like the evidence-based practice movement, claims to provide the knowledge and theory 
(through robust and rigorous research methods that are claimed to be able to precisely and 
unambiguously know, measure, explain, and predict) that is needed for the cost-efficient, 
value-for-money, auditable, and accountable service provision demanded by neoliberalism 
and New Public Management (see e.g., Power, 1997; Furedi, 2011). We should also 
remember that the potential of technology was central to socialist and communist projects. It 
appears that technology has been critical to diverse and disparate social, economic, and 
political systems. 
 
 
The Solution according to Schön: Artistry and Reflective Practice 
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While Schön (1983, 1987) highlights some of the problems with a technical-rational model of 
theory and professional practice, he also observes that the sort of knowledge that many 
practitioners actually use for good professional practice has not been clearly articulated. 
According to Schön (1983, 1987), technical rationality is not the way of knowing that is 
needed for good practice, and practitioners who do not practice according to its logic are 
unable to talk about the knowledge they actually use in their practice, which is characterized 
by “complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict” (Schön, 1983, p. 39). 
Schön (1983, pp. 19–20) argues: 
‘Professionals have been disturbed to find that they cannot account for processes they 
have come to see as central to professional competence. It is difficult for them to 
imagine how to describe and teach what might be meant by making sense of 
uncertainty, performing artistically, setting problems, and choosing among competing 
professional paradigms, when these processes seem mysterious in light of the 
prevailing model of professional knowledge. We are bound to an epistemology of 
practice which leaves us at a loss to explain, or even describe, the competences to 
which we now give overriding importance.’  
In light of his critique of professional practice modelled on technical rationality, Schön 
(1983) argues for the value of an inquiry into the epistemology of practice. According to 
Schön (1983), this would involve asking question like, “What is the kind of knowing in 
which competent practitioners engage?” and, “How is professional knowing like and unlike 
the kinds of knowledge presented in academic textbooks, scientific papers, and learned 
journals?” (Schön, 1983, p. viii). Schön undertakes a phenomenology of professional practice 
to learn about the epistemology of practice. This involves asking, “What we can learn from a 
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careful examination of artistry, that is, the competence by which practitioners actually handle 
indeterminate zones of practice…?” (Schön, 1987, p. 13). 
 
Schön makes the case for an epistemology of practice based on the idea of artistry, which he 
characterizes as “an exercise of intelligence” and “a kind of knowing” that involves “an art of 
problem framing, an art of implementation, and an art of improvisation—all necessary to 
mediate the use in practice of applied science and technique” (Schön, 1987, p. 13). Schön 
seems to be treating the kind of knowing professionals use as a kind of art best distinguished 
from the model of theory that the technical-rational model of professional practice relies 
upon. 
 
According to Schön (1983, p. 62), reflection in action is central to “…the art through which 
practitioners sometimes cope with the troublesome ‘divergent’ situations of practice.” In 
other words, Schön argues that a key aspect of good practice is artistry, or performing 
artistically, in “the indeterminate zones of practice—uncertainty, uniqueness, and value-
conflicts—[that] escape the canons of technical rationality” (Schön, 1987, p. 6). And, such 
artful practice involves reflection in action, or reflective practice. According to Schön (1983, 
pp. 68-69), when a practitioner is performing artistically and engaging in reflective practice, 
he or she becomes “a researcher in the practice context” and constructs “a new theory of each 
unique case.” This involves practitioners allowing themselves to experience surprise, 
puzzlement, or confusion in the practice situations that they find uncertain or unique, 
reflecting on the phenomena before them and carrying out an experiment that serves to 
generate both a new understanding of the phenomena and a change in the situation (Schön, 
1983). 
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The real value of Schön’s (1983, 1987) work is his focus on spelling out the sort of 
knowledge people use in professional practice. Schön makes the case that good professional 
practice requires artistry and the nurturing of artistry in the education and the 
institutionalization of practice. And he particularly makes the case for the  
reflective practicum in professional education for this purpose (Schön, 1987). 
 
Although Schön’s account of reflective practice still has lessons for us today, Schön is not 
always as clear as he might have been in saying how this reflection might best take place and, 
more importantly, why reflective practice is worth pursuing. Schön’s solution of a turn to 
practice is not grounded in any clear or defensible critical, political, or ethical ideas or 
commitments. He fails to spell out the kinds of ethical ideas that might matter in defining the 
point and purpose of any professional practice. Schön is reluctant to detail the kinds of ethical 
thinking that might make reflective practice a good idea. In this respect and by implication, 
we need some better fleshed-out accounts of the kinds of human goods that professional 
practice is oriented to achieving or promoting.16 Almost as problematic, though much less 
important, is that when Schön describes reflective practice, he draws on a narrow slice of 
professional practice: all of his examples come from American universities or colleges. 
Though this sounds like very harsh criticism, in effect Schön unwittingly contributes a little 
to the mess in which we now find ourselves by virtue of his unwillingness to provide 
examples of the kinds of value rationality that would address the untenable claim to value 
neutrality made by those advocating for a technical rational model of professional practice. 
 
                                               
16 This clearly points to a set of interconnected problems to do with (i) how we might begin to develop such a 
framework based on a defensible conception of human goods, (ii) what those human goods might look like, and 
(iii) whether there are any guides to this in the various traditions that make up the history of practical reasoning. 
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Martin Heidegger: The Dangers of a Technological Fix 
 
Let us turn then to the German 20th century philosopher Martin Heidegger, who is easily one 
of the towering and most controversial figures in western philosophy and someone who is not 
conventionally identified as having made a contribution to ethical philosophy.17 Heidegger is 
critical of modern technology. Can he illuminate the kinds of ethical, political, and critical 
ideas and commitments that might go a long way to defining and realizing good professional 
practice? Let us start by outlining his radical challenge to the way we know technology. 
 
Unlike Schön, Heidegger does not directly examine good professional practice. However, just 
as Schön has a lot to say about scientific knowledge, Heidegger has a lot to say about 
technology. In particular, Heidegger is interested in exploring the essence of modern 
technology and its implications for human beings. But what does Heidegger mean by the 
essence of modern technology? And what are the problems of the essence of modern 
technology for people? And are the essence of modern technology and its associated 
problems evident in the practices of the helping professions? We will address each of these 
questions in turn to make the case that Heidegger’s critique of modern technology is relevant 
for thinking about the prospects of human service practice embracing modern technology. 
 
 
The essence of technology according to Heidegger 
                                               
17 The controversy about Heidegger goes to the question of how much his philosophy enabled his notorious 
embrace of Nazism in 1933–35: see Wolin (1993) and Safranski (1998). The question of Heidegger’s ethical 
position is controversial for different reasons: see Webb (2011) and Artemenko (2016).   
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Heidegger (1977) argues that the conventional ways in which technology has been 
understood are correct. However, he believes that they do not capture the truth or essence of 
technology. In particular, Heidegger argues that treating technology as a means to an end and 
as a human activity, which he calls the instrumental and anthropological definition of 
technology, is “in principle untenable” because it diverts attention from considering its 
essence (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 21, 32). Heidegger (1977) argues that the essence of 
technology is a mode of revealing, or a realm of truth, or a way of understanding or 
unconcealing, or a “destining” that works to reveal. Heidegger stresses this point when he 
suggests, “The possibility of all productive manufacturing…,” and this includes the 
possibility of all ends and means or instrumentality, and the possibility of all making and 
manipulating, “…lies in revealing” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 12).18  
 
Heidegger (1977, pp. 14–24) argues that the mode of revealing that rules in modern 
technology, compared to the mode of revealing that ruled in the Middle Ages and Antiquity, 
is a challenging or ordering revealing, which he calls enframing. Heidegger (1977, pp. 16–
24) characterizes enframing as a revealing of nature, the world, objects, being, and “the real” 
that “has the character of a setting-upon,” or the character of an “ordering,” and, in particular, 
a challenging, setting upon, and ordering of the real as “standing-reserve.” “The revealing 
that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable 
demand that it supplies energy that can be extracted and stored as such” (Heidegger 1977, p. 
                                               
18 Heidegger’s distinctive recovery and radical revision of Western approaches to truth in which he recovers and 
appropriates the Ancient Greek idea of truth and its relationship to the concept aletheia (often translated and 
interpreted as unconcealment, disclosedness, revealing) is examined by Suvak (2000); Sheehan (2011); Malpas 
(2014); and Nicholson (2014a, 2014b).  
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14). As standing reserve, the real is at people’s command as the disclosers of the real as 
standing-reserve. In other words, the real is on call as resource or potential that is ready to be 
unlocked and to deliver what people demand of it. As Heidegger (1977, pp. 17, 23) explains, 
“Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed, to stand 
there just so it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way 
has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve…Enframing…is the way in which the 
real reveals itself as standing-reserve.” For Heidegger, the essence of modern technology is 
its power to reveal, and in particular to challenge or order, the real as calculable, orderable, 
and expected and ready to provide whatever people require of it. 
 
 
The problems of Enframing 
 
Heidegger argues that enframing poses two dangers for people. The first is that “Enframing 
endangers man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is” (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 
27). Heidegger is particularly concerned about the ways in which enframing reveals a 
reduced scope to, and a specifically amplified way of, being, including human being. More to 
the point, Heidegger suggests that by enframing people end up conceiving of themselves and 
of other people as a standing reserve. And, Heidegger adds that people do not realize that 
they are being revealed as resource or potential to be optimized and exploited. Heidegger 
(1977, p. 27) argues, “Man stands so decisively in attendance on the challenging-forth of 
Enframing that he does not apprehend Enframing as a claim, that he fails to see himself as the 
one being spoken to, and hence also fails in every way to hear in what respects he ek-sists, 
from out of his essence, in the realm of an exhortation or address, and thus can never 
encounter only himself.”  
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According to Heidegger (1977, p. 27) the second danger of enframing is that “it drives out 
every other possibility of revealing.” Put another way, where enframing holds sway, every 
other possible mode of revealing is concealed (Heidegger, 1977). Heidegger argues that every 
mode of revealing involves concealing, and therefore every mode of revealing poses dangers. 
At the same time, Heidegger (1977, p. 26) emphasizes the “supreme danger” of enframing, 
which he argues rules when it comes to modern technology.  
‘What is dangerous is not technology…The essence of technology…is the 
danger…The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially 
lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected 
man in his essence. The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it 
could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience 
the call of a more primal truth’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 28). 
Dreyfus (1993, p. 305) stresses the point: “Heidegger’s concern is the human distress caused 
by the technological understanding of being, rather than the destruction caused by specific 
technologies…The threat is not a problem for which we must find a solution, but an 
ontological condition that requires a transformation of our understanding of being” (italics in 
original). 
 
One important question we must consider is whether Heidegger’s arguments about the 
essence of technology and its dangers, which were delivered as lectures over 65 years ago 
and first published soon after, are still relevant today. Don Ihde (2010), for example, 
questions Heidegger’s relevance in light of the transition from an industrial to a post-
industrial epoch. Ihde (2010, p. 21) is also critical of Heidegger’s “essentialism,” or 
subsuming all technology under the same analysis that “keeps one from seeing particularities 
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of technologies….” Heidegger wrote of the essence of technology at a time when the 
dominant types of technology were mechanical and industrial in form – what Ihde (2009, p. 
xii) described as the “rust belt, smokestack industrial technologies” characteristic of the first 
half of the twentieth century - and not when electronic, digital, knowledge-based and 
“technoscience” technologies were prevalent as is the case now (Ihde, 2010, p. 3). Although 
we live in an age where the form of technology that dominates is different, we argue that the 
new types of technology can still be conceived as having an essence or a mode of revealing 
that is enframing and that poses dangers for people, similar to the technology of Heidegger’s 
time in his interpretation. Others agree with our position that Heidegger’s account and 
critique of the essence of technology remains important and useful (e.g., Marcuse, 1964; 
Thomson, 2000, 2009; Polkinghorne, 2004; Feenberg, 2005; Kisiel, 2014). At the same time, 
we accept that not everyone agrees with Heidegger’s account of the essence of modern 
technology and subsequently with our position. 
 
 
Enframing in human services 
 
Is the essence of modern technology (or enframing) and the dangers associated with it as 
described by Heidegger evident in practices of care? Human service practice is implicated in 
revealing being in particular ways, and often this is in the mode of enframing. According to 
Herbert Dreyfus (1993, p. 306), “…Heidegger thinks the perfectly ordered society dedicated 
to the welfare of all is not the solution to our problems but the culmination of the 
technological understanding of being.” In other words, the perfected welfare state where all 
resources, including human, have been efficiently mobilized, calculated, and ordered to 
provide material welfare for all is enframing par excellence (Dreyfus, 1993). Many critiques 
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of modern welfare emerge from and correspond with Heidegger’s account of enframing. In 
particular, Heidegger’s intellectual work on technology inspired (for want a better word) a 
radical left critique of welfare.19 Moreover, Heidegger has been particularly influential on 
many theorists who critically assess modern welfare and human services; one who is most 
notable for our current purpose is Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1977, 1988, 1997; Bernstein, 
1991; Irving, 2009; Powell, 2013).  
 
Timothy Rayner (2001) provides an example of the relationship between Heidegger and 
Foucault’s work, which hints at the way in which enframing pervades social welfare systems 
and practices. According to Rayner (2001, p. 142),  
‘Heidegger and Foucault share the view that individuals in modern society are to 
some extent determined by technological structures pervading that society. Both 
develop the idea that the basic character of these structures is to objectify and order 
the forces of life. Both argue that the view of human beings as a kind of manipulable 
resource is essential to the technological management of society.’ 
According to this point of view, practices of the caring professions can be an aspect or 
example of rationalities and technologies of modern government, or governmentality, that 
conceive of people as a resource or potential that can be efficiently normalized, constrained, 
and optimized with the right type of regulation, ordering, and discipline (Polkinghorne, 2004; 
Miller and Rose, 2008; Dean, 2010). Dreyfus (2004) also discussed the influences of 
Heidegger on Foucault’s work. For example, Dreyfus (2004) suggests that Foucault’s critique 
of objectification, normalization, governmentality, and bio-power follows Heidegger’s 
                                               
19 There is a body of left radical critique of welfare professional practice which points to the unwitting adoption 
or acceptance of neoliberal policy as well as the impact of new public management on welfare professional 
practice. See Foster and Wilding (2000), Fraser (2012) and Keating (2016). 
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critique of enframing and modern technology. In particular, Dreyfus (2004) argues, 
“Foucault, like Heidegger, is, of course, not opposed to modern welfare techniques…but 
he is opposed to taking for granted that welfare practices, based on the social sciences, 
should, in the name of efficiency and optimization, be extended without critical questioning 
to all aspects of our lives.”  
 
Søren Riis (2009, p. 127) also suggests that a consequence of enframing is the creation of “a 
manual for everything—including humans.” The prevalence of guides, frameworks, tip 
sheets, and handbooks also indicates that the logic of enframing has captured human service 
practice. This discussion, though limited, suggests that according to much analysis, 
enframing offers a valuable heuristic for understanding and scrutinizing practices of care. 
And, this is particularly the case when human beings are conceived and treated as human 
capital or human resources—things to be calculated and ordered, subjects to be disciplined, 
assets to be used, and populations to be optimized (Ihde, 1979; Riis, 2009; Thomson, 2009; 
Emslie, 2016). Similar to Heidegger, Foucault suggests that when practices of care are 
entangled with enframing they limit human possibility while also emphasizing particular 
ways of understanding human beings. These reductions and amplifications are a problem and 
suppress and subjugate alternative ways of being.  
 
We are not interested here in providing a comprehensive comparative analysis of Heidegger 
and Schön’s accounts of modern technology and technical rationality. At the same time, one 
aspect of both of their respective arguments is relevant to our interest in human service 
practice. Even though Heidegger’s (1977) detailed description of modern science and its 
essence is more sophisticated than Schön’s account of positivistic science, both authors 
comment on the entanglement between their conceptualizations of science and technology in 
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modern times. Heidegger (1977) argues that enframing, as the essence of modern technology, 
preceded modern science, and that modern science emerged from enframing. According to 
Heidegger (1977, pp. 21–3), even though “modern technology must employ exact physical 
science,” the essence of modern technology is present in modern science and therefore 
modern technology occurred historically earlier. Heidegger’s account of the relationship 
between modern physical science and the essence of technology is the invert of how this 
relationship is typically understood. According to the aforementioned definition from the 
online Oxford Dictionary (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/technology), 
technology is conceived of as “the application of scientific knowledge for practical 
problems,” and this definition, which places science before technology, aligns with Schön’s 
account of technical rationality. According to Heidegger and Schön, modern technology and 
technical rationality rely on science as an exact, calculable, and orderable way of knowing 
and form of knowledge. And professional practice that is based on modern technology or 
technical rationality is interdependent with modern, systematic, positivistic science and 
scientific knowledge. This being the case, the same arguments Schön presents to critique 
professional activity based on the model of technical rationality can be made to critique 
professional practice based on modern technology. 
 
 
The Solution according to Heidegger – Art or Techne 
 
According to Thomson (2009, p. 157), “…Heidegger insisted, a real solution demands not 
that we abandon our technological manipulation and control of human beings (which he 
recognised will not happen in the foreseeable future), but rather that we find ways to integrate 
these technological projects for increasing self-optimization into our basic sense of self 
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without allowing this sense of self to be completely dominated by enframing’s optimization 
imperative.” At the same time, Heidegger (1977, p. 26) makes the case that it is in the 
essence of technology that we are to find the alternative to enframing: “when we once open 
ourselves expressly to the essence of technology, we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a 
freeing claim.” Heidegger (1977, p. 29) argues that “in technology’s essence roots and thrives 
the saving power” or “the promise” and that when we recognize and understand the “supreme 
danger” of the essence of modern technology, we experience “the lightning-flash of Being,” 
or what Dreyfus (1993, p. 308) describes as a “sudden Gestalt switch,” and a “transformation 
in our understanding of being” (Thomson, 2009).20 Heidegger proposes that the alternative to 
enframing, which is simultaneously concealed by enframing, is a different mode of revealing 
that enables the real to appear to people in a different way.  
 
In thinking about technology, Heidegger (1977) describes this other mode of revealing the 
real as “bringing-forth” and argues that this is the sort of revealing that was familiar to the 
Ancient Greeks, who called it poiesis. According to Heidegger (1977, p. 7), one thing that 
was particular to poiesis was its well-known four causes, which Heidegger argues were, “the 
ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else.”21 In other 
                                               
20 It is reasonable to suggest that Heidegger’s analysis of technology took place not in spite of, but rather as a 
result of his initial support for and his later break with National Socialism (e.g., Dreyfus, p. 1993). In light of 
this and Heidegger’s claim that it is in the essence of technology that the saving power thrives, do we all need to 
engage with a political movement such as Nazism that is an extreme expression of faith in technological 
ordering and planned calculation to experience the “sudden Gestalt shift” or the lightening-flash of Being, and 
come to realize and appreciate the dangers of enframing and its alternative? Moreover, how this sudden Gestalt 
shift takes place deserves further attention (see Dreyfus, p. 1993)? 
21 Aristotle proposes four kinds of causes or explanations when we ask the question “why?” According to 
traditional accounts of Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics (e.g., Aristotle, 1996, pp. 38-42; 2004, pp12-15) 
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words, Heidegger (1977, pp. 6–11) argues that the four causes, or the four ways of being 
responsible, or the four “modes of occasioning”, are all at play within revealing as bringing 
forth or poiesis. Heidegger also makes the case that a crucial difference between the two 
modes of revealing—bringing forth and challenging forth—is to do with causality. In 
particular, Heidegger (1977, p. 23) argues that in modern times “causality is shrinking into a 
reporting—a reporting challenged forth—of standing reserve….” John Henry (2008) and 
Keekok Lee (2009) similarly observe that Galileo and others involved in the emergence of 
modern science were critical of the four causes and actively promoted a narrower approach to 
causation that emphasizes the material and efficient causes because they lent themselves to 
measurement and quantification. 
 
Heidegger has more to say in his characterization of bringing forth or poiesis. In particular, 
he describes poiesis’s relationship to the Ancient Greek idea of technology. According to 
Heidegger (1977, p. 12-3), “The word [technology] stems from the Greek. Technikon means 
that which belongs to techne. We must observe two things with respect to the meaning of this 
word. One is that…Techne belongs to bringing-forth, to poiesis…The other point that we 
                                               
Aristotle says when we explain change or movement in matter, it is determined by the material that composes 
the moving or changing things. Any change or movement of a table is a consequence of its being made of wood. 
Second, we can also explain any change or movement in form by its being caused by the arrangement, shape or 
appearance of the thing changing or moving. Aristotle says, for example, that if we explain an octave in music 
this is explained by the ratio 2:1, and number in general. Thirdly, if we want to know why something has come 
into being we look for an efficient or moving cause. For example, the efficient cause of a table is a carpenter. 
Finally, we can explain why something does what it does in terms of its end or purpose (telos). For a seed, for 
example, it is to become an adult plant. Heidegger (1977, 1998) offers what he claims to be a more originary 
interpretation of Aristotle’s four causes and that complicates and challenges typical translations and 
interpretations. 
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should observe with regard to techne…[is that] It is as revealing…that techne is a bringing-
forth.” In particular, Heidegger (1977, p. 13) argues that the Ancient Greek techne is a 
revealing “according to the perspectives of the four modes of occasioning.” Heidegger’s 
account of the relationship between techne and poiesis aligns with Aristotle’s and neo-
Aristotelian accounts that suggest techne is the way of knowing most suited to guide poiesis 
as the form of activity (Dunne, 1997, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Polkinghorne, 2004; Aristotle, 
2009).  
 
Heidegger adds that in Ancient Greece, art was called techne. Heidegger (1977, p. 34) argues, 
“Why did art bear the modest name techne? Because it was revealing that brought forth and 
hither, and therefore belonged within poiesis.” Heidegger then suggests that the alternative to 
the mode of revealing that rules in modern technology (enframing) is to be found in the 
bringing-forth that was revealed by art as the Ancient Greeks knew it. Heidegger (1977, p. 
35) argues, “Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection 
upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one 
hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. 
Such a realm is art.” Heidegger makes the case for a different essence or mode of revealing 
the real compared to the mode of enframing or challenging forth that dominates in modern 
technology. That different mode of revealing is a bringing-forth mode of revealing, which is 
the type of revealing that Ancient Greeks called techne or art, and that has the four modes of 
occasioning at play. Because the four modes of occasioning are at play, art is not as 
reductionist and amplifying of the specific in its revealing the real compared to enframing. 
 
Heidegger examines technology and does not directly investigate good professional practice 
like Schön does. At the same time, if enframing and the dangers associated with it are evident 
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in human service practice, as we argue, then this suggests that practice should be based on a 
different way of revealing the real, and Heidegger proposes that this should be a mode called 
art. However, Heidegger argues that the way to the alternative to enframing is through 
enframing. In light of criticisms of enframing, we are unsure if human service practice should 
be based on this way of revealing the real. But if practice is not based on enframing then, as 
Heidegger suggests, we will not experience the transformation in how the real is revealed. 
This circular argument is unresolvable and does not help us to think about and pursue an 
alternative to professional practice based on a technological fix. Moreover, Heidegger’s 
failure to suggest some possibility for addressing enframing outside of enframing is an 
example of what Jürgen Habermas (1987b) describes as a totalizing critique that leads to 
performative contradictions, a criticism Habermas levelled at Foucault. 
 
Are there other ethical considerations in Heidegger’s work that might help to define the point 
and purpose of a professional practice? Heidegger (1993) argues that he does not provide an 
explicit ethical theory in his account of Being. He begins by asking, “…can we obtain from 
such knowledge directives that can be readily applied to our active lives? The answer is that 
such thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It comes to pass before this distinction. Such 
thinking is, insofar as it is, recollection of Being and nothing else…Such thinking has no 
result. It has no effect” (1993, p. 259). On this basis, Jeremey Wisnewski (2012, p. 57) 
argues, “…Heidegger…explicitly claims in several places in Being and Time that he is not 
interested in providing an evaluative analysis of the modes of Dasein’s existence.” According 
to Sacha Golob (2015, p. 1), “Essentially his [Heidegger’s] view is that, before one can 
address ethics, construed as the question of how we ought to live, one needs to get clear on 
ontology, on the question of what we are.” However, after getting clear on ontology, 
Heidegger does not return to this question. As John Paley (2000, p. 68) argues, all moral 
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theories or ontic alternatives meet the ontological condition of Dasein, and “Heidegger makes 
absolutely no attempt to adjudicate between them.”  
 
Nonetheless we believe that Heidegger’s work is hardly silent on the question of what is bad 
and good for people. Indeed, his account of the dangers of the essence of modern technology 
is an example of just that. In his 1951–2 lectures on thinking, he is clear that the nature of 
technology is not just a human fabrication that, given an appropriate moral constitution, could 
be subdued by superior human wisdom (Heidegger, 1976). That said, any claims that 
Heidegger’s work provides an obvious or unambiguous ethical theory are highly contested 
(e.g., van Buren, 1992; Reich, 1995; Philipse, 1999; Paley, 2000; Volpi, 2007). Dreyfus 
(1993, p. 293) suggests that Heidegger would find such a theory to be an example of the 
problem of enframing, and Dreyfus argues that, according to Heidegger, true moral 
knowledge should not be explicit and disinterested like scientific knowledge. At the same 
time, we appreciate that professional practitioners need to make decisions, and these 
decisions should be good ones. If technology is not the panacea for good practice, and Schön 
and Heidegger’s alternatives to technology are inadequate or too ambiguous, then is there an 
alternative? 
 
 
Another Alternative to Artistry and Art: Phronesis and Praxis 
 
Are Heidegger and Schön’s solutions adequate for good practice? 
 
Both Schön and Heidegger’s critiques of technical rationality and the essence of modern 
technology suggest we should not place too much confidence in making good practice in 
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caring work reliant on technology. Schön directly critiques technology as both a tool and 
knowledge. Heidegger agrees that these negative assessments of technology are correct and 
then goes even further to criticize the essence of modern technology. However, are the 
alternatives to the technical rationality and enframing proposed by Schön and Heidegger 
adequate for good practice in human services? Moreover, is artistry including reflective 
practice (Schön), or art as the true essence of technology as a bringing forth or poiesis 
(Heidegger) the way to achieve good practice in social, youth, and community work? Many 
authors have critiqued Schön’s work on reflective practice (e.g., Bleakley, 1999; Clandinin 
and Connelly, 1986; Newman, 1999; Johns, 2004), and Heidegger’s account of the essence of 
modern technology, especially as it appears in The Question Concerning Technology (e.g., 
Feenberg, 2002, 2005; Harman, 2009; Riis, 2009; Ihde, 2010). These assessments suggest 
that Schön and Heidegger’s proposals are not what good practice in caring work requires, and 
we do not revisit these critiques here. Instead we explore another possibility that is absent in 
Schön and Heidegger’s alternatives to technology and that is also typically missing from the 
examinations of these authors’ work. This other alternative to technology, which is a gap in 
Schön and Heidegger’s work on technology, is Aristotle’s intellectual virtue called phronesis 
and its corresponding form of action known as praxis. 
 
Schön (1987) acknowledges that he did not explore wisdom per se. Schön (1987, p. xiii) 
writes, “I would like to say what I have not tried to do in this book. I have not considered 
how the teaching of applied science might best be combined with a reflective practicum…I 
say little here about wisdom….” At the same time, Schön (1987, p. xiii) argues, “…I believe 
that education for reflective practice, though not a sufficient condition for wise or moral 
practice, is certainly a necessary one.” We agree that reflective practice can have a role to 
play in achieving good practice, but it is not enough on its own. Elizabeth A. Kinsella (2012) 
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similarly suggests that this is a gap in Schön’s work and proposes an elaboration of Schön’s 
reflective practice in light of phronesis. 
 
Heidegger’s questioning reinvigorates a mode of revealing the real that the Ancient Greeks 
called techne, or art, which Heidegger compares to the current mode of revealing, which he 
describes as enframing. Moreover, Heidegger focuses on the essence of technology and its 
ontological implications rather than on ethical or practical questions such as how one should 
live or what one should do. Donald E. Polkinghorne (2004, p. 44) argues, “What is left out of 
Heidegger’s analysis of technology is phronesis.”22 Richard Bernstein (1983, 1991, 120) 
agrees that Heidegger passes over Aristotle’s phronesis and praxis in The Question 
Concerning Technology and other work, and makes the case that this “striking silence” by 
Heidegger is a significant gap. “The entire rhetorical construction of ‘the Question 
Concerning Technology’ seduces us into thinking that the only alternative to the threatening 
danger of Gestell [Enframing] is poiēsis. It excludes and conceals the possible response of 
phronēsis and praxis” (Bernstein 1991, p. 122). Similarly, according to Polkinghorne (2004, 
p. 44), “Turning to Aristotle in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ to introduce the 
Greek concept of techne as bring-forth…Heidegger omitted the other way of thinking, 
                                               
22 Heidegger was deeply engaged with Aristotle prior to the publication of Being and Time (e.g., see Heidegger, 
1962, 2003 [1924/1925], 2007 [1922/1923], 2009 [1924]). Many authors make the case that Aristotle’s ethics 
and Aristotle’s concept of phronesis are central to Heidegger’s ontology (e.g., Sheehan, 1975; Volpi, 1992; 
Kisiel, 1993; Coltman, 1998; Weidenfeld, 2011; Thanassas, 2012). For example, according to Robert 
Bernasconi (1989), Heidegger has four equivalent ideas to Aristotle’s phronesis—circumspection, 
understanding, resoluteness, and conscience. At the same time, Heidegger’s interpretations and translations of 
Aristotle are both criticized and hotly debated (e.g., Bernasconi, 1986; Gonzalez, 1997, 2006; Brogan, 1989, 
2005; Taminiaux, 2002; Kisiel and Sheehan, 2007). However, Heidegger does not deploy phronesis as an 
alternative to the essence of modern technology. 
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phronesis, which Aristotle describes in the same section [of Nichomachean Ethics]...Gadamer 
has proposed that phronesis enables us to respond to the dominance of contemporary 
technology in our lives.” And Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975, 1987, 2004 [1960]) is not the 
only person to argue just that. For example, other students of Heidegger’s, in particular 
Hannah Arendt (1958), make a similar point. Moreover, many of Heidegger’s students and 
many others who were subsequently influenced by Heidegger and his students specifically 
pursue phronesis and praxis—concepts that Heidegger introduced to many of his students in 
the 1920s—in ways contrary to how Heidegger appropriated these concepts in his own work. 
Lawrence J. Hatab (2000) also observes Heidegger’s failure to consider praxis. Hatab (2000, 
p. 203) argues, “Another way to understand the shortcomings of Heidegger’s political vision 
involves his preference for poiesis over praxis, for creative bring-forth over engaged social 
practice…For all his interest in Aristotle’s ethics, Heidegger never followed through on 
Aristotle’s praxis….” Francisco J. Gonzalez (2006) helps explain this failure by making the 
case that Heidegger transforms and distorts Aristotle’s meaning of praxis. 
 
 
Phronesis and praxis 
 
So, what are phronesis and praxis? And how can phronesis and praxis help us to 
conceptualize and pursue good practice in the social services in ways that avoid the problems 
associated with technical rationality and enframing? Aristotle (2009) was one of the first 
philosophers to distinguish phronesis and to describe its relationship with praxis, and his 
account is upheld by those who are typically referred to as neo-Aristotelians. To describe 
phronesis and praxis, it is useful to return to Aristotle, who characterizes these ideas, in 
particular in his Nichomachean Ethics. Before we do that, it is important to note that Aristotle 
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lived almost 2,400 years ago when life was very different, and some authors, most notably 
Foucault (1984) and Jürgen Habermas (1993), resist looking to the Ancient Greeks for an 
ethical theory for contemporary times.23 On the other hand, many other authors including 
Georg W. F. Hegel (1977 [1807]), Heidegger (2003 [1924/1925]), Jacques Derrida (2001a), 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), Martha Nussbaum (2001), and Michael Sandel (2009) return to 
the Ancient Greeks and particularly to Aristotle to help answer critical questions. We follow 
these authors’ lead and believe that there is value in exploring the possibilities afforded by 
ancient ideas to assist with understanding and dealing with modern problems, and this 
includes the problem that we are addressing. Many other authors agree, and Richard 
Bernstein (1986), Anna C. Petersén and Jan I. Olsson (2015), Joseph Dunne (1997, 2005), 
Bill Green (2009), Shirley Grundy (1987), Jon Ord (2016), Stephen Kemmis and Tracey J. 
Smith (2008), Kinsella and Pitman (2012), and Jennifer White (2007) are among those who 
suggest that phronesis and praxis offer possibilities for inspiring new kinds of professional 
practice that attempt to avoid the kinds of problems that our critique of technology identifies. 
 
Aristotle’s intellectual virtues and plural forms of reasoning 
 
Aristotle (2009) discusses phronesis and praxis significantly in Book VI of Nichomachean 
Ethics. In Book VI, Aristotle gives an account of the five main intellectual virtues, which are 
also referred to by neo-Aristotelians as forms of reasoning or ways of knowing, and 
phronesis is one of these. The way in which Aristotle (2009) describes phronesis and praxis 
that is most relevant to our purposes is by relating and distinguishing these ideas from four 
                                               
23 Habermas (1974, 1993) acknowledges Aristotle’s distinctions between phronesis, techne, and episteme, 
however does not agree that phronesis is the best response to the problems posed by modern technology, 
technique and a technical interest in the practical and political realms. 
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other concepts that are also paired and coupled—techne and poiesis, and episteme and 
theoria. David Ross and Lesley Brown’s (Aristotle, 2009) translation and interpretation of 
Nichomachean Ethics, which is a traditional version of the text, translates phronesis as 
“practical wisdom,” praxis as “acting,” techne as “art,” poiesis as “making,” episteme as 
“scientific reasoning,” and, theoria as “developing theoretical knowledge”. To maintain 
consistency in our text, we continue to use the Ancient Greek terms.24  
 
According to Aristotle’s (2009) account of the intellectual virtues there are plural forms of 
reasoning, and these suit or accord with different types of materials, activities, agents, and 
outcomes. Dunne (2005, p. 381) recaptured Aristotle’s point when he argued the integrity, 
strength and success of practices requires being clear about,  
‘…just what kind of material we deal with in practical domains: the material will 
determine the kind of activity we are engaged in and, in turn, the kind of knowledge 
that is required or the type of rationality that is appropriate.’ 
 
The idea that there are diverse ways of knowing that correspond to different forms of matter, 
action and ends is quite radical for our time. This is because we live in a world where a 
particular type of knowledge has been dominant for several centuries and this is variously 
described as technical, instrumental, modernist, empirical, positivist or scientific (Carr, 2004; 
Eisner, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Habermas, 1974; Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; Schön, 1983). 
                                               
24 According to Robert Bernasconi (1986, p. 111) Aristotle does not offer a sustained account of the distinction 
between praxis and poiesis because the distinction was already well known to Aristotle and his contemporaries. 
Bernasconi (1986, p. 111) adds, “Nor is there any clear agreement amongst scholars as to how the distinction is 
understood by him [i.e., Aristotle].” We do not follow these controversies and debates and closely follow Ross 
and Brown’s interpretation and translation. 
172 
 
More to the point, it is generally presumed and taken-for-granted there is only one useful and 
legitimate condition of knowledge or only one type of reasoning, and this way of knowing is 
subsequently used to guide all action regardless of whether it takes place in the physical, 
organic, human or social realm (Polkinghorne, 2004). Consequently, most accounts of human 
service practice fail to make a case for the types of reasoning and action that are most suited 
to the matter that caring work deals with (Dunne 2005). Accordingly, conceptions of ‘good 
practice’ in person-to-person work too often privilege scientific and instrumental rationality 
(Ord, 2014; Schön, 1983). Ellul (1964) and Habermas (1974) argued technical ways of 
knowing have assimilated scientific and practical forms of reasoning and come dominate all 
fields of human activity. The ubiquity of technique is evident in popular approaches to human 
service delivery such as evidence-based practice, professional practice standards, codes of 
ethics, ‘what works’ guides, and transferable skills handbooks. However, the integrity of 
human practices requires a way of knowing that is different to formal logic, the faithful 
application of scientifically produced ‘truths’, or a blind compliance with authority. 
 
What we are proposing here, and what Aristotle and the neo-Aristotelians argue, is that there 
are different and likewise valuable ways of knowing. Table 1 explains Aristotle’s (2009) 
ideas and demonstrate the correspondence between particular types of matter, forms of 
action, ways of knowing, kinds of agents, and sorts of ends. 
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Table 1: Aristotle’s intellectual virtues and their corresponding forms of action, agents, and 
outcomes (Adapted from: (a) Aristotle 2009; (b) Dunne 2005 pp. 378-380; (c) Dunne 1997 
pp. 237-249; (d) Flyvbjerg 2001 p. 57; (e) Polkinghorne 2004 p. 114). 
 
Material, 
matter being 
dealt with 
Activity, form 
of action: 
Reasoning to 
guide activity, 
intellectual 
virtue, way of 
knowing: 
Exercised, 
practiced, 
performed or 
possessed by: 
Outcomes, 
ends: 
Things eternal, 
the ‘universal, 
invariable, 
context 
independent’ 
(d), e.g., 
‘mathematical 
entities, the 
heavenly 
bodies, and the 
divine…first 
mover’(c) 
Theoria – 
developing 
theoretical 
knowledge, 
theorizing, 
contemplation 
(science) 
Episteme – 
theoretical 
reasoning, 
scientific or 
analytical 
rationality, 
theoretical 
Sophoi – one 
devoted to theory 
and 
contemplating on 
things eternal 
‘Knowledge 
about the realm 
of the 
unchanging’ 
(e), Theoretical 
knowledge, 
Explanations 
and predictions, 
Eternal truths 
‘Wood, stone, 
cloth, or leather’ 
(b), other such 
stable or passive 
Poiesis – 
producing, 
making, 
application of 
Techne – 
planning, 
knowing how to 
make something, 
Technitai – one 
who practices 
techne or skill 
Artefacts, Art, 
Craft, Products, 
Reproduction, 
‘…a 
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materials where 
‘…an already 
designed form 
can be imposed 
(b), ‘the fabric 
of the material 
universe, in its 
physical, 
chemical 
and…biological 
aspects’ (b) 
technical 
knowledge and 
skill 
(a trade) 
instrumental or 
technical 
rationality, 
productive 
substantial, 
durable product 
which – like the 
materials 
themselves – is 
quite separate 
from the 
producer and 
even from the 
activity of 
production’ (b) 
‘Volatile 
constellations of 
human passions 
and 
motivations’ 
(b), shifting and 
protean sites of 
engagement (b), 
‘a field of 
forces’ (b), 
human action 
and interaction 
(b), human 
practices (b) 
Praxis – 
acting, doing 
the good, 
practical 
understanding 
(conduct) 
Phronesis – 
deliberating on 
activities for the 
good, practical or 
value rationality, 
practical, 
practical wisdom 
(a) 
Phronimos – one 
who sees and is 
disposed to do the 
good in every 
situation 
Good conduct, 
Good action, 
Living well, 
Living fully, 
Doing the right 
thing for the 
right reason in 
each particular 
situation, ‘…a 
propitious [or 
favourable] 
result’ (b) 
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First, Aristotle (2009) argued there are ‘things eternal’. Dunne (1997, p. 238) suggested such 
‘things’ include ‘mathematical entities, the heavenly bodies, and the divine being or first 
mover’. Gravity is an example of such material. The form of activity most suitable for 
dealing with such matter is developing theoretical knowledge or what the Ancient Greeks 
phrased theoria. And this action is best guided by episteme, or scientific reasoning. This is 
the knowing and doing required of mathematicians, scientists and others who work in the 
hard sciences and who deal with the matter just described. 
 
Second, there are materials that Dunne (2005, p. 379) described as ‘stable or passive’ such as 
‘wood, stone, cloth, or leather’. On this occasion the activity best suited to deal with this 
matter is producing, making or poiesis. Techne or technical rationality, often referred to as 
‘know-how’, is the appropriate reasoning in this instance. Engineers and other workers in 
construction, architects and artists are examples of the people who deal with such matter and 
therefore need to be good at exercising techne and performing poiesis. 
 
Third, we have the realm of human action and interaction with all of its intricacy, fragility, 
passions, contradictions, motivations, and unpredictability (Dunne, 2005). According to 
Aristotle (2009) and the neo-Aristotelians the most suitable form of action to deal with this 
sort of material is praxis. Phronesis, or practical rationality, is the type of reasoning that 
corresponds to praxis. In other words, anyone who deals with people needs to possess 
phronesis and perform praxis to do it well. 
 
Using this account of different types of reasoning suiting different forms of action to deal 
with particular sorts of matter how should we understand or conceive of good practice in 
human services? 
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The case against episteme and theoria, and techne and poiesis 
 
Child, youth, family, disability and aged-care work are examples of ‘human practices’ that 
deal with ‘the frailty and intricacy of human affairs’ (Dunne, 2005, p. 381). To put this 
another way, the matter of human service work is complex and perplexing human beings, and 
contingent, unpredictable and situated human relations. Schön (1983, pp. ix, 16) elaborates 
on this description by arguing such professional practices are characterised by ‘unique, 
uncertain and conflicted situations’, or, borrowing from Ackoff (1979), ‘messes’. This 
understanding of the material that social professions work with resonates with accounts of 
practice in social work and youth work (Fook, Ryan and Hawkins, 2000; Spence, Devanney 
and Noonan, 2006). More importantly, it guides how we should conceive good practice in 
these fields. 
 
According to Aristotle (2009) and those who agree with his account, episteme and theoria are 
inadequate when dealing with human action and interaction. This is because, for example, 
they ignore context, uncertainty, unpredictability, and the need for situational awareness to 
make good decisions in the human realm. The fact that people are not eternal beings also 
makes episteme and theoria unsuitable. Hamilton (2005) and Schön (1983) similarly 
questioned the conventional idea that good practice in caring work can be understood 
scientifically. In other words, cumulative, explanatory, universal, and predictive theories will 
not achieve good practice in human service work because the matter which this type of work 
deals with is conditional, inexact, irregular and immeasurable (Flyvbjerg 2001). Good 
practice in the caring professions should not be conceived of as a type of theoria or science 
guided by episteme or formal logic. 
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Now one thing that phronesis and techne, as different intellectual virtues or types of 
knowledge, and praxis and poiesis, as different sorts of human activity, share is that they 
relate to variable things or matters that can be otherwise, rather than invariable things or 
unchanging objects (Aristotle, 2009). If we accept that human services respond to variable 
things or matters that can be otherwise, rather than invariable things or unchanging objects, 
then we need to decide whether social services are better characterized or revealed as a praxis 
guided by phronesis, or as a poiesis guided by techne.  
 
To help answer this question, we can look to Aristotle’s descriptions of and distinctions 
between phronesis and praxis, and techne and poiesis. Aristotle’s (2009) accounts of techne 
and poiesis that resonate with descriptions of modern technology are among the most 
pertinent. Aristotle (2009, pp. 105, 106) argues, “All art [techne] is concerned with coming 
into being, i.e. with contriving and considering how something may come into being…and 
whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made…[and] making [poiesis] has an end 
other than itself.” Heidegger’s (2003 [1922/1923], p. 29) translation and interpretation of 
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics further illuminates the distinctive character of techne and 
poiesis. “The object of know-how [techne] is…the finished product, which arises through a 
production and a fabrication [poiesis]. This [finished product]…is “for the sake of 
something,” [Nichomachean Ethics 1139b1], it has a relation to something else…The 
[finished product]…is “for something and for someone” [Nichomachean Ethics 
1139b2]…This double character entails that the [finished work] of the [production, poiesis] is 
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for further use, for man [sic].”25 Similar to these descriptions of techne and poiesis, modern 
technology is concerned with making or producing things (typically for some other further 
use), begins with someone who is separate from the thing being made, and ends in something 
that is separate from the activity of making. We have already identified the problems with 
these ways of knowing and doing for practices in the social services in our critiques of the 
technical rationality offered by Schön and the criticisms of enframing provided by Heidegger. 
In light of these problems, human services should not be considered as poiesis guided by 
techne.  
 
Neo-Aristotelians similarly argue techne and poiesis are insufficient forms of reasoning and 
action when dealing with the complexity of people (Polkinghorne, 2004). This is because, for 
example, people are not stable or passive objects to be fashioned or crafted into ‘things’, 
which in the current neo-liberal policy context typically translates into things that serve the 
interests of free-market capitalism. Thinking about people in such ways, as clumps of 
physical matter rather than unique and complex human beings, is also dehumanizing and 
deeply troubling (Arendt, 1963). Moreover ‘know-how’, or the efficient application of rules 
or techniques to produce pre-determined goals or results, is inadequate to achieve good 
practice in human services (Bondi, Carr, Clark and Clegg, 2011). Dunne’s (1993) critique of 
technical rationality challenges approaches to achieving good human service practice that 
privilege means-ends efficiency. Such methods aim to tightly control what people do often 
for the purpose of maximising utility and include the use of technologies such as outcomes-
based funding, accountability regimes, and evidence-based and competency-based 
                                               
25 What can be observed here in Heidegger’s early translation and interpretation of Aristotle’s account of techne 
in Nichomachean Ethics is an original glimpse of what was to become Heidegger’s theory of enframing in The 
Question Concerning Technology. 
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approaches to practice. However, these mechanisms wrongly assume people are controllable 
and worryingly presume people should be controlled. Good practice in practices of care 
should not be understood as a form of poiesis or craft guided by techne or the efficient use of 
knowledge or demonstration of skill.  
 
The case for phronesis and praxis 
 
This leaves revealing social services as a praxis guided by phronesis. So why are these better 
ideas for conceptualizing good practice in the human services?  
 
First, using Aristotle’s (2009) and the neo-Aristotelian account of different ways of knowing, 
good practice in the human services should be conceived as a form of praxis guided by 
phronesis. This is because practitioners of care work with the sort of matter that is best dealt 
with by such reasoning and action. Polkinghorne (2004, p. 126) agrees. 
‘…phronesis is the proper rationality for developing knowledge to determine actions 
(praxis) that deal with people’ (original italics). 
Moreover, praxis and phronesis correspond to the contingent, unpredictable and situated 
nature of human service work and work involving complex and perplexing human beings. 
 
Second, Aristotle (2009, p. 106) argues that, contrary to poiesis, praxis cannot have an end 
other than itself, “for good action [praxis] itself is its end.” In other words, in his account of 
praxis, Aristotle offers a way to conceptualize action that avoids the kinds of problems that 
our critique of technology identifies. In particular, in the case of praxis the end is not 
something separate to the action; the action is the end. But how is the action to be good 
action? This is where phronesis comes in. According to Aristotle (2009, p. 106), phronesis is 
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a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regards to human goods or to the things that 
are good or bad for human beings. In other words, phronesis is concerned with deliberation 
and good judgment regarding how human beings should be and, in particular, how they 
should act. Aristotle (2009, p. 109) adds that because action is concerned with particulars, 
phronesis recognizes and needs universal and particular knowledge, especially contingent, 
context-specific knowledge. This helps to explain why Aristotle (2009, xvi, pp. 115–17) 
argues that there is a close connection between phronesis and moral virtue.  
 
And third, phronesis is needed and exercised to determine what the virtuous act is in a 
particular circumstance—or phronesis is the intellectual reasoning that helps to guide the 
desire to pursue what is right and avoid what is wrong, as well as to make good choices 
regarding states of character or the moral virtues in a given instant (Aristotle, 2009). 
Schwartz and Sharpe’s (2010) account of phronesis captures these key ideas of the concept. 
“Ethics, said Aristotle…was about performing a particular social practice well—being a good 
friend or parent or doctor or soldier or citizen or statesman—and that meant figuring out the 
right way to do the right thing in a particular circumstance, with a particular person, at a 
particular time. This is what took practical wisdom [phronesis]” (Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010, 
pp. 5–6). Wisnewski (2012, pp. 61–5) agrees that “The virtuous action [the action guided by 
phronesis or praxis] is one done in the right way, at the right time, to the right person, and 
with the right kind of knowledge” (see also Anscombe, 1958; Bessant, 2009a; Eikeland, 
2014, Cheung, 2017). According to Aristotle (2009), phronesis is the intellectual virtue best 
suited to guide praxis. And praxis, as a type of activity, is often understood as human action 
oriented toward some idea of the good that, while guided by universals, emerges in response 
to particulars or the context-specific contingencies of the given situation of practice itself 
(Polkinghorne, 2004). Because the end of praxis is thought through and determined with the 
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aid of phronesis in the specific context of action itself, rather than the end being a 
scientifically produced, pre-determined rule or theory to be correctly applied in practice, and 
because the end of praxis is not separate from and for the sake of something outside the 
action itself, as it is in the case of poiesis guided by techne, praxis and phronesis offer a way 
to conceptualize good practice in the human services that could avoid the problems 
associated with technical rationality and enframing.  
 
According to Polkinghorne (2004) praxis can be understood as good conduct, doing the good 
and acting for the good of the other. Similarly, Green (2009, p 11) argued praxis indicates 
‘…engaged work in and on the world’ (original italics). And ‘engaged’ people are doing 
praxis by clearly thinking about what they are doing and why they are doing it. Such 
accounts of praxis make it clear why it is the form of action, compared to theoria and poiesis, 
most suited to a defensible conception of good practice in the people professions. Moreover, 
to have integrity in what they do, people working with people should have a foremost interest 
to do good for the people they are working with and act in ways that align with this. 
 
Phronesis is an ancient Greek term for which there is no direct modern translation. But 
phronesis is described variously as good judgment, practical wisdom, prudence, practical 
reasoning, and practical rationality. For example, Schwartz and Sharpe (2010, p. 5) 
characterised practical wisdom as the capacity to figure out, ‘…the right way to do the right 
thing in a particular circumstance, with a particular person, at a particular time’. Simply put 
phronesis is the capacity to figure out the right thing to do for the right reasons in each 
instance of practice. The fact human service work is never the same thing twice requires 
workers to exercise phronesis, rather than episteme or techne, to do good practice. And, just 
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as important, the integrity of people professions demands the recognition of phronesis as 
critical to good practice. 
 
 
The role of technology 
 
When it comes to practices that involve work between people, such as child, youth, family, 
disability and aged-care work, the type of reasoning that is best suited to practicing well is 
not scientific or technical, it is practical. Where does this leave technology? More to the 
point, should technology still have a role in achieving good practice in human services?  
 
Some authors are suspicious of technology and suggest that techne and poiesis have no role 
to play in association with phronesis and praxis in professional practice (Arendt, 1963; Carr, 
2004). This is because techne and poiesis are oriented toward making, manipulating, and 
controlling. For example, David Hamilton (2005, p. 40) argues, “…through techne one sees 
nature as something to be used and controlled…. Both pre-modern and modern technologies 
regard nature as something to be used.” In other words, technology can be associated with the 
dangers of enframing no matter the era in which it is located.  
 
Other authors argue that technology still has a role to play, and that pragmatically it is 
difficult to think about people and practice in modern times without technology (Thomson, 
2009). We are inclined to agree.  
 
If technology has a role to play in achieving good practice in the caring professions, then 
what should it be? Most accounts that support technology having a role suggest that 
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technology should be in the service of and subordinate to phronesis and praxis (Dunne, 1997; 
Walker and Walker, 2012; Carr, 2014). This is a relationship to technology that Dreyfus 
(1993) suggests is supported by Heidegger’s response to the technological understanding of 
being. This suggestion also makes sense in light of an assumption or claim that phronesis and 
praxis rest on: that each instance of practice is unique, and practice is never the same thing 
twice. A relevant implication of this account of practice is that a critical aspect of exercising 
phronesis and doing praxis is that people have to decide in each instance of practice whether 
to use technology and, if so, what technology to use, when to use it, and why and how to use 
it.  
 
To put this another way, we are not suggesting that a good foundation of relevant knowledge 
and a broad repertoire of potentially useful skills are unimportant for practicing well. On the 
contrary such facts and techniques are necessary. However, they are not enough. Much more 
is involved in doing good caring work than using scientifically produced evidence of what 
works or implementing standardised procedures. Carr (2014) illustrated the limits of episteme 
and techne in ‘professional services’ that include human services. 
‘…doctors do not just need medical knowledge or surgical skill, but the wisdom to 
employ these in the best interests of patients’ health; lawyers need not just legal 
knowledge, but the judgement to ensure that such knowledge conduces to the benefit 
of clients; teachers need not just the academic knowledge and pedagogical skills 
required for effective practice, but some understanding of how, when and where to 
use such knowledge and skills to the ultimate educational welfare of each and every 
pupil in their care’ (Carr, 2014, p. 21). 
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In other words, good practice in person-to-person work will not be achieved with the 
entrenched techno-scientific condition of knowledge outlined earlier. Instead, achieving good 
practices of care requires a different way of knowing, and this way of knowing is phronesis. 
And this conception of good practice in the people professions has a number of implications.  
 
For example, it demonstrates that simply being compliant, obeying rules, following 
instructions, applying theory, or using instruments or techniques will not achieve good 
practice in the caring fields. The current demands for deference to authority and obedience to 
regulation are inappropriate ways to realize good human practices. Moreover, if practices of 
care deal with matter that is best understood as the messy, uncertain, volatile, and intricate 
world of human affairs, then it is indefensible to argue for an analytical or instrumental 
rationality to deal with this matter. Unfortunately, the management, funding, administration 
and delivery of much human service work is based on a conception of practice that values the 
application of theory, means-end efficiency, and the pursuit of pre-determined context-
independent outcomes. Episteme and techne are the rationalities at play in the current trend 
towards evidence-based practice and the emphasis being put on the achievement of 
“outcomes” in state funded caring work. Such institutional arrangements dishonour the 
integrity of practices of care. A conception of good practice in the human services as a type 
of praxis to be guided by phronesis offers a counter to this current context. 
 
This understanding of good practices of care also suggests that workers doing caring work 
need to act, and be equipped and enabled to act, in ways that align with thinking about the 
right thing to do in each instance of practice. If we value good human service practice, then 
we need to get serious about nurturing and supporting phronesis and praxis. Many neo-
Aristotelians and proponents of phronesis and praxis would agree with me and have made 
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suggestions on how we can do just that (Bessant, 2009a; Higgs et al., 2012; Kinsella and 
Pitman, 2012; Walker and Walker, 2012). Many of these proposals focus on curriculum 
changes in higher education and include valuing the role of on-the-job placements to provide 
the kind of experience critical for the development of phronesis (Flyvbjerg, 2001). But if we 
are really serious about empowering phronesis in the people professions then it is time to re-
think the organisational contexts in which such practices take place. The current utilitarian 
and neo-liberal oriented policy context is hostile to phronesis and praxis and places 
considerable constraints on individual efforts to achieve good practice in ways that align with 
the conceptualization described herein. More to the point phronesis and praxis call for new 
ways of collectively thinking about, valuing and investing in our human services. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The idea of technology as a tool that includes new digital technologies has become 
fundamental to and embedded in ways in which good practice in the social services is 
conceptualized and pursued. We also argue that technology as knowledge, and in particular 
as a technical-rational conceptualization of knowledge, has been and continues to be evident 
in professional practice and in particular in the assumption and expectation that good practice 
in practices of care are achieved with the correct application of theory produced by rigorous 
scientific research. We observe that this is evident in the current emphasis on evidence-based 
practice rooted in the social sciences. 
 
Nevertheless, we argue that there are significant critiques of the relations between good 
human service practice and technologies. In particular, we examine the work of Schön and 
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Heidegger and agree with these authors’ suggestions that technical rationality and modern 
technology are not the way to achieve good practice in the human service professions. 
Furthermore, we acknowledge the ways in which Heidegger’s account of the essence of 
modern technology problematizes conceptualizations and approaches to good practice that 
articulate or assume an efficacy, in particular because any claims or hopes of effectiveness, 
outcomes, or results can be revealed as examples of the problem of Enframing people. We 
explore the alternatives to technical rationality and modern technology provided by Schön 
and Heidegger. We report that Schön advocates artistry or artful practice, which he suggests 
involves reflective practice. And we identify that Heidegger recommends a reinvigoration of 
art as conceived by the Ancient Greeks in the concept of techne. 
 
However, we are not convinced that the proposals offered by Heidegger and Schön are what 
good practice in human services requires. At the same time, and in light of Heidegger and 
Foucault’s perspectives of social services, we acknowledge that accounts of good practice 
need to avoid reverting to a technical simplicity and efficacy. We take up this ambitious 
challenge and embark on a prefatory project of suggesting an alternative conceptualization of 
good social service practice. In particular, we explore another prospect that is absent in Schön 
and Heidegger’s alternatives to technology, and that is often missing from the critiques of 
these authors’ work. We draw on Aristotle’s account of the intellectual virtues to provide an 
alternative to techne and artistry. We introduce phronesis and praxis as other possibilities for 
inspiring new kinds of practice in the 21st century. We emphasize that phronesis and praxis 
are often characterized as different ways of knowing and doing compared to technical forms 
of knowledge and action, and we emphasize these distinctions. 
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Although they are both significant contributors, Heidegger and Schön are only two writers 
who have thought about technology and its implications. Other accounts are worthy of 
attention (e.g., Feenberg, 2002, 2005; Latour, 2002; Ihde and Selinger, 2003; Olsen et al., 
2009; Verbeek, 2009; Ihde, 2010). Attending to this body of work would go a long way 
toward further inquiries about what role, if any, technology could or should play in achieving 
good practice in human services. Further research is also needed on the question of the 
relationship between praxis, phronesis, and modern science and technology for good practice 
in the caring professions. 
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Chapter 7: ‘Enabling young people to live the good life’: Orienting youth work to 
proper ends 
 
Youth work, also phrased child and youth care, informal education and youth development, is 
a form of human service that has a rich history spanning at least 200 years and is growing as 
practice and a profession in many countries (Beker and Eisikovits, 1997; Freeman, 2013; 
Jones, 2005; Spence and Devanney, 2006). However, many researching youth work agree 
that there is no agreement on what youth work is. For example, a meeting of ‘experts’ on 
youth work in Europe reported: 
‘Because of the different national historical contexts and as a result of its orientation 
to the various life situations of its target groups, youth work is a complex and diverse 
field suffering from a lack of basic definitions’ (Institute for Social Work and Social 
Education, nd, p. 10). 
The need for a coherent understanding of youth work has similarly been observed in Africa, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States (Australian Youth Affairs Coalition (AYAC), 
2011a, 2011b; Commonwealth Youth Program Africa, 2011; Martin, 2002; ProYouthWork 
America, 2011). 
 
There are good reasons to get the right type of answer to the question, ‘what is youth work?’ 
For example, the AYAC (2013) argued that a clear account of youth work is needed to 
protect and improve the occupational, social and political recognition and standing of the 
practice. According to the AYAC (2013) a good theory of youth work would help distinguish 
the practice from other interventions into the lives of young people and promote a shared 
identity among youth workers. The AYAC (2013) suggested the conceptual refinement of 
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youth work would lead to increased resources and support for youth workers and secure 
better services for young people. 
 
This article aims to assist with reaching a good understanding of youth work by proposing a 
method for doing just that. Drawing on Carr (2004, p. 57) I ask a substantive philosophical 
question about the fundamental aims and values that should provide the intellectual basis for 
contemporary youth work practice. I begin by describing the concept of telos and I explain its 
value in describing youth work. Up to now telos is virtually absent from the youth work 
literature and I aim to fill that gap. Second, I identify some of the goals of youth work that 
have been articulated or inferred in the literature. I examine and assess the merits of the 
different aims as a way to identify the proper purpose or telos of youth work. Finally, I make 
a case for youth work’s telos to be ‘enabling young people to live the good life’. 
 
 
The value of telos in understanding youth work 
 
Telos is an old idea that can be used to understand present-day practices such as youth work. 
Aristotle (2009, p. 1) argued, ‘All human activities aim at some good’, and identifying the 
universal or chief human good or telos of human life was a central concern in his 
Nicomachean Ethics. Despite the problems with Aristotle’s ethical theory, including a blatant 
prejudice against children and young people’s capacity to reason, some contemporary moral 
philosophers and social theorists have revived his concept of telos (e.g., Emslie, 2012; 
Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; MacIntyre, 1984; Sandel, 2009). For example, Schwartz and 
Sharpe (2010, p. 7) articulated one of its practical consequences. 
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‘Acting wisely demands that we are guided by the proper aims or goals of a particular 
activity. Aristotle’s word for the purpose or aim of a practice is telos (original italic). 
The telos of teaching is to educate students; the telos of doctoring is to promote health 
and relieve suffering; the telos of lawyering is to pursue justice. Every profession – 
from banking to social work – has a telos, and those who excel are those who are able 
to locate and pursue it.’ 
 
Similarly, O’Neill (2002, p. 49) argued; 
‘Teachers aim to teach their pupils; nurses to care for their patients; university 
lecturers to do research and to teach; police officers to deter and apprehend those 
whose activities harm the community; social workers to help those whose lives are for 
various reasons unmanageable or very difficult. Each profession has its proper aim.’ 
 
According to Dunne (2011, p. 14) practices are characterized by ‘internal goods’ that include; 
‘…the desirable outcomes characteristically aimed at through a practice, for example 
patients restored to good health, well-educated students, and clients’ achievement of 
greater resourcefulness in dealing with emotional conflict – in the cases, respectively, 
of medical practice, teaching and psychotherapy. What all these examples show are 
the characteristic end-results of a practice, the attainment of which is its essential end 
or telos as a practice.’ 
 
Carr (2004, p. 61) reiterated the point; 
‘For Aristotle the ‘end’ of a practice is some ethically worthwhile ‘good’ that is 
internal to, and inseparable from, the practice and only exists in the practice itself.’ 
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These accounts demonstrate that the telos’s of teaching, doctoring and lawyering are 
cosmopolitan and transcend contexts and it is reasonable to assume that this can also be the 
case for youth work. Assuming youth work is a particular practice, then according to 
proponents of telos youth work must also have a proper aim, right end, or internal good. 
 
There are good reasons for identifying the telos of youth work. First, according to MacIntyre 
(1984, p. 58) the proper goal of youth work would act as a good definition;  
‘[Youth work is a] functional concept; that is to say, we define…[youth work] in 
terms of the purpose or function which…[youth work is] characteristically expected 
to serve. It follows that the concept of…[youth work] cannot be defined 
independently of the concept of…good [youth work].’ 
Baizerman (2103), Davies (2003), Martin (2006), Smith (2005) and Young (2010, 2006) 
suggested defining youth work by focusing on the intent or purpose of the practice. However, 
proponents for defining youth work according to its purpose have typically failed to examine 
different aims, compare and assess their merits, or argue the case for a proper purpose. 
Bessant (2009, pp. 432-433) agreed: 
‘Ours’ is a time when a willingness or the capacity to engage in a specification of the 
ethical point or purpose of social intervention is often either poorly done or not at all. 
Consequentialist-oriented managerialist policy talk about ‘better outcomes’, for 
example, which is typically accompanied by inadequate resourcing for the tasks at 
hand inspires little enthusiasm.’ 
 
The concept of telos, and its value in understanding youth work, has essentially been missing 
in youth work literature. Baizerman (2013, p. 189) mentioned telos and argued: 
192 
 
‘The telos of purely scientifically based youth work may only be a fantasy…It is a 
troublesome fantasy if that telos draws away potentially viable alternative strategies 
of grounded practice, such as phronesis.’ 
Baizerman makes an important point shared by others that youth work is a form of action that 
should be guided by phronesis or practical wisdom rather than scientific rationality (Kinsella 
and Pitman, 2012; Ord, 2014; Polkinghorne, 2004). However, Baizerman’s use of telos does 
not engage with the purposes of youth work typically articulated in the literature. Baizerman 
also does not make a case for using the telos to define youth work. 
 
Second, a telos would help youth workers avoid bad practice and promote good youth work 
practice. Skott-Myhre (2006) argued against the use of moral discourse in youth work 
because he claimed it functions to include and exclude. However there needs to be some 
delineation about what it is youth workers ought to be aiming to do when they work with and 
for young people. In the absence of a telos, the goals youth workers pursue could be 
inappropriate. For example, aiming to harm, oppress, exploit, punish, deceive or control 
young people should not be considered youth work’s proper end. On a different note, 
according to Carr (2004, p. 61) the ‘end’ or ethically worthwhile ‘good’ of a practice should 
not be the ‘satisfaction’ of the practitioners ‘own immediate needs and desires’. In other 
words, making money or securing other personal gains are not the proper purposes of youth 
work. And on another note drawing on Bessant (1997), Carr (2004, pp. 64-68) and Ord 
(2014) the proper goal of youth work should not be externally imposed outcomes and goals 
set by the state that subordinate the excellence of the practice to institutional efficiency and 
effectiveness. Smith (2001) agreed; 
‘Over the last twenty or so years there has been a consistent failure to properly 
theorize…[youth] work…and to consider [its] aims…The result has been a been a 
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series of pathetic attempts by many youth services and agencies to justify their 
existence in terms that would first make sense to the…[neo-liberalist government] 
agenda – and more recently to the rhetoric…[of] managerialism.’ 
Moreover, delivering services as cheaply as possible and thoughtlessly complying with 
managerial accountability regimes and prescribed standards of performance are not the goods 
that youth workers should be aiming to realize or promote (Belton, 2010). On the other hand, 
a telos can orient youth workers to do the right thing. It is therefore important to get the telos 
right to assist youth workers to ‘act wisely’ and do youth work for the right reason.  
 
Third, working out the telos would help to demarcate youth work from other practices and 
facilitate a clearer understanding of who is a youth worker. Young (2006) agreed that 
identifying youth work’s purpose was a way of distinguishing it from other forms of work 
with young people. There have been explanations of youth work based on how it is distinct 
from other practices however it remains unclear whether youth work is dissimilar to or 
derivative of other interventions into the lives of young people such as social work, generic 
human service work, child care, counselling and teaching (Anglin, 2001, 1999; Beker, 2001). 
A telos could unite different practitioners in a wide range of settings on what they have in 
common, a shared commitment to realising the proper purpose of youth work.  
 
 
Figuring out youth work’s telos 
 
I scoped the literature to identify and categorise the common and dominant aims of youth 
work. This investigation was complicated because many accounts of youth work had multiple 
goals that were at times ambiguous and therefore did not fit neatly within a single category 
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(for example: Batsleer and Davies, 2010; Furlong, 2013; Roche, Tucker, Thomson and Flynn, 
2004; Sapin, 2009; Wood and Hine, 2009; Youthlink Scotland, nd). Fusco (2012a, p. 224) 
agreed that in the United States the aims of youth work are not articulated with consistency. 
The same argument applies to other jurisdictions. For example, the Council of the European 
Union (2010) suggested youth works’ purposes include supporting young people’s 
development in multiple ways, empowering young people, addressing social exclusion, 
targeting young people living in poverty, and strengthening civil society. Lauritzen (2006) 
similarly listed a range incompatible aims for youth work: 
‘The general aims of youth work are the integration and inclusion of young people in 
society. It may also aim towards the personal and social emancipation of young 
people from dependency and exploitation.’ 
Bessant (2012b, p. 57) saliently observed that youth work, ‘is a highly contested field 
characterised by paradox and contradiction between “control and cure” or “regulation and 
emancipation”.’ To stress the point, youth work can have a range of aims however according 
to Aristotelian tradition of telos one of these will be the proper goal and good internal to the 
practice.  
 
Deciding upon a telos of youth work is difficult for a number of reasons however these 
challenges can be resolved. First drawing on Niedenthal and Cantor (1984) and Dworkin 
(2011) the concepts likely to be used in youth work’s telos, such as best interests, positive 
outcomes, making a difference, personal or social transformation, are ‘fuzzy’ or interpretive. 
Many descriptions of youth work’s purpose are vague or incoherent because key concepts are 
inadequately explained. Therefore, the concepts in an account of youth work’s goal need to 
be interpreted and characterised. Fuzzy concepts contribute to the second challenge in 
weighing up the proper end of youth work. According to Rittel and Webber (1973) 
195 
 
identifying youth work’s telos is a ‘wicked problem’; there can be no objective or 
meaningfully correct or false telos and any account can be disputed. The Australian Public 
Service Commission’s (2007) report on tackling wicked problems also suggests that no 
version of youth work’s proper purpose can be complete, verifiably right or wrong, or proven 
to be scientifically true. The best any account can be is better or worse when compared to 
others. 
 
In light of such ‘fuzziness’ and ‘wickedness’, an appropriate method to work out youth 
work’s telos is pragmatic or practical reasoning and deliberation. Dworkin (2011), Flyvbjerg 
(2001) and Sandel (2009) are proponents of such reasoning and deliberation in matters that 
are highly contested, which figuring out the telos of youth work is a good example. 
According to these authors determining the most plausible and desirable interpretation of 
youth work’s proper aim includes thinking critically, imaginatively and empathetically to 
form ideas, make judgments and articulate good arguments about which goals are better and 
which are worse (Sandel, 2009). It also involves the willingness to subject points of view to 
critical public examination, the ability to scrutinise and critique claims and evidence, and the 
good sense to change one’s mind when a better argument is presented. The following analysis 
uses these ideas to assist with figuring out youth work’s telos. 
 
 
Aims of youth work in the literature 
 
Eight key goals of youth work were examined (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Eight key aims of youth work 
 
1. To care for and protect young people 
2. To help disadvantaged young people 
3. To meet the needs of young people 
4. To support young people’s development 
5. To improve young people’s wellbeing 
6. To empower young people 
7. To realise justice for young people 
8. To enable young people to live the good life 
 
 
1. To care for and protect young people 
 
One goal of youth work is to care for and protect young people. Similar aims include 
protecting young people from harm, keeping young people safe, and preventing young people 
from being abused as well as supporting them if it takes place. Child protection services are 
an example of this aim in practice. In light of the extent of violence against young people 
these are relevant and worthwhile ends for youth work however there are a number of 
concerns that question whether this is youth work’s telos. For example, the aim to care for 
and protect young people is somewhat based on and perpetuates assumptions and prejudices 
that young people are troubled and troublesome, are ‘out of control’ and are incapable of 
making good decisions or looking after themselves (White, 1990, pp. 164-176). Bessant 
(2012a, 2005) argued such ideas have been used to justify the monitoring and regulation of 
young people by adults. Young people can also take on the claims being made about them; 
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that they are weak and unable to protect themselves and need protection (Tucker 2004). 
Paradoxically this does not help protect young people from harm and instead can intensify 
their ‘vulnerability’. Protecting young people can also be at odds with aims of youth work 
aligned to young people’s liberation (Farrell, 2004; Sebba, 2005). 
 
 
2. To help disadvantaged young people 
 
Another purpose of youth work is to support young people who are disadvantaged, 
traumatised, in distress, or in trouble. This goal can also be understood as reintegrating ‘at-
risk’ young people back into the ‘community’ as well as helping the marginalised, the 
vulnerable, the poor and those deemed to be part of the ‘underclass’. Targeting interventions 
to particular populations of young people including young refugees, homeless youth, young 
people who are living in poverty and indigenous young people can be understood as an 
ethically worthwhile good for youth work and can be a way of addressing the adverse effects 
of social problems. However, whether youth work should be ‘universal’ or ‘targeted’ is a 
point of contention (Bradford, 2004). There are good reasons for youth work to be universally 
available to young people regardless of circumstance. For example, if youth work is 
interested in developing citizenship then all young people should be targeted. Selective youth 
work approaches may also stigmatise those it aims to help (Bessant, 2012a; Sercombe 2010). 
Another criticism with this aim according to Tait (2000, pp. 7-8) is that any category of 
‘disadvantaged’ or ‘at-risk youth’ can be understood as a ‘governmental construction’ used to 
bring a greater number of young people into ‘the field of regulatory strategies’ that include 
the interventions of youth work (Kelly, 2007). The meaning of key concepts such as ‘help’ 
and ‘disadvantaged’ are also unclear; is ‘help’ oriented towards prevention and addressing the 
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‘structural’, social or environmental causes of problems, or is it a charitable exercise focused 
on responding to young people who are suffering?  
 
 
3. To meet the needs of young people 
 
A goal of youth work is to meet young people’s needs. For example, Ord (2012a, p. 3) argued 
that youth work should have ‘broad aims’ that are not specific and, ‘…importantly are 
grounded in, and developed, in response to young people’s aspirations, intentions and 
interests rather than [aims that are made] pre-set, immutable in advance by ‘others’’. 
However, there is disparity on what young people’s ‘needs’ are. A range of material, social, 
spiritual and psychological needs are sometimes specified and are often based on Maslow’s 
(1970) hierarchy of needs. There are conflicting reports that all young people need is 
discipline, ‘love’, freedom, good role models, or supportive communities. On other occasions 
no specific needs are identified and instead it is suggested that youth work should deal with 
young people ‘holistically’. Whether youth work can and should meet all of young people’s 
needs is debatable. On a different note, aiming to meet the needs of young people can also 
function as a governmental technique, obliging young people to understand and manage 
themselves in particular ways, such as individuals capable of and expected to take care of 
themselves, that may not necessary benefit them (Kelly, 2007; Tait, 2000). 
 
 
4. To support young people’s development 
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An aim of youth work is to support young people’s development. This is variably described 
as developing young people as human beings, promoting young people’s social, moral, 
academic, emotional, or personal development, developing young people’s ‘life skills’ or 
‘social skills’, and promoting ‘positive identity formation’ in ways that help young people to 
fully develop their potential and enable them to become independent (Banks, 2010; Bessant, 
2009a; European Commission, 2012; Harrison and Wise, 2005; Williamson, 2007; Youth 
work Act, 2001). Weems (2009, p. 2) described this goal as fostering what is best for child 
and adolescent’s development and functioning; ‘In other words, to help the child and 
adolescent actualize’. This purpose has also been referred to as providing positive pathways 
for young people, promoting young people’s resilience, supporting young people’s 
‘precarious’ transition from childhood to adulthood, and creating positive adults who can 
contribute to their families, communities and society (Hoyla, 2012). On other occasions the 
goal has been described as developing particular types of people, such as ‘rounded’ citizens 
who are active and democratic and who benefit from and contribute to the common good 
(Gharabaghi, 2012; VeLure Roholt and Cutler, 2012).  
 
As the various accounts of this aim demonstrate there is disparity on what and how youth 
work should be developing young people. For example, is it about socializing young people 
to fit in and comply with prevailing norms, or encouraging them to question, critique and 
change social conditions? (Coussée, 2008). Another limitation of this purpose is that it 
typically relies on discredited developmental theory, which has been criticised for focusing 
on deficits and producing ‘healthy’, ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ expectations and assumptions that 
can be harmful to, exclude and pathologise young people (Bessant, 2012a, 2012b; Pacini-
Ketchabaw, 2011). A further problem with this goal is that too often young people’s 
‘development’ has narrowly focused on producing human capital or generating young 
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people’s productive and consumer capacity (Ginwright and Commarota, 2002). In other 
words, attention has been on regulating transitions from school to work, ‘development’ has 
been defined with commercial and economic ends in mind, and individual responsibility for 
achieving positive (employment) outcomes in increasingly complex, ‘risky’ and uncertain 
labor markets has been emphasised (Kelly, 1999). 
 
 
5. To improve young people’s wellbeing 
 
Another aim of youth work articulated in the literature is improving or promoting young 
people’s wellbeing. Similar goals include remedying social exclusion, ensuring young people 
have a good quality of life, and building social capital. As these descriptions suggest there is 
no consensus on the meaning or measurement of wellbeing (Wyn, 2009b). Sometimes 
wellbeing refers to young people’s ‘happiness’, moral ‘hygiene’, mental health or physical 
welfare. At other times wellbeing is closely related to young people’s engagement in 
employment, education or training, or securing and strengthening young people’s 
relationships and connections with their peers, family, significant others and community. 
Further still, there are arguments that emphasise economic and social determinants of young 
people’s wellbeing. Such perspectives highlight the connections between social conditions, 
such as economic inequality, and individual wellbeing. Wellbeing has also been associated 
with the ‘capability approach’ (Clark 2006). Bessant (2012a) argued some people have 
claimed an interest in improving young people’s wellbeing to justify ‘class-based’ 
interventions. These forms of youth work, which include the work of Boy Scouts and the 
YMCA, have the intent of ‘pacifying the urban poor and working classes’ as well as 
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managing social problems such as delinquency, juvenile crime and larrikinism by reinforcing 
‘moral uprightness and physical wellbeing’. 
 
 
6. To empower young people 
 
There are suggestions that youth work’s ethically worthwhile good is to empower young  
people (Belton, 2012; Fitzsimons, Hope, Cooper and Russell, 2011; Forrest, 2010; Nicholls, 
2012). This goal has similarly been described as helping young people help themselves, 
giving young people responsibility, developing young people’s leadership skills, and enabling 
young people to experience the consequences of their decisions. Other ways this aim has 
been referred to include promoting young people’s participation, raising young people’s 
political and social consciousness, providing young people a voice, and facilitating young 
people’s agency. There has also been an interest in empowering young people through 
processes of engagement so they can affect change in their lives and communities. 
 
Typically, proponents of this goal overlook critiques of empowerment and these concerns 
draw into question whether empowering young people is youth work’s telos. For example, 
processes designed to empower young people can paradoxically increase the control and 
surveillance of them. Youth work might also empower young people to participate in 
conventional practices that maintain the status quo rather than disrupt political or social 
conditions that exclude and marginalise (Bessant, 2004c; Wong, 2004). The empowerment of 
young people might also be used to promote self-management or self-governance in ways 
that primarily serves the interests of governments, teachers, youth workers or parents 
(Bessant, 2012a). The way empowerment is typically explained also assumes that ‘power’ is 
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something that workers or adults have and are able to give to powerless young people. 
However according to Foucault (1995) young people are far from powerless. 
 
 
7. To realise justice for young people 
 
Bessant (2012a, 2012b, 2004c) makes the case that youth work’s purpose is to realise justice 
for young people. Bessant (nd.) described this as securing the basic principles of equality of 
respect to young people as complete human beings.  
‘Because a person might sometimes need some assistance, does not mean they cannot 
or ought not exercise their rights, nor does it entitle others to deny them their basic 
human rights. Yet this is common practice with young people’ (Bessant, nd., p. 13). 
This purpose for youth work is consistent with the goals to help young people receive a 
dignified and deserved place in society and to strengthen citizenship by actively pursuing and 
securing young people’s human and voting rights. This aim incorporates addressing aged-
based stereotypes and prejudice against young people, encouraging political engagement 
among young people, ending corporal punishment, and addressing poverty and inequality 
(Bessant, 2012b; Males, 1996; Young-Bruehl, 2012). Other purposes captured by this broader 
aim include improving youth wages, achieving intergenerational equity, challenging 
discriminatory ideas associated with ‘teen brains’, banning mosquitos alarms and anti-social 
behaviour orders that have disproportionate negative consequences for young people, and 
ensuring young people participate in decisions that affect their lives (Adam and Hall, 1972; 
Godwin, 2011). 
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This aim is complicated by different ideas of justice (Sandel, 2009). For example, the 
classical idea (Aristotle, 2009; MacIntyre, 1984) differs from modern perspectives, which are 
also hotly contested (Dworkin, 2011; Fraser, 1997; Rawls, 1999; Sen, 2010; Young, 1990). 
Indigenous perspectives of justice can also diverge from classical and modern accounts. The 
idea of justice and child rights may also have very different meanings in secular, Western, 
and wealthy countries compared to poor, developing countries and nations that privilege 
religious thought (Shaafee, 2013). de Finney, Cole Little, Skott-Myhre and Gharabaghi 
(2012) argued the purpose of youth work is to name and address social injustice however 
similar to others who suggest that this is youth work’s aim the authors failed to mention aged-
based prejudice against young people among the ‘contexts of injustice’ which need to change. 
Moreover, prejudice against young people is often opaque and overlooked by those who are 
committed to securing social justice for young people. 
 
 
8. To enable young people to live the good life: Youth work’s telos 
 
Compared to the goals just mentioned, I propose youth work’s telos is to enable young people 
to live the good life. According to Aristotle (2009) and Sen (1983) the seven aims of youth 
work previously described are at times useful and worthwhile ends to pursue. There can be 
value in orienting practice towards caring for and protecting young people, helping 
disadvantaged young people, supporting young people’s development, empowering young 
people, and pursuing a social justice agenda with and for young people. However, these goals 
are not the good youth work is seeking, they are, ‘…merely useful for the sake of something 
else’ (Sen, 1990, p. 44). That something else is enabling young people to live the good life. 
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Davies (2003) and Ord (2014) similarly made the case for the aim of youth work to be 
enabling young people to live the good life. Corresponding aims in the youth work literature 
include enabling young people to flourish and live well (Smith and Smith, 2008). This 
ethically worthwhile end for youth work is also described as an interest in wanting young 
people to grow up good, with the capacities to ‘…make reasoned choices and informed 
decisions that can be sustained through committed action’ (Young, 2006, p. 59; see also 
Sercombe 2010). Dworkin (2011) offered a more thorough account of ‘the good life’. He 
argued having a good life is inextricably linked to living well. 
‘Someone lives well when he (sic) senses and pursues a good life for himself and does 
so with dignity: with respect for the importance of other people’s lives and for their 
ethical responsibility as well as his own’ (Dworkin, 2011, p. 419). 
According to Dworkin there is a level of personal responsibility for living a good life. At the 
same time there is an obligation for everyone, especially governments, to make the lives of 
other people better. 
 
There are good reasons for youth work’s telos to be enabling young people to live the good 
life. First the value of phronesis to good practice in youth and human service work is well 
documented, and developing and promoting practical wisdom and flourishing in young 
people supports youth workers’ role modelling practical wisdom or phronesis to realise it 
(Bessant, 2012b; Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; Ord, 2014; Polkinghorne, 2004; Walker and 
Walker, 2012).  
 
Second this goal for youth work aligns with the capability approach, which is connected to 
the telos tradition and has demonstrated cultural transferability. Sen (1990, 1983) is a 
prominent proponent of the capability approach. He argued that while economic growth and 
205 
 
the expansion of goods and services are critical for addressing poverty and inequality, wealth 
is not the good or proper purpose of human development. According to the capability 
approach the proper aim of human development is the promotion and enhancement of 
people’s achievements, freedoms, functioning, and capabilities to achieve valuable 
‘functionings’ (Clark, 2006; Sen, 2010). In other words, the telos of human development is to 
enable people to live the good life and flourish. The capability approach has been adapted and 
adopted to measure and improve social and economic conditions in developed and 
developing countries; demonstrating it has diverse cultural relevance and applicability which 
is critical in light of the ‘youth bulge’ or the fact that a majority of people aged 15-24 years of 
age live in poorer, developing nations (Stanton, 2007; Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009; 
UNICEF, 2012). A relevant illustration of this goal is offered by Nussbaum (2000) who, 
unlike Sen and ‘after years of cross-cultural discussion’, identified a list of human capabilities 
that she claimed if supported enhance the prospects that people will have good or flourishing 
lives. According to Nussbaum the goal of youth work is to support young people to flourish 
and this can be realised by securing the capabilities. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition I argued that a useful way to understand youth work is 
by its telos. Getting the telos right means that practitioners can pursue the correct goal of 
youth work. In light of the ubiquity of the command model of organization in modern 
institutions that obliges compliance with and obedience to the authority of administrators and 
managers it is critical that youth workers orient their practice towards youth work’s ethically 
worthwhile end. I argued that a telos would serve to demarcate youth work from other 
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interventions into young people’s lives. The case was made for the telos of youth work to be 
enabling young people to live the good life. 
 
There is a need for further research on how youth work is understood and what youth work is 
and ought to be. This includes investigating the meaning and purposes of youth work in 
China, India, Indonesia and other countries where it is unclear whether a practice named 
youth work even exists. This project should also involve conducting research in the field so 
that the voice of youth workers, youth, and others are included.  
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Chapter 8: Why University Education Matters: Youth Work and the Australian 
Experience 
 
Recent interventions by Australia’s Department of Human Services (DHS) exemplify the 
kind of thinking that now characterises human services here and in many other countries. 
DHS says it wants to advance the government’s ‘social inclusion framework’ by changing the 
way it offers services: ‘many of our most basic transactions remain costly, labor intensive and 
time consuming’ (DHS, 2011, p.3). This initiative is illustrative of a broader neo-liberal 
worldview that talks of inclusivity as a humane concern inspired by commitments to social 
justice and a pragmatic interest in preventing social unrest and a sense of insecurity said to be 
associated with excluding sections of the population from ‘mainstream’ activities. At the 
same time the declared policy intent of social inclusion is to reduce costs through the use of 
‘convenient’ self-service one-stop shops, the greater use of technology and automated 
services designed to ‘improve efficiency’. In short, what DHS propose is to extend the New 
Public Management (NPM) rationalization project that has been in place now since the 
1990s. It is an approach that has sponsored major and often detrimental changes to human 
services. Amongst other things this has seen the privatization of state services, their 
corporatization, the implementation of new ‘accountability’ and regulatory regimes such as 
‘quality auditing’, and the introduction of ‘evidence-based policy’. 
 
Developments like these present a few challenging questions for ‘education providers.’ Are 
human service professionals, and specifically youth workers, to be educated with a view 
towards docilely complying with such arrangements, or should they be educated to think 
critically about the contexts in which they work? Are they to be educated to follow through 
with actions aligned with their thinking? Should students be encouraged to transform what is 
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the increasingly recognized as deficient neo-liberal models of human service delivery? We 
propose that good youth work practice entails more than demonstrating instrumental 
rationality and officially and typically narrowly prescribed technical competencies. It also 
requires an ability and interest in shaping the habitus and policies that inform the youth 
sector. For this a decent university education is critical.   
 
Unlike advocates of ‘human capital’ theory who talk about return of investment in education 
by way of lifetime earnings, we suggest the value of higher education lies in its capacity to 
develop critical reasoning and practical wisdom or what Aristotle called phronesis (Aristotle, 
2004).  A good youth work university education should equip graduates with the interest and 
ability to figure out what is the right thing to do for the right reasons in each particular 
circumstance and then how to align their actions with that judgment (Schwartz and Sharpe, 
2010). We note that such capabilities are distinct from an approach to education and practice 
based on following rules or ‘ticking boxes’. The capacity for value-rationality and moral 
judgment are also noticeably absent from competency based training and the lists of 
‘employability skills’ employers and their interest groups expect of universities in graduating 
‘job-ready’ practitioners (eg., Australian Industry Skills Councils). We argue these capacities 
are critical if youth workers are to have the capacity needed to shape their own professional 
habitus and to have a worthwhile impact on policy and practice.  
 
It is these observations that animate a number of questions about the state of youth work 
education which we explore in this article. While much of the material we draw on is 
Australian, we suggest there are sufficient commonalities between Australia and many other 
countries (i.e. England, Scotland, NZ) to make arguments and findings applicable to other 
jurisdictions. We note also the unprecedented international interest in strengthening the 
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provision of youth work education. Our article aims to contribute to this project and 
associated debates with a focus on Australia (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012; Fusco, 
2012a, 2012b; ProYouthWork America, 2011). We write with the assumption that enlarging 
current levels of university-based youth work education is vital and detail the reasons for this 
later in the article. We ask: what is the status of youth work education in Australian 
universities and how does this enable and constrain good practice in youth work? After 
arguing that a university education that develops and supports students’ capacity to exercise 
phronesis is critical for achieving good practice we ask: what factors affect supply and 
demand for youth work courses in higher education? After establishing that university-based 
youth work programs are vulnerable to being closed in a ‘demand-driven’ university system 
we ask: what is the demand for youth work graduates in the relevant labour market? After 
making the case that there is labour market demand for more university educated youth 
workers we ask: what other reasons are there for investing in university youth work programs 
and, in particular, how would this help achieve good practice in youth work?  
 
 
The status of youth work education in Australian universities 
 
For well over forty years, Australian government reports and independent research have 
identified the need for quality youth work education (Chew, 1995; Hamilton-Smith and 
Brownell, 1973; Maunders, 1990; Szirom and Spartels, 1995; Wright, 1995). The Australian 
Youth Affairs Coalition (AYAC) (2011a, 2011b) also recently surveyed the youth sector 
asking what the minimum level of qualification should be to practice youth work. The 
overwhelming response was an ‘undergraduate degree.’ Yet despite these calls, moves to 
210 
 
implement recommendations to extend the provision of university youth work programs have 
largely fallen on deaf ears.  
 
In 2013, university youth work education is not available in a number of states and territories. 
In 2013, only five of Australia’s 39 universities offered youth work degrees, degrees with 
youth work majors and double majors or double degrees that included youth work at an 
undergraduate or postgraduate level. These included the Australian Catholic University, Edith 
Cowan University, RMIT University, Victoria University and Southern Cross University. 
Tabor College, a religious private higher education provider, offers youth work degrees in 
South Australia and Victoria. The scarcity of youth work degrees has not been helped by the 
recent closure of programs and contraction of others. The University of Western Sydney 
closed its youth work degree in 2010 and the Australian Catholic University ceased offering 
its post-graduate Certificate in Human Services (Youth Work) in 2011. 
 
Australia now lags behind other comparable countries in providing university Youth Work 
education. In the UK for example, while youth work programs have been under threat, access 
to youth work in higher education has been widely available for some time (Holmes, 2007). 
This is despite the fact as Sercombe (2013) reported that the recent fee increases contributed 
to the closure of some university youth work courses across the region. In the US Fusco 
(2012b) reported a 900% increase in university-based youth work programs from 2008 to 
2012. Likewise, in Europe the European Commission and the Council of Europe have been 
working together since 1998 to improve the training of youth workers in order to guarantee 
the quality of youth work (Council of the European Union, 2010; Mitter, 1999). In short, 
compared with similar jurisdictions Australia continues to fall behind. 
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Australian youth work programs in higher education face a precarious future. One damaging 
influence has been a de-valuing of youth work education within the university and a more 
general lack of high profile in the community (White 2011). In 2010 the Australian Office for 
Learning and Teaching (formally the Australian Learning and Teaching Council) project 
examining youth work education also reported that many of the youth work university 
programs were under pressure to make financial savings (Australian Learning and Teaching 
Council, 2010). This situation is also partly explained by the absence of a strong professional 
association and associated accreditation requirements, which can play a protective role. The 
absence of a strong tradition that sees youth workers themselves building their own body of 
knowledge has also been sorely missed (cf. medicine, nursing, psychology etc.). A mix of a 
strident anti-intellectualism that has characterized the field has also not been conducive to 
youth work education in higher education (Denholm and Ling, 1990; Ewen, 1981, p. 101).  
 
In comparison to university youth work education we see an abundance of lower level 
vocational education and training (VET) youth work certificates or diplomas. Currently there 
are dozens of VET providers across Australia delivering the Certificate IV in Youth Work 
and the Diploma in Youth Work. The Community Services and Health Industry Skills 
Council (2012) reported that for 2010 there were 2,243 enrolments in the Certificate IV and 
643 enrolments in the Diploma. 
 
In spite of this trend, we argue there are good reasons why youth work education should be 
located in the university. To begin, youth work training in the VET sector has come under 
sustained criticism for almost fifteen years (Broadbent, 1998; Bessant, 2012b). According to 
Corney and Broadbent (2007) the integrity of VET youth work training had been undermined 
by successive problematic training package reviews. Secondly inadequate regulation of youth 
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work training in the vocational training sector reinforces doubts that it can provide the kind of 
quality training needed to build an appropriately qualified workforce.  
 
Thirdly, while the ‘competency based’ training delivered by VET plays an important role in 
educating practitioners, on its own this training is not enough. The kind of competency-based 
training and assessment provided by VET can produce proficient technicians who possess 
beginning level capabilities, and can follow and apply instructions. However, this focus on 
developing students’ instrumental rationality or ‘know how’ does not go far enough in 
providing learning opportunities that cultivate good practice. It provides for beginning level 
learning that needs further development - ideally in higher education (Kinsella and Pitman, 
2012). We argue that universities are best equipped to ensure graduates not only have 
technical competencies, but also have reflexive and critical capacities needed to be expert, a 
graduate attribute that entails having a regard for ‘good or bad’ when working out what 
action is best for a particular situation (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986). A good university 
education nurtures in students their capacity to draw on, and in the right balance, three 
intellectual virtues required for good practice, namely, techne, episteme and phronesis. It 
entails learning how to go beyond the analytic, scientific knowledge (episteme) and the 
technical knowledge or know-how (techne) and involves the capacity to make judgments in 
the manner of a virtuoso social and political actor (Flyvbjerg, 2001 p. 2) 
 
Fourthly, regulatory bodies have raised concerns about the quality of VET training 
(Productivity Commission, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d). Since 2009 successive State 
governments in places like Victoria have changed VET funding arrangement, to increase 
competition between public and private providers. This reform, which is likely to be 
implemented nation-wide, benefits private registered training organizations at the expense of 
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the public TAFE sector, and is geared towards driving costs down in ways that further 
seriously compromises the quality of youth work training delivered in the VET sector (Hall 
and Preiss, 2012). 
 
Fifthly, VET credentials are increasingly less attractive to students as they have become more 
expensive. Additionally, increasing numbers of employers in the youth sector expect recruits 
with at least a bachelor degree-level education. As Skills Australia chief executive Robin 
Shreeve reiterated, increasingly university qualifications are required to get a decent paying 
job, and if youth work is to have a future, practitioners need a higher education (Rowbotham, 
2011). Finally, if youth work education is to be predominantly based in VET then we would 
see little if any research or knowledge production, something that is critical for fostering a 
professional identity and a specialized knowledge base. 
 
 
The higher education policy context 
 
Currently we operate in a policy context where the notion of education as a social good is 
seldom taken seriously (Nussbaum, 2016). Amongst other things, this is a consequence of 
policymakers embracing the neo-liberal idea that individual utility maximizing effect through 
market mechanisms will shape the future of higher education. It is a policy shift affirmed by 
the national government’s own ‘Bradley Review’ of Australian Higher Education (Bradley, 
Noonan, Nugent and Scales, 2008). Despite popular and official expressions of concern about 
skills shortages and support for the rhetoric of building a ‘clever country’, the Bradley 
Review recommended moving to a demand-driven system. This was implemented in 2012 
when the Federal government removed ‘caps’ from government funded university places, 
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signalling that labour market demands or social need would no longer play a part in shaping 
the profile of higher education enrolments.26 The effect of this policy shift is that student 
demand will increasingly determine which programs are offered: low demand programs will 
be closed down while high demand programs will expand. This is a problem for youth work 
because – as we mentioned above – it is a sector that has not enjoyed attractive wages and 
conditions or the benefits of high status in the community. This understandably effects 
demand for programs. 
 
Arguably and in the context of what is an ‘individualized society’ increasing numbers of 
students have pursued more remunerative career paths, in part to help repay their education 
fee debt. We note we have seen a steady growth in higher status, high demand programs. Law 
schools have proliferated with an increase from 12 law schools in 1984 to 32 by 2012 
(Thornton, 2012, p. 6). Paralleling this has been a steady growth of business schools and to a 
lesser extent of health science programs. For example, from 2001 to 2011 in all areas of 
health, student applications rose by 78% with the highest in the highest paying area i.e., 
dentistry (502.1%) (Group of Eight, 2012). Amongst other things this has the effect of 
seriously reducing the ability of universities to cross-subsidize smaller courses as they once 
did (Group of Eight, 2012, p. 4). This matters for youth work because historically the practice 
of cross-subsidization within the university has been critical to programs such as youth work 
which tended not to attract students interested in high status high paying jobs.  
 
More generally government funding for universities has steadily declined to a point where it 
does not meet the costs of essential activities like teaching and research (Lamox-Smith, 
                                               
26 We note that medicine is exempt from this new demand driven system. Health professionals more generally 
are not. 
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Watson and Webster, 2011). Data from the Higher Education Base Funding Review Final 
Report ‘found’ government funding rates were lower than costs. Indeed, the ‘real value’ of 
the Commonwealth contribution to base funding provided to universities per student, ‘…  fell 
sharply after the mid-1990s and, while it has increased since 2003, it remains well below the 
1994 levels’ (Lomax-Smith, et al., 2011, pp. 3-4). Moreover, despite its commitment to an 
‘Education Revolution’ the Gillard Labor government has not increased base funding for 
universities following the Review’s recommendations for more investment and for increases 
in the average level of base funding per student place.  
 
In the prevailing context fiscal interests have priority over other interests (e.g. social goods). 
It is a situation which threatens the quality and indeed the continuation of youth work 
programs because those programs tend to be small, and in the new ‘demand driven’ 
university system find it difficult to ‘compete’ with other higher demand ‘more attractive’ 
high status programs. All this effects what are described as program ‘viabilities’ (e.g., school 
entry scores, student staff ratios, etc.) which in turn make youth work programs vulnerable.  
 
We now turn to the question of labour market demands for youth work graduates. 
 
 
The demand and supply of youth work graduates  
 
One difficulty the youth sector and labor market researchers face when trying to answer this 
question is that little if any analysis has been done on the demand and supply of youth work 
graduates in Australia. To establish a beginning sense of what the situation is we used 
electronic data bases like ProQuest 5000, JSTOR and OCLC ECO collections on-line to 
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search for ‘youth work education’, ‘workforce supply and demand’. More general searchers 
were also carried out using Google and the websites of relevant government departments.    
 
What we found was that while a demand exists for qualified youth workers, it is difficult to 
quantify that demand precisely. This difficulty reflects problems with the nomenclature used 
by researchers. One problem is the occupational category ‘youth work’ which is typically not 
used when labor market data is being collected. It is usually incorporated in other sector 
profiles such as human services, child protection, juvenile justice, community services and 
‘other social assistance services’ (eg., Australian Government, 2011; Community Services 
and Health Industry Skills Council, 2012; Healy and Lonne, 2010; Martin and Healy, 2010). 
This means that clear and precise figures on demands, shortages and associated educational 
needs are not available.  
 
In 2008 the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) 
(2008) carried out an occupational survey on ‘Youth Workers’ and youth work received a ‘no 
shortage’ labor market rating. Paradoxically, at the same time the survey reported increasing 
demand for youth workers and a lack of qualifications and experience as the main reasons 
employers gave for considering job applicants unsuitable. Subsequently DEEWR decided to 
abandon reference to ‘youth work’ in future labor market surveys and collapsed it into the 
generic ‘welfare worker’ and ‘welfare support worker’ categories (DEEWR, 2011a, nd). 
Given that DEEWR no longer uses the youth work category, they cannot report supply and 
demand issues in respect of youth work graduates. This highlights the issue of status and 
professional recognition and the need to use ‘youth work’ as an occupational category. It is 
needed if we are to get specific demand and supply analysis of youth workers.  
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To get some sense of the demand for graduate and to overcome this hurdle, we have 
extrapolated from the material that is available. Assembling the current official research 
enables us to infer that there is likely to be a shortage of youth work graduates in Australia. 
Emslie (2012, 2009) surveyed human service and youth sector workforce audits and reported 
critical skill shortages in the youth sector (see also; Community Services and Health Industry 
Skills Council, 2012; PricewaterhouseCoopers and The Centre for Social Impact, 2012). 
Service providers reported increasing difficulty in attracting and retaining qualified, skilled 
and experienced staff. Problems with recruitment combined with high attrition rates 
contributed to service shortfalls, escalating waiting lists and high levels of unmet need. At the 
same time there was a greater than ever demands for youth services, increasing complexity in 
youth work and mounting workloads. AYAC (2011b) reiterated that youth work employers 
across Australia faced difficulties recruiting and retaining high quality, well-trained youth 
workers. Martin and Healy (2010, p. 204) also reported that employers in child protection and 
juvenile justice sectors, which they argue include youth support workers and youth workers, 
‘faced a substantial recruitment task.’ That included the task of replacing ‘at least one quarter 
of their employees every year’. They added there is ‘fairly limited excess labor capacity’ in 
the workforces (Martin and Healy, 2010, p. 208). Similarly, DEEWR (2012a, 2012b) 
projected that ‘health care and social assistance’ industries, which include youth work, will to 
grow more than twice the average rate of all industries and contribute one in four of all new 
jobs over the five years to 2015-16. This also indicates increased demand for youth work. 
 
The demand is also suggested for the recent period in a 2011 DEEWR report on National 
skill shortage in the category ‘Welfare Worker’, which is the occupational category that 
includes youth workers (DEEWR, 2011b). Similarly, the Australian Government (2011) 
listed ‘Welfare Support Workers’, (again encompassing youth work), as an occupation 
218 
 
difficult to fill. The occupational report from DEEWR (2011a) for ‘Welfare Worker’ also 
found that: ‘Employers were generally seeking tertiary qualified and experienced welfare 
workers’. Moreover, the ‘majority of employers surveyed reported difficulty recruiting 
qualified and experienced welfare workers’ (DEEWR, 2011a). The report found, ‘Unsuitable 
applicants generally lacked qualifications and/or experience’, and ‘This included applicants 
with Certificate level qualifications, as Diploma or Degree qualifications were required for 
the vast majority of positions’ (DEEWR, 2011a). 
 
In 2012, youth work was listed as an occupation for skilled migration on a number of 
occupations lists (Acacia Immigration Australia, 2012). Likewise, the Australian Visa Bureau 
(2012) reported that, ‘If your profession is Youth Worker…then you are currently in demand 
by employers in Australia’. The government recruitment of youth workers from overseas 
implies there is a demand and insufficient supply to meet that requirement. 
 
Available data indicates the supply of youth work graduates in Australia is not meeting 
workforce needs. For the reasons mentioned above, a labor market analysis that includes 
technical modeling projections which specify youth work is needed urgently. What is also 
needed is an analysis of the implications of that data for universities who are required to 
produce the graduates. 
 
 
Reasons for investment in university youth work programs  
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It seems clear that workforce audits and official reports also indicate a need for more tertiary 
qualified youth workers. We suggest that an approach of targeted investments and incentives 
is needed for the education of youth workers. 
 
It is worth noting that governments in Australia, like elsewhere, have been prepared to invest 
steadily to increase enrolments and improve retention in some occupational areas. Since 2009 
e.g., teaching and nursing received large increases in funding, plus incentives for graduates in 
those areas were provided (They had their compulsory Higher Education Loan Program 
(HELP) debt repayments significantly reduced) (Australian Government, 2009). Similarly, 
the Federal Government recently implemented a comprehensive suite of new measures to 
train and retain a qualified early childhood education workforce which included the allocation 
of new Commonwealth supported higher education places, recognition of prior learning 
packages, and HELP benefits (DEEWR, 2011c). Targeted funding to build the capacity of the 
mental health workforce also came in the form of funded higher education places, 
scholarships and curriculum development (Council of Australian Governments, 2006). 
Additionally, the Federal government committed $1.2 billion to secure an appropriately 
skilled and well qualified aged care workforce (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012). 
Likewise, due to the need for a national, coordinated approach to health workforce planning 
in 2009 the Council of Australian Governments established a new statutory authority, Health 
Workforce Australia, (Health Workforce Australia, nd). Clearly the connection between 
education and the workforce planning has not been lost, what seems to be missing is 
recognition of the need for young people to have access to quality professional youth work 
practice.  
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Quality youth work education enhances the well-being of young people by improving 
professional practice and contributing towards building a viable youth sector. We work on the 
assumption that nurturing the young person to enhance their life and improve prospects for a 
flourishing life is central to youth work. This rests on an interest in valuing the young person 
for their own sake rather than a means to an end (i.e. investment in human capital). It rests on 
a capacity to identify what a young person is good at along with an interest in drawing out 
and developing those abilities, while at the same time working to develop one’s own capacity 
to be a good practitioner. This requires qualities like self-control, critical thinking, a 
commitment to an ethics of care, along with an interest in and ability to access the requisite 
knowledge and skills to do the job well.  
 
Youth work is a professional practice informed by the idea that what is happening in the lives 
of young people can have a major impact, for better or worse, on their immediate and future 
lives. The rationale for investing in the education of practitioners is that it enhances the 
prospect that young people will have flourishing lives now and as they grow. And while 
youth work is not just for young people who find themselves in trouble, it certainly can and 
does ameliorate some of the negative effects of social problems like poverty, illicit substance 
abuse, homelessness and sexual abuse.    
 
Young people also move in and out of difficulty and for this reason the right degree of 
intervention at the right time can prevent the exacerbation of problems. Professional 
discretion and the capacity to be able to read a particular situation, to see what is going on 
and provide assistance before matters deteriorate is a critical youth work capacity. There is 
also an argument for investment in youth work education that calls on strategic even 
‘economistic’ arguments. Using this framework, we argue that failure to invest in youth work 
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in higher education is short sighted and does nothing to avert problems ‘down the track’ 
which could have been prevented as well as costly lost opportunities. 
 
Investment in youth work education is critical if some of the government’s key policy 
objectives are to be achieved. If the Commonwealth government is serious about ‘providing 
young Australians with the support they need to succeed’ and building the capacity of the 
youth sector, then measures are needed to support building an effective workforce (Australian 
Government, 2010). Investing in youth work education would also go a long way towards the 
supporting national initiatives like the Youth Connections Program which aims to support 
young people gain a year 12 or equivalent level education. It is a program that is more likely 
to succeed with young people identified as being ‘at risk’ if they are supported by qualified 
youth workers (DEEWR, 2011d). The same case can be made about governments’ targets for 
increasing student participation in higher education - particularly in respect to those from low 
socio-economic status backgrounds (Australian Government, 2009). Increasing numbers of 
university youth work graduates are recruited by schools and some universities to assist in 
this regard. Reforms to and significant investment in the National School Chaplaincy and 
Student Welfare Program has also increased demand for high-quality youth work training 
(DEEWR, 2012c). 
 
Investment in youth work education is also aligned with moves to professionalise youth 
work. The states of Victoria and Western Australia are leading the push with the 
establishment of professional associations and it is not surprising that in these jurisdictions 
university youth work programs are on offer. While VET certificates provide a good start, we 
argue that on their own they are not enough. If we want expert practitioners able and willing 
to play an active role in shaping the policy and practice landscape it is critical that they be 
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educated to critically assess what is happening and to act in ways oriented towards social 
goods as opposed to an exclusively competency based approach to practice.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In spite of the calls for improved professional service provision for young people, youth work 
in Australia has made little progress in building a qualified workforce. We have not yet seen a 
professional culture emerge or the organizational supports like those enjoyed by teachers, 
nurses, early childhood educators or various health professionals. Compared to the 
investments made in these industries, the financial commitment made to building the youth 
work workforce has been miniscule. It is a situation that is likely to get worse given the 
context of the student demand-led higher education policy model.  
 
We suggest that one way of encouraging university qualifications as a required standard is to 
regulate the sector with minimal educational credentials equivalent to those required in 
similar professions. Currently the credentials required are either no formal qualification or a 
TAFE certificate. This in conjunction with low wages, insecure employment, unclear career 
paths and low status is not conducive to building a strong sector or improving the prospect for 
programs in higher education. We argued that while competency-based training of the kind 
provided in TAFE offers an excellent beginning level training, on its own it is not enough. It 
needs to be complemented by education, ideally offered in a university program designed so 
as to provide learning experiences that equip graduates with the ability to make good 
judgment and to act according to those judgments.  
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Chapter 9: When things go wrong: A Reflection on Students as Youth Researchers 
 
For those of us who live and work in a “western” cultural frame we have long understood that 
ethical issues are practical issues. Aristotle (2009, p. 1) observed some time ago, “every 
[human] action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good” even as he acknowledged that 
people seem not always to agree about those goods. Several millennia later the philosopher 
Williams agreed that “moral conflict is a basic fact of mortality” as he also emphasized the 
ethical character of human practice (1976, iv). On both accounts ethical issues are central to 
the choices we make on a daily basis. Faced with possible differences of view about the 
goods that are at stake, Aristotle suggested that all we needed was to be a good person which 
entailed cultivating “practical wisdom” or what he called phronesis. By phronesis he meant 
“a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regards to human goods” (Aristotle, 2009, p. 
106). Like Aristotle, Williams (2006) argued there is no universal perspective in moral 
philosophy which can be used to determine what is right or wrong, good or bad, or which 
could discern moral values for us or arrive at ethical judgments. 
 
The point of these statements is underscored by the case we report on in this chapter which 
involved an undergraduate student research project in an Australian university which raised 
various ethical issues. The issues were more than normally complex because the activity 
involved research by young people (ie., undergraduate students) of other young people and 
was undertaken as part of an assessment activity. 
 
We begin with a description of the circumstances in which the ethical issues arose, and then 
identify the ethical issues and how they were dealt with before drawing out some of the 
broader implications. Only one of the authors was directly involved in the relevant program 
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at the time, and that person did not have a direct teaching role in the subject in question. That 
teacher and one of the other authors, who had had a role in the program, were implicated 
because they were repeatedly asked by students either for advice or to intervene to resolve the 
situation. The third author had taught into the program on an occasional basis and worked in 
the same school in which the program was housed, but had no direct involvement in these 
events at the time. Although, unlike the other chapters in this book, the ethical challenge we 
discuss here did not arise in the context of our own youth research, two of us were personally 
affected by the challenge and all of us have an interest in projects that involve undergraduate 
students as youth researchers.  
 
 
The Case 
 
The ethical issues arose in the wake of curriculum decisions taken by a senior academic who 
was charged with developing a new undergraduate subject in a professional human services 
program. In line with increasingly widespread practice in many universities, the academic 
adopted a Problem Based Learning (PBL) approach that required students to “design” and 
carry out a short research project which would be assessed. The project involved researching 
and writing a “field report” and required students to interview a young person whose cultural, 
linguistic and ethnic origins were different from their own. Students were informed that they 
would be assessed and graded in part on their choice of interviewee. The subject guide 
described how additional marks would be given if students interviewed young people from 
specified backgrounds. Extra marks would be given for (a) those who had recently arrived to 
Australia; (b) those with a refugee or asylum-seeker background; (c) those who were 
culturally different from mainstream Australia (e.g. Somalis were preferred to people from 
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Latin America); (d) those who had interesting aspects about their life and experiences as an 
immigrant or refugee. Students were required to write a report based on material they 
collected from the interviews and carry out further research on the “interviewee’s ethnic 
group and their country of origin”. The stated learning objectives of this assessment activity 
were: “to gain knowledge of the interviewee’s personal, family and cultural background, 
values, norms and religion”, “to obtain information about his or her personal situation in the 
interviewee’s country, their way of leaving and the circumstances of why they left”, and “to 
gain the interviewee’s impressions of Australia, reasons for migrating, and their positive and 
negative experiences of migrating”.  
 
The research aspects of the project involved designing questions, identifying an interviewee, 
carrying out an interview and writing up the results. Students were required to complete a 
Field Interview approval pro forma after they had identified an interviewee aged 18-35 which 
involved asking the prospective interviewee to complete and sign the form. Students had to 
collect identifying information about the person like their name, contact telephone number, 
age, country of birth, “cultural or ethnic background”, and “reason why they are in 
Australia”. This was not a conventional “plain language statement” or consent form of the 
kind normally required by Australian universities for research projects involving “human 
subjects”. Once the form was completed students had to give it to the teacher who used it to 
decide whether the student could proceed with the interviews. Students were instructed to use 
“false names” rather than the interviewee’s real name because of “issues of confidentiality”. 
There was no elaboration about what the confidentiality issues were in the assessment 
material provided to students in the subject guide. 
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This assessment activity quickly became the focus of an intensely contested process as many 
of the students objected to it. At the time, the issue of the Australian government’s policy of 
mandatory detention for all asylum seekers had become one of the most both divisive and 
bitterly contested political issues by the end of the first decade of the twenty first century 
(Marr and Wilkinson, 2004; Gewcock, 2010). Students were aware of this policy context, 
many were concerned about the status of asylum seekers and that a group they saw as already 
disadvantaged were identified as possible subjects of their research intervention which some 
believed would add to their burden. Students approached the academic in charge of the unit to 
raise their concerns, and subsequently also made a complaint to the university and used social 
media to attract media and public attention. Some sought assistance from refugee advocacy 
groups who responded by publicly highlighting what the assessment was problematic as it 
could cause distress to young refugees involved as interviewees.   
 
The contextual conditions of this case help explain why it occurred, First, the assignment was 
developed by a teacher new to the program area who we can only assume was less aware of 
the socio-legal and ethical issues and sensitivities that relate to undergraduate research 
projects with - or about - “at risk youth”. Second, the usual procedures of checking course 
outlines were disrupted due to re-structuring and budget cuts in the institution.  
 
The relevance of this case study lies in the ethical issues it highlights when university 
students are asked to act as youth researchers. Problem-based and experiential approaches to 
learning are increasingly common in degree programs across many universities. We explore 
the ethical challenges such projects can raise in the remainder of this chapter.  
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Ethical issues and dilemmas (i) 
 
Students raised a number of ethical issues about the assessment. Some felt the research 
activity especially involving asylum seekers was high risk and unethical. Many students 
believed that they had various moral and legal obligations to the people they were to 
interview and felt they were being required to do something that they felt ill-equipped to 
carry out and about which they felt deeply uncomfortable and should not be doing. Many 
asked whether they needed to get approval from the university ethics committee. It is 
noteworthy that students doing this assessment were not required to submit an ethics 
application to the relevant university Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) by the 
teacher, because they were undergraduates and because their assessment was not described as 
research. HRECs are responsible for reviewing human research in Australia that is identified 
as more than ‘low-risk’ (NHMRC, ARC and AVCC, 2007).  
 
Some students described the assessment as offensive and wrong. They formed the view that 
some of the young people identified as being “of interest” like refugees and asylum seekers 
would be susceptible to further harm arising out of the questions about their past and journey 
to Australia that were to be put to them in interview. This view has been supported by 
research. Cameron, Frydenberg and Jackson (2011, p. 46) for example have shown that 
young refugees in Australia “are at heightened risk of social exclusion and mental illness”. 
This is because they: 
‘…have frequently witnessed the violent death, injury, and/or abuse of family 
members, endured the disappearance and separation of family, and observed parental 
fear and panic…Their pre-flight and flight environments are commonly characterized 
by exposure to bombardments, protracted detention, child-soldier activities, physical 
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assault/injury, famine and sexual assault…Studies have consistently highlighted an 
increased prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety among 
young refugees compared to young people without refugee backgrounds’ (Cameron et 
al., 2011, p. 46). 
 
Hugman, Pittaway and Bartolomei (2011, p. 8) likewise argue that refugees who participate 
in studies of this kind: 
‘…are so desperate for any forms of assistance that they appear to agree to requests 
for participation in the hope that…[researchers] might be able to assist them in some 
tangible way.’ 
This research suggests that any intervention asking sensitive questions about refugee or 
immigrant experiences like why and how they left their country of origin increases the risk of 
interviewees becoming distressed triggering adverse emotional and psychological reactions. 
The failure to refer to this possibility, and the absence of safeguards in case interviewees did 
experience such trauma created a potential ethical problem. 
 
Some students were also concerned about issues of privacy: what were they to do with 
information that was private to the interviewees or that related to other people the interviewee 
discussed?  It is standard practice for the procedures of ethics committees to address issues of 
privacy and confidentiality, but for this undergraduate project students were not required to 
seek formal ethics approval. While this reduced the workload involved with the project, it 
also denied students access to a potential source of support for their ethical decision making. 
Some students were worried about their capacity or competency to carry out the project. 
Some expressed concerned about their obligations and capacity to explain to interviewees 
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what the interview was for, how the information they provided would be kept safe and what 
guarantees they could offer that it would not be passed on to other people. 
 
The identification of these issues pointed to a number of dilemmas for the students. They 
were obviously keen to pass the subject and to get a good grade. However, to do well and to 
increase their chance of doing so they needed to interview young people who fitted the high 
risk category identified in the course outline. Doing that raised a series of ethical issues for 
them, as outlined above. Some were aware of the power imbalance not only between 
themselves and their potential interviewees, but between themselves and the university. 
Bourdieu, Passeron and Martin (1994) provide an account of the “games of complicity” 
played between university teachers and their students. However, when things go wrong, 
while students may choose between "exit” and “voice” their objections, effectively they may 
only have the “exit” option (Hirschmann, 1970).  
 
 
Ethical issues and dilemmas (ii) 
 
The writers of this chapter most closely involved in the case as it unfolded would normally 
have supported the problem-based-learning (PBL) approach adopted. Indeed, engaging 
students in research projects has become an increasingly normal part of many university 
degree programs following decades of debate about whether it was best to enable students to 
“consume” research or to produce it (Burgess and Bulmer, 1981; Elton, 2001; Badley, 2002; 
Deem and Lucas, 2006). The slow advance of PBL seems to have confirmed the value of real 
life research practice in postgraduate and undergraduate education (Barron et al., 1998; 
Kinkead, 2003; Brew, 2003; Jolly, 2006). There is now general agreement that students are 
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likely to learn best about research when they actively doing it (Healey and Roberts, 2004; 
Healey, 2005). Apart from the ethical challenges due to the specific nature of the assessment 
task, two of the authors also formed the view that the assessment task in question was, in fact, 
a research activity and therefore should have been subjected to the normal research ethics 
approval procedures. 
 
The university in question had already decided that undergraduate and honours level research 
would be exempt from the requirement to seek formal approval from the relevant university 
ethics committees; something that did apply to certain kinds of research projects performed 
by post-graduates and academics. Nevertheless, NHMRC guidelines on undergraduate 
research require students to be adequately prepared for the task: “within the experience, 
qualifications and competence of students” (NHMRC, 2005, p. 2). Similarly, the Australian 
Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (the Code) emphasizes the importance of 
appropriate training, mentoring and supervision (NHMRC, ARC and Universities Australia 
(UA), 2007, p. 3.1). There is also a requirement that “…supervisors must ensure that the role 
model they provide to junior colleagues is positive and conducive to a research culture of 
excellence, integrity, professionalism and mutual respect” (NHMRC, ARC and UA, 2007, p. 
3.1).  
 
The authors who were contacted by students at the time, like those students were convinced 
that including young refugees or asylum seekers as research subjects was not a good idea. 
Likewise, they formed the view that the students had not been adequately prepared, 
supervised or supported to do what was required; the fact that students expressed the same 
misgivings about their capacity reinforced this view. There was also concern that students 
might be distressed and traumatized themselves when they heard stories of loss and suffering 
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from the young refugees or asylum seekers, or stories that were painful, or detailed criminal 
or disturbing events. They understood that professional counselors, psychologists and human 
service workers who work with young refugees and asylum seekers are typically required to 
undergo significant specialist formal education, and acquire a body of practical experience. 
According to Olitsky and Weathers (2005, p. 3) “a significant amount of ethics/politics needs 
to be deployed in the interpersonal sphere”, and “[t]here is a need for continual reflexivity 
and responsibility on ethical issues such as whether aspects of carrying out the research 
methods could potentially undermine the political/ethical aims of the study.” They highlight 
the need to ensure that interactions are informed by an ethics of caring (Olitsky and Weather 
2005, p. 19; Noddings, 1984). The approach described by Olitsky and Weathers (2005) 
affirms the need for ethical practice when carrying out interviews and research with refugees 
and other vulnerable groups. Hugman et al. (2011, p. 11) for example argue that, “the 
standard approach to research ethics is insufficient in work with refugees”, they suggest an 
“ethics of care” is needed to inform research involving vulnerable groups.  
 
The authors most directly involved in the situation believed they had ethical obligations to the 
students, the young people who would be interviewees and the university. We were also 
mindful of the contradictions facing students who were concerned about the assessment task 
but who also needed to complete and pass the assessment activity. We were mindful too of 
the power imbalance between students and academics and were of the view that it was never 
a good practice to make the bullets for students to fire. In the light of all these various 
considerations it was decided that the best course of action was to support students, as far as 
was possible, by providing a sounding board for their concerns and practical advice on how 
they might best complete the assessment in ways that the students were comfortable with and 
which would not cause harm to interviewees. Taking the idea of reflective practice seriously, 
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something which we teach our students meant that we saw value in writing up the case. 
Reflection on action outside the immediate context we believed provided an opportunity for 
organizational learning as well as a chance for better understanding ourselves. 
 
 
Learnings 
 
The case described here of a class of young people being asked to research other (vulnerable) 
young people raises issues rarely acknowledged or addressed in the literature on problem 
based learning (PBL). This is peculiar given there is a very large body of such literature, 
especially designed to elucidate and/or evaluate its advantages or disadvantages in relation to 
more traditional teacher-transmission or instructional pedagogies understood in terms of 
“effectiveness” or “learning outcomes” (Meyers and Jones, 1993; Savin-Baden, 2000; 
O’Neill, Moore and McMullin, 2005). There is a no less voluminous literature on the use of 
PBL to teach research design and methods. Added to this is a large literature on approaches 
to teaching ‘ethics’ and ‘applied ethics’ to students in a range of professional programs. 
 
Some of the literature does engage the value of experiential research classes to elicit 
responses by students to a range of ethical issues likely to arise in doing research or in their 
future professional practice (Goldie, et al., 2002; Gray, Bobbington and McPhail, 2006). 
These studies typically present hypothetical cases that describe relevant ethical issues, 
highlights ethical principles that could provide assistance in addressing these dilemmas, and 
make recommendations to academics who collaborate with students on scholarly projects 
(Fine and Kurdek, 1993; Simon and Alexander, 1997). These can be of use when planning 
PBL projects that engage students as youth researchers, both to design the project in such a 
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way that it is less likely to lead to the kinds of ethical challenges that were created in the case 
discussed here, and to help prepare students for unexpected ethical dilemmas. 
  
More common, however, is the way that Knowlton (2003) discusses the virtues of PBL in 
terms of developing “problem solving skills” and enabling “participation in the labour 
market”, even as it underpins a liberal arts education and enables the student to learn about 
the self. Even when studies acknowledge, as Olitsky and Weathers (2005) do, that there are 
ethical issues at stake when students act as researchers, they only point to the problem of 
unequal power between the researcher and the researched and not to the same issues in the 
relationship of teachers and students, where teachers require students to act as youth 
researchers.  
 
Our chapter therefore is some value inasmuch as it assumes there is a case for paying 
attention to the ethical nature of practices that engage undergraduate students (themselves 
mostly young people) as researchers of other young people. We suggest there are two main 
implications.  
 
The first implication is in relation to formal ethical approval procedures. Australian 
universities have a range of policies and practices relevant to the question of whether 
undergraduate assignments that involve research activities, like interviewing people, should 
require some kind of formal ethical oversight. At the Australian Catholic University’s (ACU) 
(2004) for example the Code of Conduct for Research applies to all research conducted by 
staff and students and aligns with the National Statement and the Code. The ACU (2010) 
requires “teaching demonstrations” and “teaching projects” involving human participants to 
seek and get ethical clearance. Similarly, the University of Technology Sydney (UTS, 2011) 
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has specific HREC guidelines for undergraduate work. In many other universities, not only in 
Australia but internationally, however this kind of policy is either absent or unclear.  
 
While there is always room for debate about categories (ie., was this a research activity or 
not?), we note that the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (National 
Statement), which offers a prominent guide to research in Australia states that: 
“…research…is widely understood to include at least investigation undertaken to gain 
knowledge and understanding or to train researchers” (NHMRC, ARC and AVCC, 2007, p. 
7). Prima facie it seems the assignment meets criteria for applying the category of “research”. 
It was an “investigation undertaken to gain knowledge and understanding” as detailed in the 
aims of the assessment. Indeed, it may be said that many essays or reports written by 
university students are “research” activities. When it is empirical and relies on direct contact 
with human beings or animals then it is likely that an extra level of ethical and legal issues 
arise.  
 
A further criterion of “research”, namely, “investigation undertaken…to train researchers”, is 
likewise relevant to a task which requires students to do interviews with the intent of 
exposing those students to this research method. As the NHMRC, ARC and AVCC (2007, p. 
8) explain, human research: 
‘…is conducted with or about people, or their data or tissue. Human participation in 
research is therefore to be understood broadly, to include the involvement of human 
beings through: taking part in surveys, interviews or focus groups…researchers 
having access to their personal documents or other materials’. 
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Similarly, the Code recognizes students can do research as part of assignments, and this 
research must align with the Code (NHMRC, ARC and UA, 2007, p. 2.1). The NHMRC 
(2005) guidelines on undergraduate research also makes it clear that undergraduate student 
research needs to undergo an ethics review and if the research involves more than low risk, as 
this assessment did, then it needs to be adequately scrutinized, approved and monitored by a 
HREC: 
‘The same principles … apply to design, review and conduct of [undergraduate] 
student research as to any research involving humans … The ethical issues raised by 
the National Statement need to be addressed and student research adequately 
scrutinized, whether at a full meeting of an HREC or in an expedited manner’ 
(NHMRC, 2005, pp. 1-2). 
 
We argue that any student research that involves moderate to high risk needs to undergo 
some form of “ethics insurance” or clearance. One option is to require “class clearance” that 
teachers or program coordinators apply for which requires the teacher to ensure students have 
specified knowledge and skills before they engage in the activity, and that this is integrated 
into the curriculum of the relevant subject/s.  More specifically, it would be useful if the 
requisite knowledge and skills go beyond proficiencies in developing student abilities in eg. 
drafting consent forms, interview techniques etc. and included (somewhere in their program) 
learning activities designed to develop their capacities to apply basic ethical practices on how 
to exercise “good judgment” in ways that are relevant to their project. 
 
We suggest this as a second implication, because we doubt that an ethics clearance on its own 
can produce the desired results because rules and regulations are not enough. Cases where 
codes of practice have been developed and yet the medical professional and experts of 
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various kinds have proceeded to cause considerable harm have been detailed in several 
publications (eg., Rothman, 1992; Goliszek, 2003; Annas and Grodin, 1992, p. 228). It is for 
this reason that we argue that adherence to rules and regulation as they relate to ethical 
research need to be complemented with an introduction to practical wisdom (Sharpe and 
Schwartz, 2010). “Practical wisdom” or good judgment requires us to think about what we do 
which relying on rules and policies only tends to inhibit.   
 
Schwartz and Sharpe (2010, p. 5) and Flyvbjerg (2001) have described the capacity for good 
judgment (phronesis) which was first discussed and elaborated by Aristotle (2009). Schwartz 
and Sharpe provide a valuable account of the relevant capacities which define phronesis 
including the ability to work out what is happening, to have the appropriate feelings about the 
case, to be able to deliberate about what is appropriate in the circumstances we confront, and 
then to do the right thing in the right way. In short, as Schwartz and Sharpe say, this is less 
about establishing rules or following policies and:  
‘…more about performing a particular social practice well – being a good friend or 
parent or  doctor  or soldier or citizen or statesman - and that meant figuring out  the 
right thing to do in the right way in a particular circumstance’ (Schwartz and Sharpe, 
2010, p. 5). 
 
Phronesis or “practical reason” calls for sensitivity to context, a capacity to know when and 
how we ought to act and in what measure. It rests on a sensibility to know what 
circumstances require the exercise of particular virtues and when those virtues need 
moderation so they do not become failings and the cause of harm (ie., courage becomes 
recklessness). This refers to the idea of the “golden mean” or balance when both too little 
(deficiency) and too much (excess) becomes a vice. Practical wisdom requires an ability to 
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grasp and recognize the significance of the experiences for the different people involved in a 
particular situation (eg., students, young refugees, relevant community sector organizations 
etc.). It entails a capacity to make adjustments in line with a clear and informed grasp of the 
various competing interests in a given context as well as understanding how those demands 
and interests change, and then being able to provide a measured response. For projects 
involving students as researchers of young people, this means time and effort is required to 
first develop their moral virtues and capacities, which they can then draw on if faced with 
ethical dilemmas in the course of doing their research. Many of the chapters in this book 
point to the limitations of formal ethical approval procedures. Arguably, then, the 
development of such phronesis is likely to be useful for all, young and adult, youth 
researchers.27 
 
 
  
                                               
27 The extent to which the students and authors of this chapter most closely involved in the situation exercised 
and demonstrated phronesis in their responses to the undergraduate research project is beyond the scope of this 
chapter and is worthy of further exploration. 
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Conclusion 
 
At the end of the second decade of the twenty first century people who work in the human 
services, and in universities as researchers or teachers involved in human services, tend to 
talk about professional practice in certain ways. There is much talk about the need to be 
relentlessly relevant, particularly to the ‘real world of work’, and claims that this can be 
achieved through engagement with industry and promoting work-readiness and the right kind 
of employability skills. There is advocacy for deep effective relationships, partnerships, 
connections, integrations and collaborations between local, regional and global end-users, 
stakeholders, external partners and governments. And this relates to calls for multi-trans-
cross-inter-disciplinary approaches. There are references to ensuring service user choice and 
control, and being person-centred, consumer-directed, individualised, flexible and co-
designed in ways that include seeking client feedback and acting upon customer satisfaction 
surveys. We hear that practice should be technical and scientific, or at least linked to STEM. 
For example, practice should be evidence-based or evidence-informed, and based on the 
correct application of generalized and transferable theory produced by rigorous scientific 
research. And human services should unquestionably embrace new and emerging 
technologies and leverage the possibilities afforded by digital transformations. There is much 
value placed on accessible usable data and metrics that test, calculate, measure, assess, 
capture, achieve and deliver practice that makes demonstrable and purposeful contributions, 
real world impacts, reportable outcomes and direct benefits such as real returns on 
investment, value-for-money, improvements to productivity and efficiency, and differences 
made to the economy. At the very least it is assumed or expected that practice will meet pre-
determined outcomes in the cheapest way possible. There is an insistence that practice be 
accountable, compliant, audited and sanctioned with the use of intricate service agreements, 
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work planning and case management processes, online record keeping and administrative 
systems, key performance targets and incentives, and tough penalties if practice does not 
conform and perform.  
 
As if that is not enough, we also see the effect of decades of neoliberal policy making. This is 
evident in ideas that practice should be innovative, entrepreneurial, agile and open to growth 
opportunities that can be realised by aligning and enhancing strategic capabilities, vision 
statements, mission objectives, human resources and organisational potential, with 
influential, transformational and digital leadership that governs for the future, and by 
effective organisational change management that promotes, for example, commitment, 
passion, resilience, versatility and adaptation. This connects to advocacy for practice to trust 
in free markets and be commercialized, marketized, privatized, and modelled on business to 
ensure it meets market needs and attracts increased private investment in competitive 
environments.  
 
Is this really how we should now think about practice in human services? In this thesis I have 
argued it is not. I argued that there are dangers with revealing practice in unquestioned 
common-sense, instrumentalized and marketized ways. I also argued that the prevailing ways 
practice is understood reproduce dominant ways of knowing and doing. This also 
presupposes these are the only way we can be, and conceal, overlook and ignore other and 
possibly better alternatives. Moreover, and drawing on Heidegger (2007b, pp. 225, 237), I 
argued that how practice in human services is revealed and spoken about is too often 
misguided and inadequate, or ignorant of how this practice should be understood.  
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I made the case that if we are serious about achieving good practice in human services then 
we need to think more clearly about what practice in human services is. I argued that there 
are other possibilities, other modes of being in the world, other ways of existing, and other 
kinds of knowing and doing that are better suited for thinking about human service practice 
compared to what is typically the case. I was moved by the clear thinking on practice 
presented by Aristotle and by Dunne who was inspired by Aristotle and who recommended 
articulating a theory of practice that features a defensible account of how we should 
conceptualise the stuff that human services deal with along with the sorts of knowing, 
actions, and ends that best accord with these kinds of entities. In effect I outlined the 
beginnings of a theory of practice for human services.  
 
That theory of practice is primarily neo-Aristotelian. I acknowledge that there are criticisms 
of returning to Aristotle and that there are criticisms of neo-Aristotelianism and virtue ethics 
in the social sciences and human services literature (Armstrong, 2007; Clifford, 2014; 
Fröding, 2013; Hursthouse and Pettigrove, 2016; Peters, 2013; Snow, 2018). For example, 
the most obvious criticism is that we cannot simply take an idea from approximately 2400 
years ago and transfer it to our age because times have changed, and the contemporary world 
is completely different to the world that Aristotle lived in. However, this criticism forgets the 
profound role Aristotle’s work has had on world philosophy and the enduring legacy of 
Aristotle’s thought, which Watts and I acknowledged (Emslie and Watts, 2017; see also: 
Derrida, 2001b, p. 100; Feyerabend, 2016, p. 158; Heidegger, 2007b, p. 219, 2003, p. 7; 
Hetherington et al., 2018; Kirkland and Sanday, 2018, pp. xiii-xv).  
 
Another criticism suggests that we should not return to Aristotle for intellectual inspiration. 
For example, there is much in Aristotle’s (1981) Politics to raise eyebrows and to incite ire 
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and derision in the twenty first century like his justification of slavery and subordination of 
women. These are objectionable positions and should be contested and dismissed as 
unacceptable. However, these aspects of his Politics can be refused without rejecting the case 
he makes outright. Following Plato (2007), Aristotle made the case that the right kind of 
political rule was needed for the good life and he clearly linked his Nichomachean Ethics 
(Aristotle, 2009) and Politics (Aristotle, 1981), insisting they be read together. And similar to 
Plato, a valuable and enduring thing Aristotle makes clear in these works is the important 
connections between people living a good life and the city or political community (polis) in 
which they live supporting and enabling this to take place.  
 
A further criticism of returning to Aristotle that is suggested by Arendt (1958), Feyerabend 
(2016), Gadamer (2004), Heidegger (1977), Tabachnik (2013) and Toulmin (2003) is that the 
problems we have with modern thought and practice are a legacy of, have their origins in, or 
at the least coincide with a key idea of Ancient Greek philosophy, which begins with Thales 
and culminates in Plato and Aristotle. This problem can be understood as the privileging of 
theoretical over practical forms of knowledge and action. One way this is demonstrated in 
modern times is in the technical rational relationship between theory and practice. In Ancient 
Greece it was evident in the elevation of sophia and theoria over phronesis and praxis 
(Aristotle, 2009). These comparable accounts on the superiority of theoretical over practical 
ways of knowing and doing intersect with both epochs sharing an incessant interest in, search 
for, and valorisation of the eternal (as enduring and everlasting), suprasensory, permanent, 
infinite and always over and above the fleeting, sensory, temporary, inconsistent and 
changeable. Gadamer (1975) offers a compelling critique and Arendt (1958) a radical 
reversal of this state of affairs, and they are not alone in doing just that. According to 
Toulmin (2003, p. 186); 
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‘Kierkegaard, Emerson, and Nietzsche clearly accept the primacy of…phronesis 
(practical prudence) over episteme (intellectual grasp) as differentiating moral good 
sense from any rationalistic commitment to a formal theory of Ethics’.  
Somewhat paradoxically the criticisms of the preference for theoretical over practical forms 
of knowledge and action typically draw on Aristotle’s account of different ways of knowing 
and doing. It is precisely because Aristotle - or at least Aristotle (2009) as interpreted, 
translated and appropriated through history - offers such a compelling account of different 
possibilities of human being that many modern thinkers have mined his work. I agree that we 
cannot undo over two millennia of history and restart from Aristotle. However, as I have 
argued there is a case for working with what Aristotle has written because it has much to 
offer thinking about practice in human services.  
 
Maybe one of the biggest challenges associated with returning to Aristotle and pursuing an 
Aristotelian inspired theory of human service practice is provided by Aristotle (2009, p. 36) 
when he argued, ‘it is no easy task to be good…goodness is both rare and laudable and 
noble’. Aristotle makes these claims while explaining how difficult it is to find the mean in 
passions and in actions in each instance that the exercise of moral virtue is warranted. In 
other words, if acting according to virtue is ‘rare’ and ‘no easy task’ then can human beings 
be relied on to do the right thing and do praxis guided by phronesis? This point is particularly 
pertinent given the neoliberal technical contexts in which human service practice take place 
are not conducive to the forms of practice I am arguing for and instead are inclined to 
promote good practice as practice that defers to and aligns with de-contextualised obligations, 
rules and techniques or to the consideration of certain interest-laden consequences such as 
securing a national interest or a common good. Moreover, when ethical considerations are 
taken into account, good practice in human services is typically conceived and pursued 
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according to deontological and consequentialist inspired applied ethical approaches to 
practice. Aristotle provides a different normative account of ethics compared to deontology 
and consequentialism that is based on an account of what the human being is and what is 
good for the human being – the human being is capable of excellence or virtue and pursuing 
and exercising virtue is what is good for the human being. I have drawn on Aristotle’s ethics 
to provide a conceptualisation of good practice in human services and more work is needed to 
ground this theory of practice in ways that make the ‘task to be good’ and ‘goodness’, as 
characterised by Aristotle, easier and more common in human service practice.  
 
Pawar, Hugman, Alexandra and Anscombe (2017) similarly argue for cultivating and 
promoting virtues and ethical character for effective social welfare practice in their collection 
of biographical stories from practitioners. Aristotle provides ideas on how to nurture and 
support good practice-as-praxis guided by phronesis; for example, and as I argued the theory 
of practice needs to be connected to and backed by corresponding educational and 
institutional processes and arrangements. It is also possible that an interpretive framework 
grounded in an Aristotelian inspired practical ethics could assist with developing the practical 
relevance of my research. Moreover, further work is needed to explore how the ideas I am 
advocating for could be brought into the ‘real world’ of practice and to help bring these ideas 
to each case of practice. This work could include phenomenological studies in specific fields 
of human service practice to identify the possibilities and constraints of realising good 
practice-as-praxis guided by phronesis ‘on-the-ground’. It could also include further 
consideration on how curriculum could be reframed to make good practice-as-praxis guided 
by phronesis possible. At the same time care needs to be taken when translating my 
conceptualisation of good human service practice into practice to avoid it being co-opted, 
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appropriated, integrated and absorbed by neoliberal technical institutional arrangements as 
another ‘effective technique’ that ‘improves efficiencies’ and ‘enhances productivities’.  
 
Continuing to subject the questions I ask in this thesis to the force of Aristotle’s thinking 
could reveal more possibilities for knowing and doing practice and good practice in youth 
and community work. And this could include exploring the implications of Heidegger’s 
radically different interpretations of Aristotle compared to conventional accounts.  
 
There is also value in thinking further about human service practice in a post-Heideggerian 
way, which could involve the type of ethical ideas I pursued in this thesis. This thinking 
would not just be post-Cartesian. Heidegger had already made this move. Heidegger 
criticised and distinguished himself from Descartes and the Cartesian legacy that, as I argued 
in this thesis, continues to prevail in how we think about and how we know and do practice in 
human services. According to Heidegger human beings are not first and foremost subjects 
that encounter objects and make them meaningful as a result of such encounters; instead 
human beings are always already Being-in-the-world, and by world he does not mean 
spatiotemporal world as understood by modern science but world as in meaning (Sheehan, 
2018a, 2018c, 2017, 2014a). To put this another way human beings, as hermeneuts or beings 
that cannot avoid and must make meaning, are always already entangled with phenomenon or 
what is meaningfully present, and only by Being-in-the-world can a subject (human) 
apprehend an object (other). Heidegger suggests that human beings cannot escape meaning 
and are always already in relations of correspondence between encountering phenomenon 
and making sense.  
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Heidegger did not explore the ethical implications of his philosophy, whether we think of this 
as phenomenology, fundamental ontology or metametaphysics (Emslie and Watts, 2017; 
Heidegger, 1993). At the same time however, because Heidegger’s work has a radically 
imaginative account of human being at its heart it offers possibilities for thinking about 
human action, and this includes human service practice, in profoundly new ways. One 
implication of this thinking that I pursued in this thesis is that we should think about, assess 
and judge the (neoliberal technical rational) significance we always already bring to beings. 
Another is that there are other and better possibilities of making sense of the beings of human 
services compared to those that prevail. I make the case for an alternative, and there is a need 
for further work on identifying and nurturing the political and collective conditions that 
would support the identification with and enactment of human service practice that I 
imagined, especially because prevailing neoliberal technical rational frameworks are hostile 
to the dispositions I am trying to promote.  
 
Many authors are intrigued by the ethical and political implications of what Heidegger wrote 
and these insights could contribute to the project I am proposing (Agra, 2016; Benso, 1994; 
Brencio, 2016; Brook, 2009; Buckley, 2002; Emslie and Watts, 2017; Haugeland, 1982; 
Hodge, 1995; Lewis, 2005; Nancy, 2002, 2008; Olafson, 2007; Poleshchuk, 2010; Raffoul 
and Pettigrew, 2002; Ross, 2002; Sandel, 2014; Sepulveda, 2011; Webb, 2011; Wendland, 
Merwin and Hadjioannou, 2019). The fact that Heidegger was deeply inspired by Aristotle 
and in particular the Nichomachean Ethics suggests that further thinking through the practical 
implications of his insights could connect with the work I do in this thesis and inspire novel 
understandings and forms of human service practice in the twenty-first century.  
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